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CANADA

AND

SEA POWER

BY

CHRISTOPHER WEST

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INTRODUCTORY.

THE political relations of Canada to Great Britain and to the other dominions of the Empire are in some respects just ready to be re-shaped, in other respects they seem to be without form, and a certain darkness is on the face of the deep.

One of the grave questions now before us is, What is the duty of Canada to the world upon the sea?

Soon—perhaps all too soon—the thoughts of the people will descend from the realm of airy speculation and become incarnated into national action. It is a fearful thing to think that the course steered by Canada in this sea of doubt may mean the downfall of Empires. Or our ship of state may be a pilot leading other nations into yet uncharted but less troubled waters.

If ever there was a time when we should ask Him, to whom the sovereignty of the sea belongs, for wisdom and open-mindedness, that time is now. We shall do well if we first empty ourselves of our prejudice in order that enough of this wisdom may flow in to lead us to a safe decision. Every lover of his country should seek to get at this truth at whatever cost to national pride. It is thus that we may serve the best interests of the world, for the British Empire is not worth preserving unless it is a faithful trustee for a better ordered civilization.

Taking a backward glance at their history, the Canadian people may say they have not wounded any

nation's self-respect by wars of aggression. Indeed, if it had not been for the one exception of the Boer war they could wear the white flower of a blameless national life, for all their other wars have been waged in the defense of their own soil. They may be humbled with the thought that by a special Providence rather than their own superior nature they have been blessed with a national record clean from aggressive violence. They should have the consciousness, at once inspiring and sobering, that the next leaf to be turned over in their history will display an example for the other British dominions to be followed to their common shame and misfortune, or to their happiness and honor.

New forces are gathering in international affairs, and the suggestions and facts of this book are presented in the hope that they may lead fellow-Canadians to a closer study and a better understanding of these forces.

PART I.—THE ECONOMICS OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

EVOLUTION OF MODERN INDUSTRY—DIVISION OF LABOR AND ITS EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

WAR, and more particularly naval war, may be considered from three aspects: first, the economic or industrial; second, the political or international; and third, the moral or spiritual.

In considering the economics of war let us for the time divest ourselves of nationality and race, and approach the problem with the mind of one seeking only to discover the effects of the changes now operating before our eyes in the business and industrial world.

Canada, having no navy of her own construction, has not established those special industries by which modern navies are built. We will, therefore, have to go to such a country as Great Britain to learn the economic relationship of these industries to the people and the government. Since the days when the primeval oak forests of Britain were ravaged to build the wooden walls of the fleets of Drake and Nelson, navy building has undergone a remarkable transformation. The highest skill of the metallurgist, the most ponderous tools and most powerful machinery employed in any branch of engineering, the most expert mechanics and the most skilful designers are all called in to assemble the component parts of a battleship, cruiser, torpedo destroyer or submarine, and when ready for sea these ships can

only be trusted to the most intelligent engineers, the ablest commanders and the bravest and most devoted crew the country can furnish. They assemble the best mental, physical and material endowment a nation possesses, and then, on occasion and at the call of some man or men, whether inspired by duty or instigated by motives of ambition, political power, greed of trade or mere enmity, use these wonderful instruments of material power to destroy the like works of human genius built by some other nation and manned by equally capable and equally devoted men—men on both sides who but a week before may have exchanged friendly salutes or sat at the same table singing the same song of home and loved ones. And yet, such is the intimacy of the trade and social connections between the more civilized modern nations that the successful bombardment and blockade of a seaport might inflict as much damage on the trade of the blockading nation as upon the blockaded, throwing as many hands out of work and causing as much suffering among the people owning the victorious fleet as among the enemy. Moreover, the financial loss might be even greater on the side of the victor, owing to the extent and ramifications of its foreign investments.

These are changes that have come about within the last four decades unrealized by most men, and they open a new chapter in the history of the great nations. Of a certainty, they tend to diminish the factor of physical force in international politics and some students think they will soon close the last chapter in the long history of wars of conquest.

We need not go far into economic history to understand that profound changes have in recent years taken place in the methods of providing for our wants. Men not yet past middle age can remember when the older provinces of Canada were dotted with "custom" woolen mills, whose owners took wool from the farmer to spin and weave, returning it as finished cloth to

the farmer. These are now practically extinct, and even the farmer whose ancestors spun their yarn on the hand spinning-wheel and wove it on the hand-loom, now buys clothes made up in a big factory, and if the cloth were imported it would have passed through half a dozen processes in as many different mills, not one of which had any direct connection with the man who raised the wool. At the same period there were also hundreds of small grist mills grinding wheat with the old "upper and nether millstones," taking wheat from the farmer and returning it to the farmer without any money passing between them in the transaction; now the farmer takes his grain to the elevator, and sees no dusty miller, but goes to the store for his flour, which has been ground with steel rolls and refined with elaborate machinery in a mill capable of producing five thousand barrels of flour a day. So, also, there were in every village a blacksmith, wagon-shop and foundry, where the farmer might get every implement for his farm use made or repaired; now the village foundry and machine shop is in ruins, and the implements the farmer uses may come from a dozen different shops, each making, perhaps, but one or two classes of implement. The town or village of to-day, therefore, is no longer a self-contained unit, but trades and industries have been divided up, each one confined to special lines, and each depending on neighboring towns for the things it does not itself produce. This process has gone on in the mechanical industries, in the trades and professions, and even in the field of finance. Not only has this division and specialization of labor gone on through the territory of each industrial nation, making each class and each district dependent on the reciprocal work of the other, but, in spite of the obstruction of tariffs and of national prejudices and of differences in methods and customs, the same interdependence between one nation and another is resulting from the special advantages

gained by each nation according to the skill or genius of its people or their particular natural resources. This is well illustrated in the present economic relations of Britain and Germany, which two nations, by a strange perversity of purpose, are each arming with an eye on the other at a time when they have come to need each other's co-operation most.

The British Isles (referred to in trade matters as the United Kingdom) require to buy from Germany almost as great an amount of goods as Russia and France put together, while from the German standpoint the United Kingdom stands first in importance, the trade with the United Kingdom being greater than with the three chief land neighbors, Russia, France and Austria-Hungary. Germany sells to the United Kingdom more goods than she does to the United States, Canada, Argentina and Brazil put together. In some lines of goods Germany ships to Great Britain more than she does to all other countries in the world. For instance, over two-thirds of the German export of sugar goes to the British Isles. Nearly half of the export of German woolen hosiery and a quarter of the export of German cotton hosiery goes there also, and there is something very striking about the industrial relationship of the two countries in this and many other particular trades. A large and increasing proportion of the hosiery, lace and woven goods branches of the textile trades consist of goods which are exported by Germany to England and by British makers to Germany in a partially manufactured state to be dyed with the excellent German dyes, or to be further manufactured or finished, and then re-exported to each other or to foreign countries. The conditions of the industry in each country, the adaptability of the operatives and the differences in machinery all combine to render this interchange of work a mutual advantage, until it has come to pass that without such co-operation neither the British nor Ger-

man manufacturers of these goods could hold their trade in some foreign markets for a single year. The same relationship holds good in the iron and steel trades, in the electrical industries, in the engineeering and chemical trades and other fields, where in the many stages of manufacture the workers in one country are the necessary complements of the workers in the other country to bring the fabric or machine to completion. Little as some people may realize it, there are hundreds of special industries in each country which would be paralyzed if this interchange and co-operation were cut off by war or the stoppage of international trade by any other cause. The severance of trade between the industrial cities of Britain and Germany would in a single month reduce hundreds of thousands—perhaps millions —of workmen and workwomen on both sides to starvation unless they were fed and clothed by the state, which in turn would ruinously raise the cost of the conflict and hasten a condition of anarchy and bankruptcy. This industrial inter-dependence applies in increasing ratios between other manufacturing nations, but it is so ramifying between Great Britain and Germany, and affects the welfare of such a vast number of workers and vast variety of trades that a war between these two countries would now be a quarrel between a man's right arm and his left. That this is so will be plain to anyone who examines the export and import figures of the two countries and traces up the destination of these various products

CHAPTER II.

MODERN INDUSTRIALISM AS A CHECK ON AGGRESSIVE WAR.

AS Sheffield depends for its trade upon Birmingham, the shipbuilding industries of the Clyde and many other centres using iron and steel, and in turn the industries of these centres upon the thrift of the textile industries of Yorkshire and Lancashire cities, so in a wider range of supply and demand the products in which each nation excels by reason of climatic conditions and natural facilities—such, for instance, as the humid atmosphere and the purity of water, which give special advantages to the cotton and woolen manufacturing in Lancashire and Yorkshire—now renders the great industries of one nation a counterpart of those of its neighbor. Whether they seek it willingly or are compelled by the superior organization or better facilities of their rivals, those engaged in certain industries provide work for, and are becoming more dependent on, the related workers elsewhere. Each industry changes its methods of production and seeks its markets in the easiest way and to get the best results in output and profit. As it is with those who work with labor, so it is with those who work with money. Capital flows across international boundaries and pays no duties, and even governments which seek to control banking operations, as in France,* cannot always effectively do so. This was illustrated in the recent relations of France,

* The Syndicat des Agents de Change in France does not authorize the official quotation of a security on the Paris Bourse without the express sanction of government.

Germany and Russia. Declining to lend money to Germany, France lent freely to Russia for industrial and other purposes, but the very industries established in Russia with French capital at once developed industries in Germany with which those new Russian industries became naturally associated.

On the side of Germany it was the purpose of Bismarck, by the war of 1870-1, to "bleed France white," and in exacting the enormous war indemnity he thought he would accomplish his purpose, but he lived to see France revived and prosperous at a time when Germany was suffering general depression. When the war was planned German industry did not depend on either French money or French grain and produce, but a radical change has come over the scene since then. The change is outlined as follows in a paper by Norman Angell (author of the "Great Illusion") before the Institute of Bankers, of London:—

"After forty years came another Franco-German conflict; once more the armies were face to face, and a German statesman stood in Bismarck's place, basing his policy on the Bismarckian philosophy, with these advantages over his predecessor, that where Bismarck represented a Germany of forty millions confronting a France of the same number, Herr von Kiderlen Waechter represented a Germany of sixty-five millions against a France of thirty-eight millions—a Germany which had had forty years of political union and severe discipline. But there was no war. Where Bismarck could have bled France white without any immediate damage to his own country, Herr von Kiderlen Waechter (I am told to his surprise) learned that to do so would plunge this great and powerful Germany into the direst economic distress. He learned, still more to his surprise apparently, that of the twenty million souls added to German population since 1870 nearly all of them were dependent upon foreign food, and gained

their livelihood from industries dependent to a large extent upon foreign capital, most of it French and English capital, and that if by some magic the Bismarckian dream of wiping France economically from the map of Europe could be realized, he would have been prevented —and, indeed, was prevented—from doing so, not by any consideration of French welfare, but by the very pressing necessities of German industry, and by the direct influence of German financiers and German business men. The very threat of it was enough. Did it leak out that German demands had become inacceptable, there was a slump on the Berlin Bourse, and some German industrial bank closed its doors; did the German Jingoes talk of the imminence of war, the bank rate moved up a point, and some considerable German house went into insolvency. I could trace a chart establishing the direct relationship between the 'vigor' of German foreign policy and the figures of German commercial insolvency."

This relates to the Morocco incidents of the summer of 1911, and if the reader refers to the financial papers of the time he will see that it was only by the assurance given by the Foreign Office at Berlin in reply to the anxious enquiries of banks, such as the Deutsche Bank, the Berlin Handelsgesellschaft, the National Bank and the house of Bleichroeder, that more serious trouble was averted. Only last November the cables also reported the failure of German banks when there were rumors of mobilization on the frontiers of the Balkan states. This aspect of the problem will be discussed farther on.

CHAPTER III.

THE DIVISION OF LABOR CREATES THE MODERN NAVY INDUSTRY, AND ITS PRODUCT IS A STATE WITHIN A STATE.

THE reader will now see that a modern manufacturing nation is no longer a self-contained unit, living, in an industrial sense, in almost complete independence of its neighbor nations as in former times, but that, in spite of tariffs and national exclusiveness, the specialization of skilled labor tends to make one nation a counterpart of the other, and that even the same industries tend to establish a mutually beneficial interchange of work across national frontiers. From the same causes the building of warships and other armaments has become a specialized industry, but with this vital difference: that the products of the armament industry, when used, are not for the mutual benefit of the workers of neighbor nations, but for their injury or destruction, and the greater the mutual distrust, hatred or jealousy between nations, the more the armament business thrives and the greater the profits of its shareholders. There is another marked difference between the two classes of industry: in the interchange of the products of peaceful labor the laborers and their related trades are both buyers and beneficiaries, while in the case of armaments the purchasers are a group of men whom some nations clothe with the powers of Deity, and who may —at a word, and on a point of "honor," which might be two-thirds pride and one-third jealousy—take the money and resources gathered by the sweat of millions and sweep them away in one deluge of blood and destruction.

Note, further, that the companies who invite people to participate in the profits of the armament industry have among their shareholders admirals, commanders

and captains, whose opinions may determine the next new expansion of a naval programme; major-generals and generals and other officers of the army whose advice is sought by governments; bishops and ministers of all denominations, whose investments would be profitless if their preaching of good-will were earnest enough to bring about a general reduction of armaments. This industry is referred to as follows by F. W. Hirst, editor of the "Economist," in a paper on the "Policy and Finance of Modern Armaments":—

"Perhaps the most modern and peculiar thing of all is the growth of private companies for supplying impartially home and foreign governments with the means of destroying one another. Some of these concerns are truly international. Their secrets and patents are sold to foreign governments. Their agents travel abroad, urging other countries to arm themselves to the teeth. They even establish factories on foreign soil, so that their operations abroad involve corresponding preparations at home. They thrive, and well they may, for since the war of 1870 there has been a period of unrestricted competition in armaments. In this competition Great Britain has been one of the principal pace-makers, sharing this doubtful honor with Germany and the United States. The only limitations set upon international rivalry have been the taxable capacity of nations, and their ability to raise loans. Mr. Lloyd George's budget found favor as the 'People's Budget,' not so much because it fleeced the rich as because it was associated with old-age pensions. But it was really the greatest Armor Plate Budget of modern times. The merest tyro in finance must be well aware that but for Mr. McKenna's additions to the naval estimates and the continued extravagance of the War Office practically no additions to taxation would have been required. . . . This is the direct consequence of armaments. Those who elect to run in this race must expect to carry

heavier and heavier burdens in the future. . . . We are spending the whole produce of the income tax upon the navy. It is now costing forty-four millions. In the last three years Germany has added three millions and we have added twelve. We have now reached a point, I submit, at which there must be either mutual limitation or definite daily preparations for a ruinous war—a ruinous war about nothing at all—a war out of which the cleverest man in this room could find no national advantage—a war which would send Consols below 60, which might end by doubling the national debt and throwing half the population out of employment."

The development of machinery and inventions and the division of labor by the factory system have revolutionized the building of modern armaments as they have the conditions of peaceful industry. The wooden walls of Nelson's time have disappeared from the sea, and the hardy sailors of old are succeeded by the deck-hand and the mechanic. The oak hulls have given way to ironclads, and ironclads to nickel-steel armor plates, which have in turn been made thicker and tougher as the penetrating power of heavy projectiles increases, and still the contest between heavy armor and heavy guns goes on, while aeroplanes, waterplanes, submarines and torpedo boats are developed to complicate the problem of defense and attack. When, therefore, people talk of using the fishermen of our maritime provinces for the creation of a Canadian naval service they forget that the men most essential on a modern warship are not the old salts of bygone days, but skilled mechanical specialists.

And here is a fact of significance, that as the cost of armaments increases, so the number of nations who want to have navies also increases, for there is scarcely a country having the smallest patch of sea coast, from Great Britain downward, that has not in the past year either built or bought war vessels.

CHAPTER IV.

EUROPEAN NAVAL EXPANSION AND THE "YELLOW PERIL."

THE truth of the abnormal expansion of navy building in general is admitted and deplored. There is no need of piling up statistics to prove this, but a few facts will bring the situation before those readers who have given little or no study to the effects of this development on the finance and industry of a country.

The expenditure of Great Britain upon her navy in 1857 was £10,590,000, in 1897 it was £20,850,000, in 1907 £31,251,000, and in 1912-13 it is officially estimated at £45,075,000. In the short space from 1909 to 1912 the number of men employed in the navy increased from 127,968 to 137,500 [the programme for 1914 will require 200,000 men], and so great is this drain upon the best blood and brain of the nation that the National Committee on Sea Training, at its conference in October, calls attention to the decline of trained seamen and the decrease of British seamen on British ships—a decline which the report shows has "awakened in the public mind a feeling of deep apprehension." This report refers primarily to the mercantile marine, but its effect on the problem of recruits for the navy is well recognized, and is emphasized by the present difficulty of getting trained seamen, though the discipline of the service has been relaxed and the pay increased.

Germany has increased her naval expenditure from £9,530,000 in 1901 to £22,609,000 in 1912-13, the personnel of the German navy being increased in that period from 31,157 to 66,783 men; France from £13,802,000 in 1901 to £18,090,000 in 1912, the personnel

being 53,324 in the first year and 60,621 in the last. The Russian naval expenditure in 1901 was £9,359,000 and in 1912 £17,681,000, with no increase in the personnel; Italy, from £4,912,000 in 1901 to £8,566,000 in 1912, with increase of personnel from 26,750 to 33,095 men. Austria's naval expenditure in 1901 was £1,821,000 and in 1912 it was £5,841,000, the personnel increasing from 9,069 men to 17,581. The figures of United States naval expenditure, reduced to sterling money, were £16,012,000 in 1901 and £26,540,000 in 1912, the personnel increasing from 33,351 to 64,780.

In view of the fear excited in the public mind by the talk of "the yellow peril" it is instructive to compare these figures with the development of the only Asiatic naval power. Japan's naval expenditure in 1901 was £4,485,000 and in 1912 £9,461,000, the personnel being 30,412 men in 1901 and about 50,000 in 1912. So that if we take the figures of the five naval powers before named and take no account of the navies of the smaller white nations we have an expenditure of £144,402,000 by the white naval powers against £9,461,000 by the strongest navy owned by any yellow nation, the personnel of the five nations being 427,360 against a Japanese personnel of 50,000. These five western naval powers are spending sixteen times as much on naval armaments and have eight and a half times as many men in naval service as the leading naval power representing the yellow races; and their increase has been greatest in the last three or four years, while Japan's increase in expenditure has been least, though further increases are proposed next year. If we exclude the United States from consideration, and then take the cost of both armies and navies, we find that Japan spends £20,000,000 a year, while united Europe alone spends over £340,000,000 on armies and navies. And yet, notwithstanding this moderation in naval construction, the economic conditions of Japan, due to the

crushing burden of taxes brought about by war, are ominous, indeed. In August last the semi-official "Japan Times" published an article which, considering the standing of the paper, contains a remarkable confession of the conditions of the people. Portions of this article are here quoted:—

"The cost of living keeps going up; no one seems to be able to reach out his hands to bring the steadily ascending balloon to the ground; people helplessly watch its course and gasp. At the same time poverty walks about at large and the miseries of life increase. Above all, the heads of families of the laboring class seem to have the worst allotment of miseries and torture. Many of them are daily deserting their wives and families. The laboring men cannot support their families with the scanty wages they get. The little storekeepers find it impossible to balance their ledgers with the credit ahead of the debit, and are universally discouraged by dull business. At home their wives need money, and their children are simply crying aloud from starvation. The hard-pressed and miserable husbands go out in the morning to search for work, and many of them never return again at night. Daily the charity lodging-houses are crowded by women and children begging a night's lodging, to drift away the next morning, to return again at night starving. Many of them are sick, husbandless and fatherless, penniless and homeless. Some of them follow the paths of their husbands to death.

"The general hard times in Japan are making themselves felt in ways that mean increased difficulties for the Government. The heavy increase in crime means increased outlay on prisons and prisoners' food. The number of suicides is also rather alarming, whilst the persistent strikes and threats to strike can only be satisfactorily settled by the payment of at least living wages. At the present time 20,000 hands at the Koishikawa and other arsenals are agitating for rises. The circumstances

in the arsenals are rather peculiar. At the end of last year it was ordered that the employees in the arsenals should wear rough uniforms on the Western model, and that these should be commenced from April 1st, to be supplied by the men themselves. Owing to the scant pay the authorities had to postpone the enforcement of the order until October 1st, as it was absolutely impossible for the men to obtain the uniforms by savings from their wages. Now it has again been found necessary to permit the men to keep their kimonos until April 1st in next year. Naturally, all the men are asking for higher wages, and it is difficult to know how the Government are going to avoid such a solution

"All these little problems are such as complicate the plans which Marquis Saionji and Mr. Yamamoto have in hand for the reform of the administration and of the finances. Their task is further endangered by the jealousy of the various departments, who are anxious to see any retrenchments they may effect applied to their own departments. For example, the War Department are glad, nay, anxious, to retrench on condition that the money thus saved is spent on the two new divisions for Korea. In the same way the Navy Department hasten to audit their books and cut off twopence in order that the cash thus gained may be spent on the naval expansion scheme which is to be put in hand next April."

CHAPTER V.

MARVELLOUS GROWTH OF THE BRITISH ARMAMENT INDUSTRY AND ITS BEARING ON THE INDUSTRIAL EQUILIBRIUM OF THE COUNTRY.

THE situation in Japan will serve to show how, when a country's economic powers are unbalanced by undue war expenditures, the social and moral balance is also upset in consequence—a problem which will be further considered in another chapter.

We have seen how, owing to inventions, machinery and other influences, the occupations of mankind in highly civilized states have become more and more specialized and diversified, and this specialization has given to armaments themselves a new character and meaning. The building of armaments, and especially warships, has become a "business" and an "interest" in recent years; and in no country in the world has it reached such perfection of detail, or demanded such application of man's highest mental faculties, or attained such influence in state policy as in Great Britain. This has naturally followed from Great Britain's position as an island, yet lying close to the military powers of Europe; and from the efficiency of her navy in defeating the Spanish Armada, and, at a later date, in saving these islands from the invasion by Napoleon.

From being a nation which, in the middle and latter part of last century, contributed to the world its largest share of manufactures used in the arts of peace, she has become the world's largest maker of implements for destroying human life. In addition to making the materials and equipment of her own navy, the British armament makers now furnish about 75 per cent. of the naval equipment of all the other nations of the

world. This is a fact of grave import, and how it bears upon the naval policy of these other nations and of Great Britain herself will be made more clear in discussing the political aspect of the problem.*

The business, though radically changed and grown to huge proportions in comparatively few years, has not been built up in a day. The iron industry of Sheffield, which figures so largely in the armor plate department of the navy, is at least a thousand years old, and generations of skilled English workmen have succeeded generations in building up the industry to its present status. As an instance of the growth of the business one firm, which was established over fifty years ago, and was the first to make armor plate, has increased the area of its works twelvefold, but its output has increased a hundredfold in value (from £40,000 to £4,000,000 per annum), and the quantity of output from 5,000 tons per annum to 100,000 tons. It now employs in its various departments 20,000 hands. Another firm, since it was converted into a joint stock company six years ago and turned on to naval work, has doubled its capacity. It now employs from 10,000 to 12,000 hands. It is the largest establishment in the city in which it is located, and over half its workmen are continuously employed on warships. Some firms have branches in which heavy guns and other fittings for war vessels are made, and can from their own yards

* In December, 1912, it was announced from Madrid that a new naval programme had been decided on by Spain, to comprise three Dreadnoughts, two of the latest types of destroyers, nine torpedo boats and three submarines, and it was boasted that "all the vessels are to be constructed in Spanish shipbuilding yards." It was not explained that the shipbuilding yards at Ferrol, where these vessels are built, is a branch of a British warship firm.

turn out a battleship complete, with supplies of projectiles and ammunition ready for sea. You see in these establishments tools and machines of a greater capacity than are employed in probably any other field of industry —machines making gun housings of 100 feet diameter; machines boring and finishing guns 51 feet long and five feet in diameter at the breech; lathes handling pieces of metal weighing 230 tons; hydraulic armor plate forging presses with a power of 14,000 tons; rolling mills to roll armor plate of 8 to 12 inches thickness and of 4,000 tons weight; circular lathes with a radius of 30 feet; lathes with a bedplate 90 feet in length and cutting the toughest metal at a speed of 300 feet a minute, and drills boring the same metal a depth of five inches in 16 seconds; forging presses whose crosshead weighs nearly 200 tons, whose striking power is three tons to the square inch, and takes up many thousands of total horse-power; steam hammers striking blows of 200 tons per stroke; travelling cranes and radial cranes lifting weights of 150 to 200 tons; batteries of furnaces in which each furnace has a capacity of 500 tons of steel per 12 hours, and smelting at the terrific heat of 3,500 to 4,000 degs. Fahrenheit, and machine-rolls requiring 4,800 horse-power to operate, and rolling a forty-ton ingot into an armor plate in two or three rollings; and, though it requires a year to put a big gun through all its stages of manufacture, there are British works capable of turning out 400 big guns a year. One firm operates 33 steam hammers, 10 hydraulic presses (one with a power of 10,000 tons), 94 travelling cranes and 14 locomotives for carrying material from one yard to another. In the city of Sheffield, within a radius of four miles from its centre, there are about 2,000 steam boilers and 1,000 gas engines for power purposes, and about 30,000 skilled hands, a large percentage of whom are employed in work directly or indirectly connected with armaments. Barrow-in-Furness, which in 1871 had

a population of only 18,900, has grown to a town of about 65,000, and is practically wholly devoted to war-ship construction, one firm here employing 15,000 hands in naval engineering and shipbuilding. Some of these firms will have at one time contracts for warships from half a dozen different nations. The share capital of coal, iron and steel companies of Sheffield is £25,000,000. This twenty-five millions is not, of course, all devoted to the production of war material, but certainly the proportion of work in that sphere of industry is steadily increasing. Such is the rapidity with which new inventions are brought forward and applied to the industry of war that, though a ship of the Superdreadnought type costs $10,000,000, a warship is considered obsolete in ten or twelve years; whereas Nelson's ship, the "Victory," was fifty years old when she took part in the battle of Trafalgar. So rapidly do the ships built a few years ago become useless that one firm in Sheffield has established a large and profitable business of breaking up the old ships at certain shipyards under an agreement with the government. One warship firm employs in normal times 25,000 hands, and in the past ten years has built 120 warships, aggregating about 600,000 horse-power, and including among their customers almost every country of importance in the world.

What has been said of ships can also be said of the guns and armament of ships. The naval guns of Nelson's day were six to eight feet long and threw shots of from 12 to 32 pounds, but their extreme range was a thousand yards, while three or four hundred yards was practically the limit of broadside actions. From a whole broadside of Nelson's ship, the "Victory," the total weight of the shots of the fifty-two guns was only 1,160 pounds, where a single projectile from a modern naval gun weighs from 850 to 1,400 pounds, and a broadside from the new ships now building will be about 15,000 pounds, firing three "aimed" shots per minute.

The larger of these modern guns are 51 feet long and weigh 60 to 80 tons, taking a shot or shell 10 to 14 inches diameter, and firing it with an initial speed of 3,000 feet per second, or nearly three times the velocity of sound. Such a projectile has the power to penetrate nickel steel armor of 10½-inch thickness, or of perforating a mass of wrought iron 52 inches thick at a distance of 10,000 yards. Only ten years ago the best guns could not penetrate such armor at a greater distance than 3,000 yards; and, speaking generally, the battleship of to-day can do thirty times the damage of the strongest battleship of twenty-five years ago, and that, too, at double the range. After firing from sixty to ninety rounds a naval gun is now useless and has to be returned to the works to have a new inner tube made. And still the contest is undecided between the resisting power of heavy armor and the penetrating power of heavy guns. Ten years ago the effective range of torpedoes was 1,000 yards, now it is 10,000 yards, and this again is compelling important changes in the gun equipment of new battleships and cruisers.

The word dreadnought is already a common noun, familiar throughout the naval world, yet the original Dreadnought was only launched in 1906. The first Dreadnought marked a new era in battleships, yet the new ship now succeeding the "Iron Duke," the last completed super-dreadnought, will be as far in advance of the first Dreadnought in destructive power as that ship was in advance of the battleships before it.* The

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* The weight of projectiles fired from a broadside of the first Dreadnought was less than 7,000 pounds, but the weight of a broadside of the "King George V." is 14,000 pounds, and even the new armored cruisers have an offensive power 50 per cent. greater than the

guns increase in power and calibre and the ships increase in tonnage and speed. The new battleship guns have a calibre of 14 inches instead of 13.5; the vessels have a tonnage now of from 26,000 to 30,000 tons displacement compared with 18,000 and 20,000 a few years ago; the speed increases from 21 knots to 28 and 30 knots per hour, and the length of ship from 450 up to from 500 to 700 feet. Here, again, a new development emerges with a fresh demand upon the finances of a naval nation, for the big ships are beyond the capacity of the drydocks, which will have to be extended wherever the British navy has a harbor.

Yet again a fresh problem confronts naval designers and fleet tacticians by the sudden advent of the internal combustion oil-burning engine, which increases a warship's cruising range from 3,000 to 12,000 miles, thus largely cancelling the special advantage which a nation like Great Britain had in the possession of coaling stations in distant parts of the world.

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original Dreadnought. The "Iron Duke" had a tonnage of 26,000 tons, a length of 580 feet, with 13.5 guns, but the new ship following it on the docks at Portsmouth has a tonnage of 30,000, a length of 700 feet, and 14-inch guns; while two battleships, ordered from firms on the Clyde, are to be mounted with 15-inch guns. As this note is written the original Dreadnought is being removed from her place in the first battle squadron and relegated to a place in the fourth squadron at Gibraltar.

CHAPTER VI.

INFLUENCE OF THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES IN PARLIAMENT, THE PULPIT AND THE PRESS—NAVY BUILDING AS AN INDUSTRIAL PERIL.

IT is manifest that the best brains of scientific men, of mechanical experts, and of business men cannot be devoted to these new industries without a corresponding increase in the use of capital for maintaining and extending them; and the men who have their capital invested in the business have a natural influence upon an ever-widening range of trade and industrial concerns from whom they require material, supplies and special machinery. By a natural law of association, naval and military men, and men of social and political influence who have money to invest are attracted to the armament industry, and not only for their interest in the subject, but because of the large profits yielded on such contracts. It is certain that this must reflect its influence in distorting public opinion of the country and throwing the nation's economics out of balance.

At Somerset House, London, a record is kept of the shares held in all the registered joint stock companies. The share capital of the leading armament companies ranges from a fraction of a million sterling up to four and five million pounds. In going hastily over the list of one of these companies this year the writer found thirty-six men bearing titles, from earls down to honorables and members of parliament, and there were sixty navy and army officers. The men and women of title included five Earls, a Marquis, seven Right Honorables, eleven Honorables, three Sirs, one Lord, and the officers were of all ranks, from Admiral and Major-General down to Captain. And more surprising, there were about seventy ministers of religion, from Bishops

down, and comprising representatives of nearly all denominations of Christians. Along with these there were, of course, many professional and business men. An attempt was made to analyze the share list of a larger firm, but, as there were over 12,000 names in the list, it was impossible to complete the assortment in a day's sitting, but if the pages gone over represented the average there would be as shareholders in this company 240 people of title, including Dukes, Duchesses, Countesses, Viscounts, Barons, Lords, Knights, Sirs, etc.; 945 officers, many of them high in military and naval authority; 585 ministers of religion, some of whom are high in Church councils, and 930 men in the various professions. A number were, of course, members of one or the other houses of parliament, and some were journalists.

It can fairly be affirmed that the majority of these shareholders, whether officers, ministers of state or ministers of religion, have put their money in these companies for dividends expected in an expanding business, or at least believing that their money would not diminish by having it invested there. If they have put their money here for profit, then where the treasure is there will the heart be. Is it possible that these things can be without having their influence on national life?

It is not possible to get reliable statistics of the trades and industries of Great Britain which are devoted to, or dependent upon, war, because now-a-days the component parts of a battleship or other war vessel, and the big guns and chemical works required for high explosives reach out into a hundred different industries having no exclusive connection with them. The electrical and chemical industries, for instance, play an increasingly important part in warships and their equipment; and one is not long in a naval dockyard or ordnance works, producing from twenty to fifty types of machine tools commonly associated only with the indus-

tries of peace till he realizes of what wide range are the influences that have been brought to serve the business of destroying human life. The harbor works, the floating docks, signalling stations, the makers of anchors, chains, ropes, bolts, rivets, paints, waterproof goods, textiles, scientific instruments, diving apparatus, and scores of other trades and callings contribute their quota, and find in the naval contractor a profitable customer.

The "Census of Production" of the United Kingdom for 1907 gave the value of the output of the mercantile shipbuilding and marine engineering trades at between £37,000,000 and £41,000,000, while the value of the output of the naval dockyards, the ordnance factories and the ammunition and other works specified as for navy and army requirements amounted to about £20,000,000. This does not take into account the value of the output of various other trades contributing to the army and navy in unknown proportions. It may here be observed that in recent years the tonnage of mercantile ships turned out in Britain has decreased, while that of warships has increased. Returns published by the Board of Trade—which in Great Britain is a department of the government and not a voluntary association of business men as in Canada—show that, while the merchant vessels built and launched in the United Kingdom in 1906 (the year of the beginning of the Dreadnought era) had a total tonnage of 1,156,771, those of 1910 had a total of 698,707. Later returns are not available. But the tonnage of war vessels in 1906 was 84,800, while in 1910 it was 136,249 and in 1911 228,123 tons. These developments, when summarized in the national finances, come to this, that of all those revenues of the United Kingdom raised by taxes nearly one-half is spent on the navy and army, these revenues in 1911 amounting to £152,000,000, in round numbers, and the expenditure on the navy and army being £72,000,000; or if we add the annual interest charges on the national debt, due

chiefly to war, we have a total of about £90,000,000, or one-half of the gross revenues of the Kingdom—£181,000,000. If we add to this gross revenue the receipts from the services, such as post-office, telegraph, telephone, etc., we still have a war expenditure which takes up £6 out of every £10 raised by the nation from all sources, or enough to provide a weekly allowance of fifteen shillings a week to every needy person in the Kingdom.

It can hardly be denied that the production of armaments is a waste production to the extent at least that vessels, guns, etc., become obsolete, and, as we have seen, such depreciation is very rapid. We have, then, the phenomenon of an increasing rate of taxation (an increase in Great Britain of a rate equal to £2 11s. per head of population in 1897 to £4 per head in 1912) to maintain an increasing amount of production of waste—the naval expenditure having increased in the past three years by twelve millions sterling—and the related phenomenon that the ratio of tonnage in the mercantile marine has in recent years decreased as the naval tonnage has increased. If this process goes on there must come a time, and that not long hence, when the balance must be upset. The longer it is delayed the harder will be the process of readjustment. The tariffs of protectionist countries are spoken of as "vested interests" and "the mother of trusts," but if so, how shall free trade Britons describe a vested interest of the magnitude here set forth, which has its advocates in parliament, in the civil service, in the Church and in the press? From the present extent and ramifications of the armament business it is manifest that if a large and immediate reduction in naval armaments were decided on there would be an industrial depression at once throughout the country, so wide are its connections with the factory operatives. Witness the case of the Thames Iron Works of London, the last

of the warship dockyards which made the Thames River famous in British naval annals. Owing to the fact that wages are lower on the Clyde, the Tyne and other shipbuilding districts of north Britain, conditions have gone against the building of large ships around London, and when the Thames Iron Works finished and launched the Dreadnought "Thunderer" in 1911 the government ceased to give further contracts. The result has been that half of the four thousand hands employed at these works have been discharged and the company is now in liquidation. Visiting these works in September, the writer found that in the streets in the vicinity of the workshops about fifty retail dealers had put up their shutters, many of them being bankrupt from the losses sustained by the workmen being out of employment, while there was much poverty and distress in the locality. This will illustrate what would happen if there was a sudden and general reduction in armament building, but it will equally illustrate the problem a nation raises for itself which becomes the state patron of an industry held in private control, but yet able to influence a foreign policy to its own aggrandizement. It is this aspect of the problem which is heavy with warning for Canada, for a like policy will lead to a situation of like gravity, and the way out will be equally costly and perplexing.

From the incident of the Thames Iron Works it must not be assumed that profits of armament companies and builders of warships are cut to a fine point. When compared with other branches of industry they are notoriously high, as we know is the case in contracts let by governments in time of war. As illustrated in the Balkan crisis, the effect of war is to depress industrial stocks and increase the importance and profits of war industries.* The "Economist," of London, in its

* Vienna papers calculated that between September 30th and October 12th, 1912, the shares of thirteen se-

issue of 15th April, 1911, gave a report of earnings of armament engineering firms, and this showed that of seventeen companies two declared no dividend (one of these having expended sums for new plant), while the others yielded 2 to 15 per cent. Six of them paid over 10 per cent. The total net profits of the seventeen were £1,587,802 in 1909 and £1,921,924 in 1910. The compiler then observes: "None of the companies engaged on general engineering alone has anything like so large an amount of profit. In fact, it is remarkable that, although the total profits of all the companies show a substantial advance over those of last year, the improvement is really due entirely to the armament firms, the profits of the other companies having fallen from £897,194 to £664,555."

The wasteful nature of armaments, in an industrial sense, is insisted on, because, apart from the destruction of war, all the modern implements of war soon become obsolete, or at least of minor consideration, through the progress of invention. A first-class battleship now costing £2,000,000 is either obsolete or in the second class in ten or twelve years. It is a class of product like fireworks, for example, which, when once discharged, represent the complete destruction of the work of their makers. On the other hand, a traction engine, which is sent from England to the Canadian prairie, will cultivate an area of land far beyond the powers of manual labor, and the resultant crop of grain comes back to a British flour mill and feeds the workers who produced the engine and give them

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lected companies had depreciated by 360 million crowns; but the profits of the Krupps, who supplied the guns for the armies in this war were $8,000,000, and the company's last dividend (1912) was 12 per cent., plus 5 per cent. carried into the surplus and half a million added to the pension fund.

the means of paying for the family's shoes and clothing, and so keeps up a perpetual circulation of trade which serves the needs of men in many countries.

We need not personally condemn those engaged in the armament industry. The managers and workmen of these establishments are as good as can be found in any other industry, and have as high a conception of their duty to their country and their employers; moreover, many of them regret the tendency of the time, and foresee trouble when either the day of war or of retrenchment comes. But is anyone so blind as not to see that the evolution of this industry must either be in war or a very expensive readjustment of shop equipment and work in case of reduction of the business? And after a war, with its incalculable losses, the question of turning the workmen into other industries would still have to be faced; or else, if continued, the whole industrial fabric of the nation would collapse from sheer top-heaviness.

CHAPTER VII.

NORMAN ANGELL ON THE ECONOMICS OF MODERN WAR.

BEFORE leaving the topic of the economics of naval warfare, the reader is advised to study a book written by Norman Angell under the title of "The Great Illusion." This book has been translated into eighteen foreign languages, and is rapidly dissipating the notion heretofore held by politicians and economists that wars of conquest can benefit the conqueror under the conditions of modern civilization. On its appearance the

book was reviewed by about two hundred financial and economic journals of various countries of the world, and it appears that nearly ninety per cent. of the reviewers admitted that the thesis of the author was sound. One Englishman has been so impressed by the book that he has contributed a fund of £20,000 for the issue of a cheap edition for the enlightenment of his fellow-countrymen. The work has been mentioned in the debates in the British House of Commons and other parliaments, and the Minister of Colonies of France embodied a chapter of it in an official white book issued by that government. The author deals largely with the rivalry between Great Britain and Germany. Both are trading states and rivals for the commercial supremacy of the world, and each imagines that if she is to retain her relative position she must maintain a fleet sufficiently strong to enforce her commercial policy, or at least to protect herself from aggression by a rival nation. And all the while each nation pleads that its armaments are purely for defense. Such a plea implies that a rival nation has some interest in making an attack. This supposed interest is based upon the commonly accepted axiom that "military and political power give a nation commercial and social advantages, that the wealth and prosperity of the defenceless nation are at the mercy of stronger nations, who may be tempted by such defencelessness to commit aggression, so that each nation is compelled to protect itself against the possible cupidity of neighbors."

As the plea is the same between other nations, as, for example, between the United States and Japan, it may be taken to be universal among nations who base their foreign policy on military force. The author challenges the theory, and declares it to be based on a pure optical illusion. He sets out to prove that military and political power give a nation no commercial advantage, and that it is an economic impossibility for one nation

to seize or destroy the wealth of another, or for one nation to enrich itself by subjugating another. He establishes this seeming paradox by showing that wealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit and commercial contract. If these are tampered with in an attempt at confiscation by a conqueror the wealth dependent on this credit not only vanishes, thus giving the conqueror nothing for his conquest, but in its collapse it involves the conqueror, so that if conquest is not to injure the conqueror he must scrupulously respect the enemy's property, in which case the purpose of the conquest is futile. Equally illusory, he argues, is the theory that a powerful army or navy is an essential of the internal stability or financial credit of a nation; and he cites as the briefest and most practical proof the fact that the credit of the small and comparatively helpless states of Europe stands higher than that of the so-called "Great Powers," Belgian 3 per cents. standing (in 1910) at 96, German at 82, Norwegian 3½ per cents. at 102 and Russian 3½ per cents. at 81. The individual standard of comfort and the distribution of wealth is also greater in the small countries.

For like reasons the idea that addition of territory adds to a nation's wealth is also an optical illusion, since under the principles of government which are extending to all countries in modern times the wealth of a conquered country would remain in the hands of the same people who owned it before the conquest. For instance, when Germany annexed Alsatia no individual German secured a single mark's worth of Alsatian property as the spoils of war. Writers of great influence on military affairs, however, still hold the old view that conquest brings an advantage to the conqueror, and the author deals with these: "There is possibly no party in Europe so convinced of the general truth of the common axioms that at present dominate international politics as the Pan-Germanists of Germany. This party has set

before itself the object of grouping into one great power all the peoples of the Germanic race or language in Europe. Were this aim achieved, Germany would become the dominating power of the continent, and might become the dominating power of the world. And, according to the commonly accepted view, such an achievement would, from the point of view of Germany, be worth any sacrifice that Germany could make. . . . Very good. Let us assume that at the cost of great sacrifice, the greatest sacrifice which it is possible to imagine a modern civilized nation making, this has been accomplished, and that Belgium and Holland and Germany, Switzerland and Austria, have all become part of the great German hegemony; is there one ordinary German citizen who would be able to say that his well-being had been increased by such a change? Germany would then 'own' Holland. But would a single German citizen be the richer for the ownership? The Hollander, from having been the citizen of a small state, would become the citizen of a great one. Would the individual Hollander be any the richer or better? As a matter of fact we know that in all probability they would be a great deal worse. We may, indeed, say that the Hollander would be certainly the worse in that he would have exchanged the relatively light taxation and light military service of Holland for the much heavier taxation and the much longer military service of the great German Empire."

In ancient times it was true that the conquest of a country meant a material advantage to the conqueror, because the invader exploited the new land for the enrichment of the aggressor, and it usually meant the enslavement of the persons of the conquered people. In mediæval times the conquest was limited more to the carrying off of tangible property, such as gold and silver, and to the confiscation of land from the citizens. At a later period the squabbles of rival sovereigns and

ruling houses brought on wars. At a more recent period conquests resulted in the establishment of order among savage peoples, and to secure to the citizens of the invading nation the advantage of providing for its overflow population "homes under conditions that were preferable to the social or political conditions imposed by alien nations. But none of these conditions is part of the problem we are considering. We are concerned with the case of fully civilized rival nations in fully occupied territory, and the question whether conquering such territory gives to the conqueror any material advantage which he could not have without conquest. And in the realities of the political world as we find it to-day, the 'predominance of armament,' or the 'command of the sea,' can do nothing for commerce, industry or general well-being; we may build fifty Dreadnoughts and not sell so much as a penknife the more in consequence. . . . The cause of this profound change, largely the work of the last thirty years, is due mainly to the complex financial interdependence of the capitalists of the world, a condition in which disturbance in New York involves financial and commercial disturbance in London, and if sufficiently grave, compels financiers of London to co-operate with those of New York to put an end to the crisis, not as a matter of altruism, but as a matter of commercial self-protection. The complexity of modern finance makes New York dependent on London and London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history. This interdependence is the result of the daily use of those contrivances of civilization which date from yesterday—the rapid post, the instantaneous dissemination of financial and commercial information by means of telegraphy, and generally the incredible progress in communication which has put the half-dozen chief capitals of Christendom in closer contact, financially, and rendered them more dependent the one upon the other

than were the chief cities in Great Britain less than a hundred years ago."

He then quotes a French financial authority as follows: "Under the influence of finance, industry is beginning to lose its exclusively national character, and to take on a character more and more international. The animosity of rival nationalities seems to be in process of attenuation as the result of this increasing international solidarity. This solidarity was manifested in a striking fashion in the last industrial and monetary crisis (1907-8). This crisis, which appeared in its most serious form in the United States and Germany, far from being any profit to rival nations, has been injurious to them. The nations competing with America and Germany, such as England and France, have suffered only less than the countries directly affected. It must not be forgotten that, quite apart from the financial interests involved, directly or indirectly, in the industry of other countries, every producing country is at one and the same time a client and a market, as well as being a competitor and a rival. Financial and commercial solidarity is increasing every day at the expense of commercial and industrial competition. This was certainly one of the principal causes which a year or two ago [this was written in 'L'Information' in 1909] prevented the outbreak of war between Germany and France *apropos* of Morocco, and which led to the understanding of Algeciras. There can be no doubt, for those who have studied the question, that the influence of this international economic solidarity is increasing despite ourselves. It has not resulted from the conscious action on the part of any of us, and it certainly cannot be arrested by any conscious action on our part."

A contributor to a London paper stated a possible result of a German invasion of England: "When the German army is looting the cellars of the Bank of England and carrying off the foundations of our whole

national fortune, perhaps the twaddlers who are now screaming about the wastefulness of building four more Dreadnoughts will understand why sane men are regarding this opposition as treasonable nonsense." Mr. Angell takes this paragraph to illustrate his theory as follows:—

"What would be the result of such an action on the part of a German army in London? The first effect, of course, would be that, as the Bank of England is the clearing-house of all other banks, there would be a run on every bank in England, and all would suspend payment. But simultaneously German bankers, many with credit in London, would feel the effect; merchants the world over, threatened with ruin by the effect of the collapse in London, would immediately call in all their credits in Germany, and German finance would present a condition of chaos hardly less terrible than that in England. The German Generalissimo in London might be no more civilized than Attila himself, but he would soon find the difference between himself and Attila. Attila, luckily for him, did not have to worry about a bank rate and such like complications; but the German general, while trying to sack the Bank of England, would find that his own balance in the Bank of Germany would have vanished into thin air, and the value of even the best of his investments dwindled as though by a miracle; and that for the sake of loot amounting to a few sovereigns apiece among his soldiers he would have sacrificed the greater part of his own personal fortune. It is as certain as anything can be that, were the German army guilty of any such economic vandalism, there is no considerable institution in Germany that would escape grave damage—a damage in credit and security so serious as to constitute a loss immensely greater than the value of the loot obtained, because the bullion reserve in the Bank of England is relatively small. . . . For every pound taken from the Bank of England German

trade would pay a thousand. The influence of the whole finance of Germany would be brought to bear on the German government to put an end to a situation ruinous to German trade, and German finance would only be saved from utter collapse by an undertaking on the part of the German government scrupulously to respect private property, and especially bank reserves. It is true the German jingoes might wonder what they had made war for, and an elementary lesson in international finance would do more than the greatness of the British navy to cool their blood. For it is a fact in human nature that men will fight more readily than they will pay, and that they will take personal risks much more readily than they will disgorge money, or for that matter earn it. 'Man,' says Bacon, 'loves danger better than travail' (work)."

After quoting Hartley Withers ("The Meaning of Money") to show that in the financial crisis of 1907 London drew gold from seventeen other countries to relieve the situation in New York, and to show that it has been by using English credit that German trade has been able to extend, he shows that if, on the other hand, Great Britain bombarded and seized the port of Hamburg, confiscating the property, she would find that she had only involved her own financial institutions in loss, as many of the institutions there keep balances in London, and it would be a miracle if the whole influence of British finance were not thrown against the action of the British government. But supposing that were persisted in, neither German nor British financiers could forget that the bonds and shares of this property had already been turned into waste paper, so that "The British government finds, in fact, that it can do nothing with the financial world unless precedently it confirms the title of the original owners to the property, and gives assurance that title to all property throughout the conquered territory shall be respected. In other words,

confiscation has been a failure" It is so because in modern finance the value of shares and bonds depends upon the reliance which can be placed upon the execution of the contracts which they embody.

One English writer asserts that "if Germany were extinguished to-morrow there is not an Englishman in the world who would not be the richer the day after to-morrow. Nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession. Must they not fight for £250,000,000 of yearly commerce?" To which Mr. Angell replies: "What does the 'extinction of Germany' mean? Does it mean that we shall slay in cold blood sixty or seventy millions of men, women and children? Otherwise, even though the fleet and army were annihilated, the country's sixty millions of workers still remain, who would be all the more industrious, as they would have undergone great suffering and privation—prepared to exploit their mines and workshops with as much thoroughness and thrift and industry as ever, and consequently just as much our trade rivals as before, army or no army, navy or no navy. Even if we could annihilate Germany, we should annihilate such an important section of our debtors as to create a hopeless panic in London, and such panic would so react on our own trade that it would be in no sort of condition to take the place which Germany had previously occupied in neutral markets, leaving aside the question that by such annihilation a market equal to that of Canada and South Africa combined would be destroyed."

He might, like another writer, put the case conversely, that "if Germany could get command of the sea she could cut us off from our customers and intercept our trade for her benefit. This notion is as absurd as the first. The 'incalculable chaos in the financial world' could not leave German finance unaffected. It is a very open question whether her chaos would not

be as great as ours. In any case it would be so great as thoroughly to disorganize her industry, and in that disorganized condition it would be out of the question for her to secure the markets left unsupplied by England's isolation. Moreover, those markets would also be disorganized because they depend upon England's ability to buy, which Germany would be doing her best to destroy. From the chaos which she herself had created Germany could derive no possible benefit, and she could only terminate financial disorder, fatal to her own trade, by bringing to an end the condition which had produced it—that is, by bringing to an end the isolation of Great Britain. We can with certainty say two things: (1) That Germany can only destroy our trade by destroying our population; and (2) that if she could destroy our population, which she could not, she would destroy one of her most valuable markets, as at the present time she sells to us more than we sell to her. . . . He may plead that great military and naval establishments do not exist for the purpose of conquest of territory, or destroying a rival's trade, but for 'protecting' or indirectly aiding trade and industry. We are allowed to infer that in some not very clearly defined way a great power can aid the trade of its nationals by the prestige which a great navy and a great army bring, and by exercising bargaining powers in the matter of tariffs with other nations. But again, the fact of the small nations in Europe gives the lie to this assumption. We talk as though our carrying trade were in some special sense the result of the growth of our great navy, but Norway has a carrying trade which, relatively to her population, is nearly three times as great as ours. Nor does it appear that armies and navies weigh in the least when it comes to a question of a tariff bargain. Switzerland wages a tariff war with Germany and wins. The whole history of the trade of the small nations shows that the political prestige

of the great ones gives practically no commercial advantage."

The author then quotes a writer in a London paper explaining how it is that England is losing trade in Canada in some directions. "We buy," said one of the Canadian merchants, "very little direct from England. We keep a staff in London supervising our orders, but the orders go mostly to France, Germany and Switzerland, and not to England." Another firm says the orders are going to Belgium. "Now, the question arises: What more can our navy do that it has not done for us in Canada? And yet the trade goes to Switzerland and Belgium. Are you going to 'protect' us against the commercial 'aggression' of Switzerland by building a dozen more Dreadnoughts? Suppose we could conquer Switzerland and Belgium with our Dreadnoughts, would not the trade of Switzerland and Belgium go on all the same? Our arms have brought us Canada, but not the Canadian orders, which go to Switzerland. If the traders of little nations can snap their fingers at the great war lords, why do British traders need Dreadnoughts? . . . If the statesmen of Europe would tell us how the military power of a great nation is used to advance the commercial interest of its citizens, would explain to us the modus operandi, and not refer us to large and vague phrases about 'exercising due weight in the councils of the nations,' one might accept their philosophy. But until they do so we are justified in assuming that their political terminology is simply a survival—an inheritance from a state of things which has, in fact, passed away."

In other chapters Mr. Angell challenges the accepted axioms that war in inevitable, that it is necessary to bring out the virile qualities of the human race, that human nature is unchangeable, and that warlike nations are great nations, and "inherit the earth." He establishes, on the contrary, that:—

1. The unchangeability of human nature is not a fact, and all the evidence is against it (e.g., the disappearance, or at least the attenuation, of the temper which leads us to enforce our religious beliefs on others, and of the temper which produces the duel.)

2. That the warlike nations do not inherit the earth.

3. That physical force is a constantly diminishing force in human affairs, and that this involves profound psychological modifications; and

4. That the increasing factor is co-operation, and that this factor tends to attenuate state divisions which in no way represent the limits of that co-operation.

As we are now dealing with the economic aspect of war developments we will not here follow Mr. Angell's reasoning, but will advise the reader to study the argument from the book itself.

Not many months after this book was published in its present form European nations had an object lesson on the extent to which nations are becoming tied to each other in ways which will tend to make wars between highly civilized nations an act of self-inflicted injury and which, if pursued, would mean self-destruction. The great railway strike of 1911 tied up the port of Liverpool among other Engilsh centres of trade, and the stoppage of trade affected both ocean and inland traffic. It was stated that the non-delivery of the usual supplies of milk resulted in the death of one thousand children in Liverpool and suburbs—which is another way of stating that in a civil conflict a thousand propective men and women were slaughtered. The stoppage of coal supplies from the English coal mines almost tied up the shipping trade of Liverpool, and the shortage of coal almost paralyzed the shipping trade of Bremen, Hamburg and Rotterdam at the same time, resulting also in the partial or complete closing of three hundred or more establishments in Germany that depended for

their coal supplies upon England. And among the establishments so closed were some of the government works engaged on making war material.

This takes place as the result of a strike, and in a time of international peace. But suppose a war took place in which it was the policy of one or both sets of naval authorities to choke off all commercial intercourse between, say, two such closely connected countries as Great Britain and Germany? As we cannot deny that in the end the burden of a nation's wars falls upon the mass of the people whose united labor has produced the means of carrying on a war, no one can estimate the sum of misery and sorrow inflicted upon the people of both countries, millions of whom at the best of times live with the wolf of want not far from their door.

CHAPTER VIII.

DEDUCTIONS FROM THE EUROPEAN SITUATION APPLIED TO CANADA.

SINCE it is so plain that the conditions of the present time are unlike those of any p eceding age; that the trade and industrial connections of the great nations are fast becoming so closely interwoven that a war will inflict as much injury and suffering upon the aggressor as on the nation attacked, are we not to conclude that aggressive wars are now impossible? They would be impossible if all wars were determined by material interests, if the knowledge of political leaders advanced with the changing times, and if the people were both awake to their duties and vigilant as to their interests. And this question leads us into the political enquiry,

but, before we enter on that enquiry, we are warranted in taking the industrial evolution of the mother country as furnishing proof beforehand that:—

1. The establishment of a Canadian navy will involve an increase of taxation upon the Canadian people.

2. That if a navy is built in Canada it means the creation of vested interests in the form of war industries yielding large profits derived from these increased taxes.

3. That the products of these industries are largely an economic waste, and to the extent of that waste are an impost on the products and profits of the toilers working for the peaceful necessities of mankind.

4. That these industries tend to increase in political power as they grow in financial strength, in the number of hands employed, and in the extent of their alliance with the system of standing military establishments.

PART II.—THE POLITICS OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE DANGER TO REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT —IRRESPONSIBILITY OF PRIVATE CONTROL —A WAY OUT.

IT is a ceaseless wonder to the man who thinks of the great movements of the time that while statesmen are deploring the increase of armaments and professing their desire for peace, the preparations for a possible war go on at a rate unprecedented in the world's history, and that, while the fashion of building navies has spread to the smallest states claiming the dignity of a nation, the hugest efforts are being made by the nations highest in the scale of civilization, who are diverting from the pursuits of peace the best brains, the highest mechanical skill, and the ablest organizing talent within their borders, at the cost of an ever-increasing ratio of taxation. "Modern European politics might be described as the science of misunderstanding: every statesman disclaims emphatically, and probably quite sincerely, any intention whatsoever of aggressive action upon his neighbors—and every statesman in Europe has for twenty years been feverishly preparing to resist the attacks of his neighbors, who as emphatically have disclaimed any intention of making any such attack. This matter of misinterpretation is due to the absence of anything resembling a science of inter-

national polity based upon the facts of the modern world."*

Leaving aside the moral causes, we will find an important political cause in a defect in the British scheme of government, and until that fault is remedied there is not likely to be any halt in the process of naval expansion short of a war or internal revolt against excessive taxation. We have seen that, by the operation of economic laws, the construction of armaments has grown into a series of special industries depending on government orders, yet carried on under private control; that in the extension of these operations orders are not limited to the British government, but are obtained from foreign nations, whose naval expansion is given as a ground for further expansion of the British navy. Thus an industrial guild, having varied ramifications at home and agents and branches in foreign countries, is able to set government against government in a competition which is increased without legislative restriction at home or abroad. The British government is, in fact, its largest single patron, and by its present system that government has been violating the principle which associates responsibility with power. Of the Dreadnoughts laid down in Great Britain in 1910 and 1911 four were in government-owned dockyards, whereas nine were laid down in the same years in dockyards under private control, and nine of such capital ships laid down for foreign governments were furnished in that period by private dockyards owned by British firms or their foreign branches, the nations referred to being Italy, Spain, Brazil, Japan, Chili and Turkey. What applies to battleships applies even to a greater extent to war craft of some other classes. (See Navy League Annual.) One firm adver-

* From a preface by Norman Angell to "The German Emperor and the Peace of the World." (By Alfred H. Fried.)

tises the names of nineteen foreign battleships and armored cruisers for which they have furnished guns or other equipment. Another British firm built the Japanese admiral's flagship and other ships and war craft which did the most effective work in the Japanese-Russian war, educating Japan to a position where the "yellow peril" is the ground of Australia's fear and a cause of the recent naval expansion of the United States, as well as the clamor in British Columbia. Does it seem logical that a government which we endow with complete control over a navy should have no control over the means of producing it—that our wise men should rise in parliament and declare that the British navy must be superior to all hostile combinations, and yet give facilities to our own citizens to make those hostile combinations more formidable? We proclaim our desire for peace, yet give our armament builders full freedom to supply foreign countries with the means and temptation to make war. After furnishing these facilities for war we proclaim our neutrality—like a port captain who allows a shipload of smallpox passengers to land in the town and then proclaims a quarantine after they have infected the place. We hang a man who sells a plan of a British fort to a foreign military officer, but we honor with great titles the men who sell to foreign war departments the battleships, cruisers, submarines and torpedo boats whose assemblage into fleets terrorizes the British politician and journalist into demanding more Dreadnoughts and swifter cruisers, while the British toiler sinks under a fresh load of taxes. While the spy pays the penalty of his petty perfidy, we call the trafficker in foreign fleets to the councils which determine our peace or war.

The British nation has passed a law to prohibit the exportation of girls into White Slavery; and, after debauching millions of souls in China and India, it has been at last shamed into a limping legislation against the export of opium from India. Why, then, should

it not prohibit the export of warships and war material? It seems clear that if the manufacture of war equipment were made a monopoly of the government the responsibility would be placed where it belongs; and the operation of international law would automatically cut off the supply of such material to foreign governments. Inasmuch as about seventy-five per cent. of the warships and warship equipment purchased by foreign countries comes from Great Britain such restriction would immediately eliminate a large proportion of the naval expansion against which Great Britain complains.

To this the objection might be raised that if the smaller powers persisted in spending money on warships, such manufacturing countries as Germany would supply them, and "the trade" would only be diverted to such country where warships and big guns are also made to a large extent by private firms. It would be expected, however, that in taking this step Great Britain would suggest to the other chief powers an international agreement against international traffic in warships. But Great Britain alone of all the naval powers can afford to take this step as a practical expression of her faith in the good-will and co-operation of the other nations. She can afford to take it now, because no group of naval powers in the world can compare with her in the capacity for producing the highest class of warships and armament. A large naval shipyard is not to be created in a day, nor are the men to be trained in a day. In the interregnum the government could take over such of the home works as were necessary for legitimate self-protection. The prohibition of supply to foreign powers would at once give Britain a real and not a false zeal in persuading the smaller powers to cease this destructive waste of their energies, and she could even offer them protection against unjust aggression upon them by way of the sea. Moreover, Great Britain would thus avoid the dangers of domestic revolt against the arma-

ment taxation, which is becoming perilous to other nations as well as herself; but both people and government will every year get a clearer apprehension of the fact that the industrial nations are being bound together by a larger interchange of traffic, rendering the needs of co-operation greater and greater and the reasons for war less and less.

CHAPTER II.

THE ARMAMENT BUSINESS AS A CANADIAN INDUSTRY.

THE unrestricted export of naval armament to foreign countries is no more defensible by Great Britain than that of the ruffian who excuses his robbery of a drunken man by the plea that if he does not take the man's money some one else will.

If the reasoning based on the conditions before set forth is correct, it follows that the contribution, either of ships or of the money to build them, by the British colonies will be of no avail, because it does not reach the seat of the disease. It is like putting a blister on one's leg to cure a diseased liver. So far as the mother country's domestic situation is concerned, it is only one more round on the same weary treadmill. It changes the economic situation only in this respect, that it adds new machinery, new devices, new industrial tentacles, and new sources of profit to the trades of warship building. But if it makes matters that much worse within the United Kingdom, what does it do to the "British Dominions beyond the seas"? Does it not pour the same "leprous distilment" into the ears of the

colonial parliaments, tempting them to create the same vested interests, which will as surely pile the same heavy load of taxes upon our children? Do we hear it suggested that the creation of a war industry in Canada will mean the employment of more capital and men? This would also be the effect if intoxicating liquors were made in Canada requiring 200,000,000 bushels of grain to produce instead of 40,000,000 bushels annually as at present; or if poppy-growing were subsidized by government and the opium industry established; or if the White Slave traffic were encouraged on condition that the costumes of the traffickers were made in Canada.

Suppose Canada ceased to manufacture reapers, mowers, plows, wagons, and furniture and turned all her industrial energies into building armaments, or suppose she gave her body to be burned with taxation to pay for Dreadnoughts for the Imperial navy, how would it ease the international situation so long as the armament companies and allied interests of Great Britain continue, without let or hindrance, to incite other nations to plan naval programmes and then supply them with ships and armament to carry out those programmes? Upon each epidemic of naval expansion abroad is founded the argument for more and stronger ships in the British navy. Yet in the sacred name of loyalty Canada is asked to heap fresh fuel on a burning building.

Up till about seventy-five years ago the laws of England prohibited—under penalty of imprisonment, and in some cases death, with confiscation of property—the exportation of textile machinery, and the law was effective for its purposes. It was repealed when free trade was adopted, but in this situation it may seem to some that the British people have clung loyally to the letter of free trade while forgetting the spirit of good-will which inspired it. If the government authorizes companies—as it does by their charters—to make and to export warships and war materials, why should it

not authorize them to man these ships and police the seas, as, in fact, was done in the days of Elizabeth and before? If the government permits its shipyards and armament firms to create enough foreign navies to endanger Britain's own safety, it may as well give the problem of defense into these firm's hands also along with the problem of financing it. At present the people's government finds the money and the armament companies exercise the control.

CHAPTER III.

TRADE PROTECTION AND "TRADE FOLLOWS THE FLAG" ARGUMENTS.

WE hear it continually repeated that Britain must maintain a navy that will keep the world in awe because it is vital for the protection of British trade. But where does this argument lead us? Those who advance it base their deduction on a condition which no longer exists. It was a fact that during certain periods of the last century Britain was the only great European power whose trade was preponderantly sea-borne, and foodstuffs were a vital element in that trade. But, as will be shown farther on, the major part of Germany's exports and imports are sea-borne, and an increasing percentage consists of foodstuffs and other materials, without which her own industrial population would be reduced to want and misery. Upon this reasoning Germany also should have a navy able to dominate the sea and protect herself against all comers. Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Japan and a number of other countries similarly situated should also have a right to rule the waves.

The truth is that during the past half century the conditions of international trade have so changed that every trading and manufacturing nation needs the sea for its material well being. Even the United States, a country which was thought to be able to live a self-contained life within its own shell, would suffer privation within a week of the blockade of its ocean-borne commerce. Yet it has already been shown that small nations, even in armed Europe, have carried on a foreign trade greater per head of population than that of Great Britain herself without any navy to speak of.

The notion that a navy must bear a certain proportion to the trade of a country has a next-of-kin fallacy in the axiom that "trade follows the flag." It is true that if order, settled government, and improved means of communication are established among a people where disorder, anarchy and isolation previously existed, trade and peaceful intercourse will follow the change, but the raising of a particular nation's flag over these people is not the cause, since the same number of individuals with the same organizing ability would accomplish the same results if selected from twenty different nations without the introduction of any foreign flag at all. If trade necessarily follows the flag, and is due to the flag, how comes it that the trade of Germany has increased in British India and in South Africa until those portions of the earth now under the British flag are Germany's largest customers, British Asiatic possessions now buying 27 per cent. of Germany's exports to all Asia and British Africa taking 40 per cent. of her exports to all Africa? It cost Great Britain $1,250,000,000 to retain the flag in South Africa, but the flag has not availed to prevent Germany from gaining on Great Britain in that market. Germany's exports to South America have largely increased to those countries where there has been no change of flag; while her total exports of home manufactured goods have increased

from $469,000,000 in 1894 to $1,198,000,000 in 1910, and this increase has been practically all to countries under foreign flags. Similar statistics can be multiplied to show that a nation's trade is due to the industry and thrift of its people and their capacity for co-operation and organization, and not to the fact that one national flag is hauled down and another hoisted. The cause and sequence is, in fact, often in the reverse order, for we find that political interference or military aggression is often exercised against a people because governments have allowed their high functions to be degraded to serve the cupidity of traders, and so the flag is made to trail after the trader.

CHAPTER IV.

MODERN GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN—CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

THE recent advance of the German people in applied science and in the industrial arts has been hardly less striking than that of modern Japan and China. The record of this advance has produced a literature in itself, and has been achieved in the face of great obstacles and in spite of poverty of soil and a lack of mineral resources, which are wealth in themselves to a people of constructive skill. One writer (J. Ellis Barker in "Modern Germany") considers this due to the fact that in Germany the state—not the individual, as in England—is the initiator, the organizer and the instructor in movements for the general good. "In Germany the will of the individual is deliberately subordinated to the will of the state. . . . Too much

liberty and too much individualism have destroyed the greatness of the Netherlands and have completely destroyed the ancient republic of Poland. Individualism has made Great Britain wonderfully successful at a time when other countries were greatly inferior to Great Britain in organization, and when, besides, they were politically disunited. . . . At the present time, when other nations are no longer divided against themselves, as was Germany of old, but have become . . . gigantic institutions for self-improvement, and gigantic business concerns on co-operative principles, the spasmodic individual efforts of patriotic and energetic Englishmen prove less effective for the good of their country than they were formerly." Excessive state control, this writer thinks, while it helped to build up the young Empire, is apt to go too far in Germany, generating the present wave of socialism, whereas the lack of organization is now keeping Britain back. He looks to Japan as the model. "Japan's marvellous success in peace and in war is chiefly, if not entirely, due to the successful blending of a highly organized governmentalism and of a highly developed individualism, and if this country is able to link those mighty forces together, Great Britain, at the head of the British Empire, will again obtain the leading position in the world which, by her geographical position, her latent resources, and her opportunities, is her due."

Whether due to state organization or more to the skill, industry and patience of the people and their specialized education,* the material prosperity of Ger-

* There are twenty-three universities in Germany in which over three thousand professors are teaching nearly seven thousand students. These professors are not only educating young men for official positions of influence, but mould public opinion through the newspapers, to which they are industrious contributors.

many has been remarkable. While in Great Britain, since 1875, over 4,500,000 acres of land have gone out of cultivation* and been abandoned to pasture, in Germany the acreage of cultivated land has increased since 1883 from 57,000,000 acres to over 60,000,000, while the area under pasture has decreased in that period by about 3,000,000 acres. By scientific cultivation the yield per acre has notably increased, and this, too, against the handicap of a relatively poorer soil. The scientific treatment of the German forests, which yield a permanent revenue to the various states, has won the admiration of expert forest students all over the world, and has become a model for the forestry departments of the United States, India and other countries. Its waterways and canals are also one of the wonders of modern Germany. The canals of England are the oldest in Europe, and, next to Sweden and Finland, she has the closest network of artificial waterways in the Old World; but because the railways, like the armament industries, are in private hands, the country has allowed the canals to be bought up and to stagnate in idleness, thus depriving the people of an important means of cheapening transport. Excepting the Manchester Ship Canal—which is a sea canal, and, by the way, was obstructed for years by, and at a huge cost to, the British railway interests operating in parliament—practically nothing has been done to improve the canals of the British Isles in the last forty years, while in the same period Germany has built as state undertakings about 670 miles of canals, and has plans for the construction of 2,260 miles more at a cost of $250,000,000. This outlay is being incurred because it is proved that

* It is said that if the same intensive cultivation were carried on in the British Isles as is done in Belgium and Holland, those islands would supply enough foodstuffs to feed the entire population.

the cost of transporting goods by rail—notwithstanding that the state railways have lower rates than in England—is from 50 to 115 per cent. higher than by canal. The result of developing the German waterways is that, whereas in 1875 the railways handled 410,000 tons per kilometre (six-tenths of a mile) of distance and the waterways 290,000 tons per kilometre, the canals and rivers now handle double the tonnage of the railways. The capacity of British canal barges ranges from 30 to 100 tons (rarely 150 tons), while those on the minor canals of Germany are from 200 to 400 tons, and on the larger waterways from 1,000 to 2,300 tons, and the use of the larger barges reduces the cost per ton of freight to about a quarter of the small English barges. Here is one reason why the products of German industrial towns are able to reach the markets of the world in competition with British goods, though these chief industrial centres are at an average distance of over two hundred miles from their seaports, while most of the British industrial towns are only from ten to fifty miles from the sea coast. Since 1879 the German states have been steadily acquiring the railways from private control. From 1880 to 1908 the German railways, both private and state-owned, have increased 70 per cent., while those of the British Isles have only increased 29 per cent., and Great Britain no longer possesses, as she once did, the densest railway net of Europe.

In shipbuilding Germany has made still more remarkable progress. Thirty years ago this industry did not exist practically, but the iron and steel ships built by German firms in 1880 had a total tonnage of 23,986, while for the year 1909 it was 326,318 tons, and will be over 400,000 tons this year, or more than all the other continental countries put together. The capital embarked in this business has increased from 4,800,000 marks in 1870 to 105,890,000 marks (about $26,000,000) in 1910, while the dividends paid by all the shipbuilding

companies have averaged over 7 per cent. since 1880, the number of skilled hands employed increasing in this period from 4,250 to 22,150. The increase in the tonnage of German-owned merchant vessels is very striking. In 1871 these amounted to 81,994 tons, while now the German mercantile marine has nearly 3,000,000 tons. "In former times," says Mr. Barker in his book on Germany, "when Germany was poor, she possessed chiefly secondhand and second-rate ships, but at present she boasts of some of the largest and swiftest liners afloat, and she has besides proportionately by far the largest number of very large and new ships among maritime nations. The German mercantile marine is more up to date than is the shipping of this country (England). The strength of the shipping of Great Britain lies in its tramp steamers, which one might describe as the costermongers and pedlars of the sea; the strength of the shipping of Germany lies in its huge passenger and cargo boats."

The gross tonnage of the two largest German shipping companies is nearly 2,000,000 tons, and their trading and passenger services reach to the remotest countries of the earth.

One might fill a volume with figures of the development of the various industries of Germany and of the increase of her foreign trade. In 1880 Great Britain produced nearly two and a half times the coal that Germany did, but now the difference has shrunk to twenty per cent. more production by Great Britain, but, as the latter country exports 60,000,000 tons out of the 270,000,000 tons mined, while Germany exports only 10,000,000 tons out of about 225,000,000 tons mined, it will appear that Germany has already overtaken Great Britain in the amount of coal consumed for manufacturing and domestic purposes. In the production of iron Germany has increased from 7,239,000 tons in 1880 to 25,505,000 tons in 1909, while Great Britain's pro-

duction has fallen from 18,026,000 tons in 1880 to 14,980,000 tons in 1909. These are mentioned as basic industries, and indicate a similar development in the many higher industries founded upon coal and iron.

But here is a salient feature of Germany's scientific and industrial advance: in 1889 Germany imported, in round figures, $40,000,000 worth of raw materials for her chemical industries and exported $8,000,000 of such raw materials, leaving an excess of $32,000,000, where now the imports are about $60,000,000, and the clear excess of raw materials imported is about $50,000,000. This shows three things: first, that the chemical industries (which Lord Beaconsfield considered to be the best index of a country's advance in science, industry and commerce) of Germany are rapidly growing; second, that this advance is not due to any happy possession of the raw materials within the country, or she would not be importing five times as much as she exports; and third, that in this—the most important of the industries on which Germans have specialized—the safety and regularity of her oversea imports has become essential to the people's daily bread.

The discovery of the synthetic production of indigo and its subsequent development by German manufacturers is a romance in science. In 1895 the imports of indigo for the textile industries of Germany were $5,000,000, but now they are under $150,000, while the exports of indigo from Germany in this period have increased from $2,000,000 to over $10,000,000, nearly all being artificial indigo, which has made its way into the dyehouses of the whole textile world, including Canada. So we have in the dyeing materials, for example, German products which are as essentially needed in the textile, the paper and other trades of Great Britain, France and the United States as the German manufacturers need the materials to make them with. The existence of the chemical industries of Germany is

a practical argument for international co-operation and friendly intercourse. But how does the evolution of the chemical and other industries of Germany bear upon the argument for a big navy as vital for the protection of trade? Here we have a group of industries which had developed to important dimensions while the German navy was not thought of as a menace to Great Britain, and some of these industries have since outstripped those of Great Britain, while as yet the German navy is admittedly not a match for the British navy. According to the dictum of the big navy advocates, the British Empire could not exist for a day if Great Britain were not able to overawe all the rest of the world upon the seas, and yet Germany has been for years doing these impossible things. Great Britain must continue to "dominate" every ocean, because she depends for her foodstuffs and trade upon ocean carriage; but Germany, who does not dominate the seas, depends upon the ocean for an increasing proportion of her foodstuffs and for such an overwhelming proportion of her miscellaneous trade that if her sea-borne commerce were cut off her people would as surely be reduced to starvation as would be the case if Britain's sea commerce were paralyzed. In 1898 the Reichs Marine Amt (the navy board of Germany) issued a memorandum in which it was estimated that "certainly three-fifths, but probably two-thirds or more of Germany's foreign trade is oversea trade," and at the present time it is about three-quarters of the total trade.*

* The great increase in the trade of the Dutch seaports of Antwerp and Rotterdam is due to the growth of the traffic going in and out of Germany across the Dutch frontiers. In fifteen years the gross tonnage, excluding timber, passing up and down the Rhine through Holland grew from eight million tons to over twenty-four million tons.

The big-navy-for-the-protection-of-British-trade argument seems a little out of joint when we reflect that the German chemical industries, which permeate the industrial life of the land through and through, are dependent on foreign countries for five times more raw materials than can be produced within that Empire, and that Germany must find a sale overseas for the finished products of these chemicals—not to mention the many other branches of trade—in order that German workmen may live.

CHAPTER V.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE GERMAN NAVAL EXPANSION.

IF we ask, then, why is Germany increasing her navy, shall we find a partial explanation in the mistaken philosophy of those of us who have industriously inculcated the proverb that "Trade follows the flag," and the other fallacy that in order to exchange goods with a nation it is first necessary to display the power to destroy it? Other nations have been taught to regard the British people as the leaders in sound sense as well as in industry and in maritime enterprise, and since, in song and story, we have attributed all our greatness, and even liberty itself, to battleships, need we be surprised that German leaders, taking us as their model, send across the North Sea this echo of our own philosophy? Or, after having taught Japan that battleships are also the true basis of western Christian civilization, why should we whimper when that nation yields us her sincerest flattery of imitation—albeit at the cost of the unbearable burden of taxation her people are now trying

to carry? Is not the "yellow peril" but the shade and reflex of our own national faith? Let us, therefore, rejoice that in this twentieth century Canada, Australia and South Africa are being taught to reconstruct the British Empire upon the good old foundations laid by Tyre and Carthage. What nobler ambition could these new nations have than to increase the dividends of British armament companies, to add to the illustrious titles bestowed upon their directors, and to exercise the ingenuity of our statesmen in devising new methods of taxation for citizens yet unborn?

The few facts presented in preceding paragraphs are enough to show that in a material sense Germany has made astonishing progress in the last quarter century, and if the material prosperity of a nation is a greater danger to its neighbors than to itself then the commercial expansion of Germany is a growing danger to Great Britain, as so many hold. But if British diplomacy sets up trade and manufactures as the chief object of national ambition, and if, like Cain of old, we protest that everybody who meets us on the high seas will destroy us, why should we complain if another nation adopts our theory and imitates our methods? But suppose we take a more benevolent view of trade and assume that every new avenue of legitimate commerce between two nations creates some new need of intercourse with other nations, are the desires of the people carrying it on for their daily bread not sufficient motive to keep ships pursuing new paths through the sea? We do not even need to add the natural cupidity of men, when the first motive is sufficient to keep commerce expanding. To assume that a great navy is really necessary in these days to supply a trade which people need for their own daily life is to assume that the mercantile fleets of every other nation are out for piracy and murder. But we know that piracy, like the African slave traffic, is becoming extinct, and a dozen small,

swift cruisers would deal with all the piracy on the Asiatic or African coasts. In fact, the commercial history of Germany and of the United States is a proof that the mutual needs of commercial nations are all-sufficient for the fullest intercourse between them on the sea, and any other plea for a big navy is manifestly a pretext to cover other motives. These motives may be aggression, jealousy, the ambition of political or military leaders playing upon the national and race sentiment, the cupidity of vested interests using their subtle influence in parliament, or all these influences mingled. Whatever they are, they are no less dangerous in Great Britain than in Germany or the United States.

CHAPTER VI.

MOTHER AND DAUGHTER—WHAT IS NATIONALITY?

THE situation between Canada and Great Britain may be likened to a daughter and mother. If you, a daughter, find that your mother has yielded to the appetite for drink and has become a dissolute woman, are you going to mend matters by joining her carousals and becoming a drunkard, too? Would not this double the woes of the family and curse the neighborhood with two drunkards instead of one? Yes; but you will reply that no matter how besotted your mother has become, are you to stand by and see her assaulted and beaten? That question can be raised when the assault is made or afterwards, but not before. There is always a possibility that the ruffian may change his mind and not make the assault, or he may vent his brutality on someone else. But you will see that, assault or no assault, you still have your mother's drunkenness to deal with, and the

question is, Do you wish to become a partner in her frenzy, sharing her degradation along with her danger, or will you move Heaven to reform her and make her sober?

Are these not fair analogies? If so, what have Canadian statesmen of either party done to win the good-will of Germany, France and England as an international peace-making influence? No one should quarrel with the Canadian sentiment that is willing to make sacrifices for the good of the Motherland, but what is the real good of the Motherland, and how is it to be determined? Are we to be moved by love of race and language only? If so, then as one-third of the people of Canada are French, are we to deny the claims of these to give a like aid to the naval defense of France, or if the other notion of building a navy in Canada is to be carried out, would it not be fair to assign a naval unit to co-operate with the French navy, and should not also the proportion of Germans, Scandinavians, Russians and the people of the other 110 languages which are now spoken in Canada have their share according to race and tongue? Suppose we dismiss this proposition with a scoff, and say that nothing but nationality shall be the basis of Canadian sympathy.

What is nationality? If we regard it from the standpoint of the families and individuals that compose it, we will fail to find any reason why there should be ill-will or violence between the nations of Europe and the composite nations of America. If the school history had not already taught us, we would not be long on British soil before we recognized by multitudes of signs the kinship between them and the peoples of the European continent, especially the German and French divisions. The Germans, on their side, have mingled their blood with that of almost every nation in Europe, though they have in the past easily lost their nationality and become assimilated with the people they have adven-

tured amongst. The Franks are Germans who went to Northern France and gave their name to the whole country. The Longobardi, or "Longbeards," invaded Italy and became Italian; and there are to-day over 17,000,000 Germans living in Austria-Hungary, Switzerland and Russia, not to speak of 13,000,000 in the United States and Canada, and over a million more in South America and other quarters of the globe. Sir Harry Johnston in a chapter on the problems of Germany (in his book, "Views and Reviews") tells us that the Germanic peoples, with the Scandinavian Normans, "were the real originators of the rebirth of Greek and Latin culture and of the arts and sciences." Many of the great names in the literature and art of the early Italian renaissance "were obviously German in origin. Dante was certainly of German descent on his father's side . . . and where the hero has sprung from the humbler classes the German type of name may persist to our own day as in the case of Garibaldi (Gerbald). . . . The real vigor of France began with the invasion of the Franks, who gave their own German name—Francia in its Latinized form—to the Romano-Keltic provinces of north-eastern Gaul. The Germanization of the Lyonnese, Narbonese, and Aquitaine of Brittany and Normandy was earlier, and later carried out by Goths, Burgundians and Norsemen. Goths and Germans turned Roman-Iberian Spain into a Teutonic empire, and contributed a large quota to the population of northern Spain and Portugal." To what extent the present population of Great Britain partakes of German character as a result of the settlement of the Saxons, Jutes and Angles in the British Isles is well recognized, and the author just quoted gives a very instructive list of Germans who have in recent times, as British citizens, given dignity, character and credit to the work of the British people throughout the world.

If, therefore, by nationality is meant blood relationship, the British people and the European nations, especially France and Germany, are nearest of kin. With even more truth can we say this of Canada. The French Canadians, who came chiefly from Normandy and Brittany, are by that circumstance as well crossed with the blood of the Norseman and old German people as the British themselves. We must go a step further and point out what many Canadians do not pause to reflect upon—that, like the United States, the Canadian nation is not to-day merely British in its composition, and it is becoming less purely British each year. For good or ill we are "pumping in" immigrants at the present rate of about 500,000 a year. (It was over 300,000 in the first seven months of 1912.) Where we received nearly 8,000 of non-British nationality in 1897, we received last year 82,400, and of the 133,700 who came in from the United States last year, a large proportion are of foreign birth or foreign descent, leaving 138,100 of purely British origin. Of the homestead entries taken out last year it was officially estimated that only 20 per cent. were assigned to British people. About 600,000 of the people of Canada to-day are of Teutonic origin. Do these circumstances not qualify Canada to be a mediator in reconciling these estranged peoples, not shutting both eyes to the fact that there are two sides to the Anglo-German misunderstanding? Canada has this supreme opportunity of showing good-will, and, in view of the better understanding now apparent between the British and German people, is this the time for Canada to intervene with Dreadnoughts?

CHAPTER VII.

MISSIONS OF GOOD-WILL.

IF Canada can afford thirty-five millions for Dreadnoughts, she can afford another thirty-five millions to spend in missions to Germany, France and Great Britain for the special purpose of promoting international good-will. Such missions have, in fact, been undertaken in a voluntary way within the past two years by various bodies of men in England and Germany, who see that good-will is a greater power in diplomacy than physical force. If the members of the Canadian parliament were to go in a body to Germany and France and have informal heart-to-heart talks with members of parliament of those countries on various matters of common interest they might remove the distrust and the misconceptions which are among the causes of the naval rivalry. Deputations of educationists, journalists and various other interests might be sent on similar missions to learn each other's views, and so be able to find out how conflicting interests may be harmonized. Dr. Ludwig Stein, editor of the German publication, "Nord und Süd," within the past year undertook such a mission on his own account, inviting eminent public men in England and Germany to make suggestions for solving the Anglo-German difficulties. In response, forty-five Germans and Britons of prominence in politics, science, law, education, finance and trade contributed a symposium, which has been translated into English and published at a shilling by Williams & Norgate, of London. If the facts and arguments of even this little pamphlet were known to the people of both countries it would be clear that there is every reason for Anglo-German co-operation, and none for Anglo-German enmity.

Well does Shakespeare say: "There is no darkness but ignorance," and if the Canadian people knew the forces that are now at work making for international co-operation on a world-wide scale, they would spend the nation's money on organizing these forces and leave the question of "naval units" out of sight. The man who wants to fight first and reason afterwards is a shallow man and a bad neighbor. His mentality is of "such perilous stuff" as murderers are made of, and wise men shun him. Sometimes they are foolish enough to think he may be dangerous, and so they engage policemen to take him captive and hang him to destroy his life lest he destroy them as he has destroyed his neighbours.

CHAPTER VIII.

HOW CANADA COULD SUSPEND THE NAVY INDUSTRY.

IT is suggested that Canada could use the surgeon's knife on the disease we are dealing with. Canada has in her own hands the means of bringing about an armistice of sufficient duration to enable the great naval powers to pause and contemplate the depth of the precipice before them. The essential element in modern armor plate is nickel. For practical purposes there are only two deposits of this metal, one being in New Caledonia and the other in Canada. Of all the nickel produced in the world, Canada furnishes about four-fifths of the refined metal, so it will be seen that this country has it in her power to suspend the naval construction of not only Great Britain and Germany, but of the whole world. All that is needed is an act by the Dominion Government prohibiting for one, two or three years the export of nickel or nickel matte, except in such quantities as are know to be required for the peaceful

arts. If it is objected that thousands of hands would be thrown out of employment in the engineering works and naval yards, then the answer is that an economic disturbance is inevitable at some stage, and the sooner it is brought about the less will be the catastrophe. Leaving aside the staggering cost of war, the net gain of each country in saving the waste of energies and waste of money would form a fund, one-fiftieth of which would pay a lordly pension fund to every man turned out of employment by this step.

The suppression of the slave trade on the coast of east Africa, the last mart of the world's international slave traffic, is an example from history that the surgeon's knife could be applied to this end. This is told by Sir John Kirk, the friend and companion of David Livingstone, as follows:—

> "Sir Bartle Frere had failed to induce the Sultan of Zanzibar to sign the treaty for the stoppage of the slave trade. The Sultan knew that, while the local Arab chiefs took their existing view of the traffic, his signature of the treaty would be followed by his death within forty-eight hours.
>
> "Sir Bartle Frere went away and the matter was left to me," said Sir John. "I got together the independent Arab chiefs, who were largely in control of the trade, and said to them, in the presence of the Sultan:—
>
> " 'I have seen what the slave trade means in the country around the lakes, and I have seen what you do there. This slave trade will cease, and shall cease.'
>
> "I told them what a blockade was, that I had one gunboat there, that eight more gunboats were coming, and that if they wished their ordinary trade, apart from the slave trade, to go on, and their own power to continue, they had better come to terms. I pressed this matter on them, because the Sultan

could not have signed the treaty in face of their opposition. They went to him saying, 'For God's sake, sign this treaty.'

"The Sultan signed."

CHAPTER IX.

CANADIAN AUTONOMY AND FOREIGN DIPLOMACY —THE CASE OF MOROCCO.

THERE is the question of the autonomy of Canada and "a voice in the Imperial councils." The voice of the Dominions in British Imperial affairs should exert a moderating and a broadening influence, and, happily, there are other subjects besides war to claim attention. But, so far as this voice relates to the naval policy, the only proposal at present is that Canada shall be represented on the Imperial Defence Committee. But this committee is not the British cabinet, though some cabinet ministers are on it. It is a committee answerable to the British prime minister personally, as it is largely his own creation, and its recommendations are subject to revision, first, by the cabinet, and second by the parliament; and, if the London "Times" expresses British public or official opinion accurately, neither the British parliament, nor its executive, the cabinet, intend to allow the Dominion governments a share in deciding either the naval policy or a question of war. We have so far, therefore, the proposition of money contributions without effective representation in the councils which may decide peace or war.

But, assuming that this representation were made effective, would the Canadian people be prepared to set the stamp of their approval on the subterranean methods of diplomacy prevailing in Europe, to which even British

governments too frequently yield. Take, for instance, the secret treaty or "understanding" between Great Britain and France concerning Morocco which brought Great Britain and Germany to the verge of war.

There are various versions of this secret understanding, but the following account by Rear-Admiral Chadwick (Lake Mohonk Conference Report, 1912) will be found substantially correct:—

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"In 1904 there was made public an agreement which had been secretly reached between England and France, by which in return for the withdrawal by France from her right to exercise control over Egyptian finances and from her long troublesome fish-drying rights on the Newfoundland shore, and some minor yieldings, England, so far as she was concerned, gave France practically a free foot in Morocco. Three countries, England, France and Spain made a trade in which an independent country, larger than France, with perhaps 10,000,000 of population was the subject of the barter. It was the Pandora's box which contained the woes of which the present European situation is the result. So clear did this appear to me at the time that I wrote early in 1905 to a prominent English friend that this must be the effect.

"Germany, which had been wholly ignored, was naturally incensed. The Emperor visited Tangier and said things which resulted in the Algeciras conference. This conference agreed that France and Spain should furnish a moderate number of drill-masters and instructors for a force of 2,000 to 2,500 Mohammedan policemen to be used in the ports, establish a state bank, and arrange that all nationalities should be on a perfectly equal footing regarding proposals for public works. Most important of all, the independence of the Sultan and of Morocco was made a basic principle.

"The next act was the bombardment by a French man-of-war of Casa Blanca, on the west coast of Morocco because of a difficulty which, it is understood, was caused by the acts of some foreigners in a cemetery, which the Moors resented. This was followed in 1911 by a French expedition of 16,000 men to Fez on the pretext that the lives of foreigners in Fez were in danger. The expedition after a futile resistance by the Moors, arrived to find the foreigners unharmed, and that there had been no danger. But France was now in military occupation. A full protectorate by France has now been established.

"Says Mr. Morel in the 'Nineteenth Century' for February last: 'It was surely infantile to imagine that Germany was any more likely in 1911 than she was in 1904-05 to agree to France securing Morocco without positive guarantees as to the open door and without paying her bill of compensation even as France had found it necessary to pay the British, Spanish and Italian bills. To Britain, relief in Egypt; to Spain, almost the entire northern and part of the Atlantic coasts of Morocco, with a goodly slice of hinterland thrown in; to Italy, a free hand in Tripoli; to Germany—nothing. The pact of Algeciras to which Germany and ourselves [i.e., Great Britain] were signatories and in which Germany had a peculiar interest was torn up and thrown to the winds.'

"As a protest that she was not to be altogether disregarded, Germany sent the 'Panther' to Agadir. A report that Germany had demanded compensation in the Congo caused an inflammation of British sentiment which had voice in the London press. The day after a particularly inflaming article in the 'Times,' the Chancellor of the Exchequer made a speech at the Mansion House which was a clear

threat of war against Germany. The destruction of the Algeciras agreement by France was ignored and England was ready apparently to plunge Europe into a great war to uphold the action of the power which had overturned the agreement to which England herself was a signatory, as was also Germany.

"Meanwhile by England's understanding with Russia, Persia (which gave fair promise of establishing a wholesome government) has been divided into 'spheres of influence' by these two powers, and, so far as the ordinary man can see, has no longer any independence. And Italy, driven by the appropriation of Egypt and of Algiers, Tunis and Morocco, seized the only remaining chance for expansion and occupied Tripoli at the cost of an expensive war. The Balkans and the whole of southeastern Europe are, we know, but a slumbering volcano. [This was written before the outbreak of the Balkan war.]

"The whole has been a wave of self-interest apparently as irresistible as a Saharan sand wave. Deep feeling has been aroused in Germany, and we see the two foremost nations of Europe, the two most highly civilized nations of the world, spending vast sums; the one striving to overtake, the other striving to preserve, supremacy in maritime power. Can anyone say that the game of Morocco was worth the candle? Can anyone say that the unrighteous swallowing up of a backward nationality on the pretext of extension of trade and influence is worth a great European war? is worth an abiding hate between two great kindred nations which should be competing in civilization instead of in hate? Is England to be destroyed by Germany, or Germany to be destroyed by England, or France to disappear as France because the special trader wants an extension of his field? This is the bald analysis

of what has happened, and a true statement of the history of the last few years. It would seem that the words *delenda est Cartago* (Carthage must be destroyed) must be in the heart of many both German and English. But why this feeling?

"The Englishman cannot hate the German *per se*, or the German the Englishman to the extent of desiring the one to annihilate the other. There must be, apart from personality, some deep and powerful reason for the ill-feeling which has so lately been shown, which does not appear to the casual observer. The real reason is in that ever most potent cause of international dissension—trade jealousy, though trade itself is the creator of civilization and in itself the most beneficent of human institutions."

CHAPTER X.

THE CASE OF PERSIA.

FOR another example take the treatment meted out to Persia. Just at the period when the Persians had adopted a constitution and were making a sincere effort to end the long regime of corruption within their own borders, the power of the government of Great Britain and Russia is invoked to make a virtual partition of the country, using the plea of good order, the security of trade routes, etc., for taking self-government away from the people.* Morgan Shuster, a young American,

* The facts in this case are briefly that in 1907 an agreement was made between Russia and Great Britain marking off Persia to be brought within the "spheres

who espoused the cause of the Persian people, has given the story of these intrigues and of his unsuccessful efforts to help put the new government on its feet, and the sympathetic reception his book received in England shows that the British people, if they had known the facts in time, would have denounced any proposal to strangle these aspirations of the Persians.

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of influence" of the two powers, northern Persia being assigned to Russia and southern Persia to Great Britain. This is an euphemism by which, without consulting the Persian people, the annexation of the country is determined, but M. Isvolsky, who negotiated the convention with Sir Edward Grey, assured the Persians that "this agreement between the two Powers which have the greatest interests in Persia, based as it is on a guarantee of her independence and integrity, can only serve to further and promote Persian interests, for henceforth Persia, aided by these two powerful neighboring states, can employ all her powers in internal reforms." Later on, to allay the misgivings of the Persians, the British minister at Teheran added the assurance of a Briton's word that "The object of the two Powers in making this agreement is not in any way to attack, but rather to assure for ever the independence of Persia," and more to the like effect, including the promise that Persia "will thus be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own way." But it was not long before the "Novoe Vremya," the inspired organ of the Russian government, was declaring that Great Britain and Russia should each have "liberty of action in Persia within their respective spheres." This meant just what the "Chronicle," of London, says: "Ever since the signing of the agreement Russia set herself to undermine Persian independence. Every effort that was made to regenerate the country and to reorganize its administration was thwarted through her malign influence."

CHAPTER XI.

THE SIX-POWER INFAMY IN CHINA.

THEN take the sordid six-power attempt to exploit China. There we see a nation whose civilization is one of the wonders of history, and whose recent constitutional reforms make a national new birth which seems miraculous, and the world looks on in astonishment at the almost literal fulfilment of the prediction that a nation would be born in a day. But behold! a combination of bankers and commercial syndicates with an eye on the exploitation of the resources and labor of the country, approach the governments of six of the great nations—including, alas! Great Britain and the United States—and persuade them to allow the prestige and authority of the nations to be used in forcing the new Chinese government to take a loan under conditions which would have meant foreign domination and industrial enslavement. And this at the very crisis when the people of China would naturally look to the enlightened nations of the west for sympathy and help in the work of reorganizing their country after its visitation by the double calamity of revolution and famine. In this supreme hour real international good-will would have been welcomed and remembered by the Chinese people throughout the ages. Instead of the help of the good Samaritan China got the blows of a group of financial sand-baggers, who, under the cloak of their governments, caught the new Chinese government at the hour of its distress and attempted to play the soulless game of the money shark, who entraps a widow into a loan on terms that mean her ruin. No thanks to these governments, but by a special providence China has for the present been saved from this trap by an English financier, whose courage has saved his country from

the deepest disgrace that ever threatened it. Mr. C. Birch Crisp offered the Chinese government a loan of a smaller amount under conditions which would not mean the mortgaging of so much of the country's assets, and notified the British foreign office of his intention. It was not thought possible that Mr. Crisp could raise this loan with all the weight of the government against him, but how the British foreign office exerted its influence will be seen from its own confession in the correspondence laid before parliament in October, 1912. After informing the British minister to China that steps were being taken to stop the execution of the loan offered by Mr. Crisp, the British minister of foreign affairs sends the following explanatory letter to the minister to China:—

> "Mr. C. Birch Crisp called to-day (September 10th) by appointment at this office in connection with the proposed loan of £10,000,000 to the Chinese government, referred to in my despatch of the 23rd ult. Mr. Crisp was received by Mr. Gregory, of the Far Eastern Department, and confirmed the statement contained in Mr. Lew Yuk-Lin's note of the 4th inst., that the loan in question had been definitely concluded. Mr. Gregory pointed out that Mr. Crisp had acted in defiance of the declared policy of His Majesty's government, which had been made perfectly clear to him on his previous visit to the foreign office. Mr. Crisp admitted that this was so, but said that he knew that the public was prepared to take up the loan, and that he did not see how His Majesty's government could prevent the transaction being carried through. Mr. Gregory replied that His Majesty's government were not, of course, in a position to put pressure on the syndicate interested in the loan, but they could put considerable pressure on the Chinese government, and would not hesitate to do so at once. Mr.

Gregory inquired whether Mr. Crisp would prefer to see the whole influence of the six governments thrown against the loan, or whether he would be prepared himself to cancel the agreement and prevent an open conflict. After consideration, Mr. Crisp admitted that it would be foolish to proceed with the loan in the face of the active hostility of the six governments, and he, therefore, proposed the following procedure, which Mr. Gregory promised to submit to me: He would postpone the issue of the loan and would undertake not to proceed further with it without previous notification to the foreign office; he would issue no prospectus; he would cause no reference to be made to the agreement in the Press, and would refuse any information as to its existence if applied to. Mr. Gregory could not say whether I should be satisfied with this solution, or whether I should demand that the Chinese government should cancel the agreement. He would, however, submit the proposal to me as it had been made."

On September 23rd Sir Edward Grey further wrote Sir J. Jordan, the British minister to China:—

"A representative of C. Birch Crisp & Co. called at this Department to-day, and stated that the prospectus of the first part of the loan of £10,000,000 to the Chinese government was about to be issued to the public. Messrs. Crisp's representative said that this notifiation was made in pursuance of the undertaking given by Mr. C. B. Crisp that he would not issue the prospectus without giving previous notice to the foreign office. The undertaking in question would appear to be that referred to in my despatch of the 10th inst. Mr. Crisp, however, then engaged not merely to issue no prospectus, but to proceed no further in the

matter of the loan without previous notice to this Department. The present notification seems to indicate that Mr. Crisp has in the meanwhile made the necessary arrangements for underwriting and has completed all other preparations for the issue of the loan; it can therefore, scarcely be regarded as fulfilling the undertaking which he was understood to have given."

Later on the British foreign minister instructs Sir J. Jordan to decline to place the Crisp loan on record.

The unofficial story of this transaction is given as follows by Mr. Crisp, and it throws a strong light on the methods and possible consequences of secret manœuvres that are known as "diplomacy." Mr. Crisp said:—

"Public opinion in this country would be unable properly to determine whether his action was justified or not until it knew what the conditions were that the Powers sought to impose upon China. In the absense of an official statement, let them allow him to state what he knew of the position. The Six Powers [Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan and the United States] had nominated certain bankers to deal with China. In the case of France there were some twenty-six, in the case of Germany there were several, in Russia there was one, in England there was one, whilst he believed that Morgans represented the United States, and the Yokohama Specie Bank Japan. A meeting had been held in Paris, at which the delegates put forward what he would call political pretensions. If he was rightly informed, Japan stated that as a condition precedent to China's being allowed to raise money by way of a loan the reorganization of the military forces of China was to be made over to Japan. What the requirement of Russia was he did not know but he was prepared to state that the

position of Russia vis-à-vis China undoubtedly entitled that county to a considerable voice in things affecting China. Whether England would have been altogether justified in supporting the whole of Russia's demands was a question which he would not seek to answer, because he did not know exactly what those demands were. It was probably true that the English representative suitably emphasized the fact that the policy of England was to maintain the integrity of China and the open door. When it was known in China what the Powers collectively were after, public opinion had become agitated. He had it from Dr. Morrison first hand that Yuan-Shi-Kai would have been driven from office if he had sought to persuade the people to comply with those terms. He (Mr. Crisp) had considered that he and his associates were perfectly free to enter into a transaction with the Chinese government."

As to the questions raised between himself and the foreign office, Mr. Crisp stated:—

"I was approached with regard to the raising of a Chinese loan for £10,000,000, but before considering the communication I went to the Chinese Legation, where I met Dr. Morrison (formerly Peking correspondent of the "Times" and now political adviser to China), to whom I stated my belief that China could provide security for a £10,000,000 loan, and that the honesty of China, which had become a tradition, made me of opinion that the loan should be given. Nevertheless, I was not prepared to go farther without Dr. Morrison's support.

"The assurances that I received from him, the greatest living authority on China, satisfied me that the transaction was one in which the British in-

vestor would gladly participate. My inquiries in the City assured me of such support as made the completion of the negotiations certain. City people regarded the loan not only as affording the London market an opportunity of taking in hand a remunerative business, but they also believed that its completion would do something to restore British prestige in the Far East.

"Having acquired these assurances of financial support, I went to the foreign office and informed the official in charge of the China department that my firm contemplated concluding a contract with China. The matter was discussed with great frankness on both sides. I was assured that outside the recognized Six-Nation group it would be impossible for anyone to raise a loan for China. I replied that to my own knowledge there were at least five groups that would gladly undertake the transaction.

"I was then informed that the foreign office was committed to affording its diplomatic support to the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank and its associates, and that no other combination would be tolerated. It was further suggested that the Chinese government was not likely to disregard the advice tendered by our Minister in Peking upon the matter, and that Sir John Jordan would advice Yuan Shi-kai and the Chinese government not to enter into any contract such as that contemplated. I was further told that I had better regard the business as quite hopeless and incapable of completion.

"It seemed to me that the official estimate of the facts was so deplorably awry that I was not called upon to refrain from the business for the reasons stated, and I suggested that the foreign office should write me a formal letter asking me for reasons of state to abstain from the negotiations, in which case I would have abandoned the transac-

tion. The verbal reply given to me was that as the foreign office possessed no means of enforcing its views upon me I was free to act as I thought fit. As I knew full well that China would not repudiate the contract, it was duly completed and signed on August 30th.

"Early the following morning I left London and remained abroad for ten days. On my return I was invited to go to the foreign office, where I was told that the contract would most undoubtedly be repudiated by the Chinese government. To this view I demurred, as it did not correspond with the information at my disposal. I sought to make it clear that the London parties to the contract were absolutely bound, as contracts once made could, according to the practice of the City of London, only be abrogated by mutual consent.

"Then I suggested that in view of later developments the foreign office might care to write a letter to my firm desiring us to refrain from the execution of the contract, as the possession of such a letter would justify me in approaching the Chinese government on the question of the cancellation of the agreement. Again the foreign office declared its inability to write any letter. But a formula was found, namely, that my group would not proceed to the issue of the loan without first intimating to the foreign office that it contemplated such a step.

"In due course a representative of my firm conveyed to the foreign office an intimation that the issue of the loan would be proceeded with. In the absence of any communication from the foreign office since that date it was clear to me and my friends that we must proceed under the contract. It would appear that the foreign office did not formally ask the Chinese government to repudiate its contract. I do not suppose that any British Minister would ever undertake such an invidious task."

In reply to the statement (as given in the House of Commons by a member of the government) that the reason the Six-Power group did not consider that China was free to borrow from other sources because of the negotiations with the powers, the Chinese government point to their own correspondence prior to the dealing with Mr. Crisp, in which the negotiations with the Six-Power group were definitely declared off, the Powers having refused to make advances asked for, and China then held herself free to deal with other banks. The only answer of the six powers to this was that the notification miscarried. The Chinese government, however, gave full proof of its communications, and the Chinese Minister of Finance in a letter in September specifically referred to this letter of withdrawal, giving its date. When confronted with this proof the bankers admitted the letter of September, but said they thought the reference to the letter of withdrawal was a clerical error.

The foregoing account shows how, if this conspiracy for blackmailing China had gone through, that country would have been handed over to a serfdom under the domination of two military powers, while Great Britain and the United States and Germany would have found even the "open door" reduced to a fiction. The logical sequence might have been a war with its battlefields in Asia. As these pages go to press Russia is still bulldosing China on the loan question and using the name of the Six-Power group in her threats. Again the sympathies of the mass of the British people appear to be with the Chinese people in this matter, but what does representative government amount to when a band of money-lenders and concessionaires can move the mighty arm of a nation to cripple the independence of a peaceable people and put the country's resources in pawn? This is not government by the people; it is government by cabal. The frightful chasm from which the British nation has thus escaped ought to rouse the people to

demand that henceforth there shall be no secret Junto diplomacy, and that no single mortal shall have it in his power to make a compact which shall bind a nation to the alternative of dishonor or war.

CHAPTER XII.

BACK DOOR DIPLOMACY AND THE ISSUE OF WAR.

IT is said by a publicist who has made a study of modern methods of influencing governments that one of these secret compacts, which has given much trouble to the very nation in whose favor it was devised, was the work of a subordinate official, who is not known to a thousand people in his own country, and who, incidentally, served his own family's financial interests in the scheme which his chief was induced to adopt. But however unselfish a man's motives, no man or cabinet, in these days of discussion and publicity, should be permitted to bargain away a people's right of deciding their own policy. This, however, is what is continually happening in European diplomacy, and the Canadian people will do well if they take care that the principles of responsible government, won in past times at such cost, shall not be subverted by like methods. The question naturally arises in the naval problem, Are the Canadian people, without some evidence of reform in British administration, willing to permit the issue of war to depend on a secret pact which may prove to be entirely against the true interests of this country? If the "yellow peril" is now, or should prove to be, really a peril, we should owe it to the secret treaty with Japan and to such shameless politico-financial conspiracies as exposed in the Chinese loan case.

Let us avoid in Canadian public affairs the deeds done in the dark in the name of diplomacy. The people can be trusted to render a righteous decision if they are truthfully informed, and common sense and good judgment are not monopolized by politicians. If "government by the people" means anything to us, no policy affecting our external relations should be adopted without the fullest information and consideration.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE REFERENDUM?

BEFORE the last elections there was much talk of a referendum on the naval question, and it is now said that this matter will be referred to the people in the near future. The important point is, in what form will this referendum be made? Will it be that an answer will be asked to the abstract question as to whether the Canadian nation shall embark in a policy of navy-building or navy-buying? Or will the people be asked to endorse the acts already done by one party or the other? If the latter question is placed before the people, then manifestly the principle will not be touched at all. The proposition will be reduced to a mere decision between the schemes of two political parties, both of whom have prejudged the case by committing the country to a course which may prove to be entirely against the conscience of the country.

CHAPTER XIV.

FREEDOM OF COMMERCE IN WAR TIME—ONE LAW ON LAND, ANOTHER ON SEA—A DANGEROUS SITUATION.

AS it is clear that the daily needs of the great civilized peoples require imports and exports by sea, and, as one argument for big navies is the protection of trade routes, half the motive for any war between them would be cut off if private property were made free from seizure. But this is precisely what Great Britain has not been willing to agree to. For many years the United States, to its honor, has urged that the claim to capture vessels of commerce should be abandoned by belligerent nations. Great Britain has been the stoutest to oppose this reform. Why? The argument as advanced by members of the present British government is that "the power to capture an enemy's commerce is essential to our security, inasmuch as the abandonment of it would leave us powerless to 'close the road' against an enemy." But the high sea is a neutral area, and the rights of all nations upon it are equal. How, then, will this argument appear to other nations who use the sea —let us say Germany or France? The British ground for claiming the mastery of the sea, whereon all nations have equal rights in time of peace, is that the British people would starve if their sea commerce were cut off. But we have already seen that the German industrial population would also starve if their sea-borne commerce were cut off. In holding to the old contention the British statesmen maintain the right to secure to the British people the means of living—which is natural and reasonable; and they at the same time assert the right to starve the people of other nations—which is inhumane

and unreasonable. Such an attitude is not only out of harmony with the historic boast of British fair play; but it places every other nation that has need of the sea in the position of appearing there upon the sufferance of a single power. Can we wonder that self-respecting peoples object to this assumption, and that a nation like Germany must regard it as a menace to its own safety. The British claim might have been less one-sided a hundred years ago, when imports and exports from beyond the sea were not a prime necessity to nations who lived a more self-contained life, and when Britannia could rule the waves without real peril to their own freedom. But when the call for interoceanic intercourse makes equal opportunity on the high seas a primary need of even small nations, the stars in their courses must fight against an assumption upon which Britain is to use all her power to deny to other nations the right-of-life which she sets up as the base of her own naval expansion.

If the reader belonged to a nation whose working people could be reduced to beggary through the destruction of its sea-commerce by a nation which pleaded the safety of its own commerce as the reason for maintaining an overpowering navy, what would he think of the situation? The plea of the big-navy partisans that Britain's interest is for an open sea has now no better basis than the like plea by Germany and the other nations, and if a great naval war breaks out, who is to judge between the contending powers as to the justice of the quarrel? Can we expect that the world will forever acquiesce in Great Britain being judge of all the nations by virtue of her power to starve them? When men like Lord Salisbury admit, after the event, that Great Britain was wrong in the Crimean war, is it not possible that she may be wrong in the next war?

If, then, Great Britain wants to continue to rule the waves by a departure from the Golden Rule, are Canadian people prepared to follow her in that depar-

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ture, with all its ultimate consequences? But the plain man will say: "Surely this cannot be the situation. The honest Briton cannot have lost his sense of fair play to this extent." No; the average Englishman is as honest and fair-dealing now as fifty or a hundred years ago, but the truth is that the average Englishman does not know the present-day facts. Neither does many a legislator realize the economic changes that have swept over the world, nor the logic of those changes making the great nations as "neighbors in the same streets." Some, it is to be feared, who do know better are clouded in their judgment by the influences that are spread about them, whose source is in special trade privileges and the profits of war preparations.

Lest any Canadian who wants to get at the truth should think there is some mistake on this point, he is referred to the proceedings of the Hague Conference in 1907, where in Vol. III., p. 766, he will see the resolution offered by Mr. Choate, delegate from the United States, in which it is proposed that "private property of citizens or subjects of the signatory powers with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt from capture on the sea." Mr. Choate quoted from a speech by Lord Palmerston as far back as 1856, in which that British statesman advocated the freedom of private property, and his ground was that this would only be extending to the rules of war upon the sea the same principles as have long been applied to war upon land. That is sound sense. Lord Palmerston afterwards changed his mind, not because he questioned the principle, but for the curious reason that "if we adopted these principles we should almost reduce war to an exchange of diplomatic notes," as if the bloodless settlement of disputes would be a misfortune.

The reader should know that, with some reservations on points of detail, Germany supported the Choate motion at The Hague, and that among other nations

voting for it were Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Norway, Holland, Roumania, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and a number of other states, while among those who joined Great Britain in opposing it were France, Japan, Russia and Mexico. There was a two-thirds majority for the resolution, but as a unanimous vote was required it was not adopted.

In an article in the December (1912) number of the "Nineteenth Century" Lord Avebury (Sir John Lubbock) shows the inconsistency of the British contention, and quotes the late Lord Chancellor (Lord Loreburn) and Sir Henry Maine, a great authority on international law, to show that international equity as well as the economic interests of Great Britain, require the freedom of peaceful commerce. Sir Henry Maine says: "Unless wars must be altogether discarded as certain never again to occur, our situation [that of Great Britain] is one of unexampled danger. Some part of the supplies which are matter of life and death to us may be brought to us as neutral cargo with less difficulty than before the Declaration of Paris was issued; but a nation still permitted to employ privateers can interrupt and endanger our supplies at a great number of points, and so can any nation with a maritime force of which any material portion can be detached for predatory cruising. It seems, then, that the proposal of the American government to give up privateers on condition of exempting all private property from capture might well be made by some very strong friend of Great Britain. If universally adopted, it would save our food, and it would save the commodities which are the price of our food, from their most formidable enemies, and would disarm the most formidable class of these enemies."

Lord Loreburn, referring to the fact that President Roosevelt in 1904 suggested a special international conference on this very question, said: "I urge it not upon

any ground of sentiment or of humanity (indeed, no operation of war inflicts less suffering than the capture of unarmed vessels at sea), but upon the ground that, on the balance of argument, coolly weighed, the interests of Great Britain will gain much from a change long and earnestly desired by a great majority of other powers."

By the Declaration of Paris, to which Great Britain is a subscriber, a British ship could not take an enemy's goods if they were in a neutral ship, as the flag covers the goods. But when we understand that the tonnage of the mercantile marine of Great Britain is about 12,000,000 tons, or a little more than the tonnage of all European nations put together—that of Germany, the largest of them, being about 3,000,000 tons—we perceive that Great Britain would be infinitely more endangered by her own obstinacy in this matter than any other power. This is so because, if she engaged in war, there would not be enough neutral vessels to supply her own immense commerce. By extending the Declaration of Paris so as to free all private property at sea Great Britain herself would lose little, if anything, and gain much. "Moreover," argues Lord Avebury, "our investments abroad are so immense, and so widely spread, that it is almost impossible to attack any foreign country without injuring our own property. We talk of foreign nations, but, in fact, there are really no foreign countries. The interests of nations are so interwoven, we are bound together by such strong, if sometimes invisible, threads, that if one suffers, all suffer; if one flourishes, it is good for the rest. . . . In the Crimean war our fleet went to the Baltic and burnt a considerable quantity of Russian produce—that is to say, it was produced in Russia. But whose property was it? Much of it belonged to English merchants and was insured in English fire offices. Take, again, the depredations of the "Alabama." We paid £3,000,000 for the damage done to American shipping—that is to say, shipping

under the American flag. But that very shipping was, much of it, insured in England. The company of which I was chairman had to pay many thousands, and then we were taxed to pay the American government for the injury done to our own property."

So we have a strange situation—that in spite of the fact that material interests of the British people are advanced by peace and injured by war; in spite of the fact that they have most commerce afloat, and consequently most property liable to seizure, we have the representative of Great Britain instructed at the international peace conference to object to making private property free from seizure on sea as it is on land. And yet the danger of such seizure is pleaded as the excuse for spending fresh millions on warships. Are Canadians safe to follow where such self-hypnotism leads? If such an inconsistent attitude were taken by any other nation would we not be suspicious of the professions of that nation? Suppose, again, that Canada had no special interest in, or connection with, Great Britain, what would our natural attitude be on the seizure of vessels of commerce? We want to sell our grain, cattle, produce, fish, timber and minerals not only to Great Britain, but to as many other oversea countries as will buy them. There are many countries that desire to sell to us as keenly as we wish to sell to them. The moment we found that by making such an agreement this exchange of trade could be carried on at all times without risk of capture or destruction we should have very little anxiety to build a navy, for then the only defense we would need would be of and upon our own shores, which, at a small ratio of cost, could be made impregnable against even a great sea-power. So plain is the proposition, and so fully do we credit the Englishman with common sense, that the average Canadian must almost be compelled to think that back of this freedom of private property question there must be some mysterious

reasons of state, known only to a few exalted personages, to whom are committed by some Divine decree a number of awful secrets that can neither be known nor weighed by the ordinary citizen. There are no such mysteries—except that eternal mystery common to every race and tongue and not confined to the realm of diplomacy, that men can be found who know the right but are ready to do the wrong.

CHAPTER XV.

DEDUCTIONS FROM THE QUESTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.

BUT if Great Britain were to-day in the position of Canada, in having no navy and no powerful vested interests engaged in making money out of warships and armaments, can we imagine that anything would please her more than to gain so easily the safety and freedom of those communications on which the daily life of her people now depend? Or if we could imagine that the founders of our own Confederation had decided that this country could never hope to be worthy of a place among the nations unless it assisted the mother country to deny to all nations the privileges on the sea which she claims for herself—if instead of transcontinental railways and canal systems a Canadian navy had been started, employing the best engineering skill in producing that which, by the rapid changes in science, becomes almost obsolete by the time it is finished—if political honors and high tariff favors had been given to our princes of finance, with the temptation of very profitable contracts

and an increasing number of workmen and merchants interested in or depending upon these war office contracts, would it be such an easy matter to wipe all the figures off the slate and judge this as an abstract question? It seems almost a pity that Sir John Macdonald and Alexander MacKenzie did not start on the true foundation of nation building by creating a navy and leaving the present generation of statesmen the happier problem of finding the money. As it is, we can only lay broad and deep the holes where the money will be poured, leaving to our children the glory of discovering how to keep their heads above water when the new levies of taxes have to be met.

How, then, stands the balance of reason on this freedom-of-private-property question? Nations do not now make war against individuals, but against nations and governments, and, since for over a hundred years private property on land has been held inviolate, what reason is there for maintaining a reversed code upon the sea? None whatever, that can appeal to the plain man. The principle being the same for land or sea, and having faith still in British fair play, we look for an early admission that the present attitude is wrong. If this wrong is not confessed and repented of, then the alternative is a renewal of competition in navy building, and this will positively lead to civil war or foreign war or both in Great Britain and Germany. The pressure of taxation upon the poor in these countries cannot be borne much longer. If Great Britain admits her wrong, then there will be no excuse for Canadian participation in this business, for then there will be naval reduction instead of expansion. In any case Canada can well await the outcome of the next Hague conference on this question.

Until the British government controls the building of warships and armament, and stops their export, and until she gives to the people of other nations the liberty of the sea which is the professed object of her own naval

expansion, is it not plain that the entry of Canada and the other Dominions on this pathway will not rescue the Mother Country from her danger, but will only hasten and ensure her doom?

We now know, however, that neither the start Canada had made in a local navy nor the present gift of dreadnoughts has had any effect on the naval policy of Germany. When the German Grand Admiral, von Koester, who is also president of the German Navy League, was asked the other day to give his opinion of the Canadian naval gift, he replied that he had nothing to add to what he had said at Greiz on Anglo-German naval relations. What he said at Greiz is thus translated for the "Daily Mail," of London:—

> "In both countries patriotic men are working to bring about an understanding. Such an understanding can, and ought, to be made only on the basis of equality; that is to say, we must be considered fully at liberty to look after our naval interests. Mr. Churchill recently said that the way to keep Anglo-German relations healthy was to put an end to naval rivalry by proving that England is not to be overtaken. I do not see what this means. We have never thought of building a fleet as strong as England's. Hitherto we have contented ourselves with a one-to-two ratio, and we believe this proportion to be fully adequate for the defenhive objects our fleet has in view and always will have. Mr. Asquith said that war is terrible, but that it might in certain circumstances be the only alternative for deciding differences between nations. I personally do not think such blood-letting between England and Germany is necessary. I am of opinion that it can in all circumstances be avoided if England has the necessary respect for us. She will only have it if we are well armed at sea."

Admiral von Koester's speech concluded with an appeal for a flying squadron of armored cruisers as a "bitterly needed" addition to the German battle fleet.

CHAPTER XVI.

LESSONS FROM THE OLD LANDS AND LIGHT FROM THE NEW.

AS already shown, the situation in the Mother Country is dangerous because groups of private interests have been allowed to acquire powers that affect the nation's sovereign rights, and are able, under present circumstances, to shape the world's naval policy without any accountability to this nation or any other nation whose funds it uses. Supposing we leave out of sight the risks of war, can we reflect on the drift of things without seeing any connection between the naval expenditure, now approaching $250,000,000 annually, and the social debasement that characterizes the industrial areas of Britain? If there is any connection at all between the two evils, has it no significance for Canada? Shall we create the conditions that breed the poverty and social festers of the slum cities of the Old Land? From a distorted notion of loyalty, are we to say we have no fresh thought to contribute to the problem—that we must blindfold our eyes and enter this bedlam without care or knowledge as to how we shall get out, or whether or not we are making a bad matter worse? Have we no solution to offer out of the teachings of our own history? Canada and the United States have lived side by side for a hundred years, and the great fresh water seas that unite or divide them have swarmed every year with

"Would that my tongue could utter
The thoughts that arise in me

vessels of commerce that need the protection of powerful navies just as much as those of the salt seas, yet there are no Dreadnoughts here, nor have any millions been spent on the fortifications of the great emporiums of commerce on either side of these lakes. Let us try to fit these historical realities into the theory that a big navy is absolutely essential to the conduct of commerce on water, that in time of peace we should prepare for war, etc. Instead of voting millions to bear up an incubus that is already breaking the backs of the sweating and sweated peoples of Europe, let us spend some millions on missions to every nation to explain how the two nations comprising an entire continent of people have carried on a water-borne trade on this surpassing scale for a century under these impossible conditions.

CHAPTER XVII.

MISFIT THEORIES OF NATIONAL POWER.

PROVERBS and their misapplication, false maxims and unproved theories are accountable for much of the world's misdirected energies and for many of its grievous troubles.

There is a saying that the ostrich hides its head in the sand to avoid its enemies. But ostriches have been carefully observed for the past forty years, both in their wild state and in captivity, in Africa, America and the antipodes, and there is no solitary instance where this bird has been known to do such a thing. Many very unjust deductions have been made from the supposed habit.

Another common saying is that history repeats itself. This is true only in the sense that like causes

produce like effects. It is true that nations develop and decay, that conflicts, including conflicts of arms, occur between peoples, that languages change and survive or disappear according to their merit or the character of the people who use them, and systems of government succeed or fail. But these are minor eddies and cross-currents, operating according to cause and effect, on a broad stream whose movements tend ever onward and not in a circle. A study of human history at large shows that there is no such thing as a repetition. Each world movement sweeps along and serves its purpose for the age, but is never exactly duplicated. There is no place in the fabric of human history for two Egypts, two Israels and Judahs, two Greeces and two Romes. They are each unique. Therefore, when people take the proverb, "History repeats itself," and apply it to the naval problem as a proof that physical force and bloodshed must always determine the movements of mankind, or are the only sources of a nation's power they are looking at the eddies and not at the broad current of time's river. If the reader will keep in mind the few facts regarding modern war recited in these pages, and will then recall the wars of ancient times, he will confess that the purposes, the methods and the rules of war have been profoundly altered, and most notably within the last hundred years. It is reasonable to deduce that further changes will affect the occurrence of war itself.

The naval wars of Nelson's time and before have been taken as the foundation of a philosophy which modern politicians have sought to fit to the conditions of to-day on the false maxim that the history we are now making is a mere rehearsal of the dramas that have been acted. The result is the approach to the disastrous collapse which the world is now dreading. This misfit theory has been formulated in such works as those of Captain (now Admiral) A. T. Mahan, of the United States navy in "Influence of Sea Power in History."

(1890), in "The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and the Empire" (1892), in the "Interests of the United States in Sea Power" (1897), in "Sea Power in Relation to the War of 1812" (1905), and other treatises. One quotation from one of these works sets forth the main theory: "The world has long been accustomed to the idea of a predominant naval power, and it has been noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly associated with commercial and industrial predominance, the struggle for which is now in progress between Great Britain and Germany. Such predominance forces a nation to seek markets, and where possible to control them to its own advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is possession. . . . It is an inevitable link in a chain of logical sequences: industry, markets, control, navy, bases."

"Well," replies Norman Angell, "the relative economic situation of the small states gives the lie to this profound philosophy. It is seen to be just learned nonsense when we realize that all the might of Russia or Germany cannot secure for the individual citizen better general economic conditions than those prevalent in the little states. The citizens of Switzerland, Belgium or Holland—countries without 'control,' or navy or bases, or 'weight in the councils of Europe,' or the 'prestige of a great power,' are just as well off as Germans, and a great deal better off than Austrians or Russians. Thus, if it could be argued that the security of the small states is due to the various treaties guaranteeing their neutrality, it cannot be argued that those treaties give them the political power and 'control' which Admiral Mahan and other exponents of the orthodox statecraft assure us is a necessary factor in national prosperity. And one may question whether their security is due even to the treaties of neutrality, for how can the value of a credit which is derived from a guarantee stand higher than the credit of the guarantor? And these stocks of the

lesser states rank higher than those of the great states which guarantee them. Moreover, such a conclusion of itself would condemn the supporters of the great armaments, because it would imply that international good faith constituted a better defence than armaments."

The United States has put this theory into practice in its recent politics. Starting with the acquisition of the "markets" of Hawaii through a reciprocity treaty, it obtained "control" through a revolution incited by its own citizens, and it is now making those islands one of its "bases." By similar means it planted "industries" and obtained the "markets" of Cuba and Porto Rico, and then by force of arms attained "control" of those islands and the Philippine Islands, where there are "bases" now established.* By these inevitable links in the "chain of logical sequences" the government of the United States broke away from the farewell counsel of George Washington and then committed the first breach of its own monologue, the Monroe doctrine. The Monroe doctrine was a notice to European nations against trespassing—a warning that those nations must not commit aggressions on American peoples by force of arms; and the counterpart of it was an undertaking that the United States on its part would not interfere in European politics or commit aggressions on the people of other continents. To quote the words of a writer† in the

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* If the reader questions these deductions he will do well to refer to "Theodore Roosevelt, Dynamic Geographer," a biographical sketch by Dr. Frank B. Vrooman, in which the deliberate preparations for the "control" of these islands and their markets are set forth. This was before the blowing up of the "Maine" in 1898.

† This writer points out that the southern part of South America is nearer to Europe than to the United

"Atlantic Monthly." "This famous doctrine was the clear cut expression of the sense of American obligation towards the protection of the ideals and institutions for which the nation then stood, but for which it stands no longer. . . . Whatever strength the nation had in reason and equity in preaching that Monroe creed it lost when it began to practise another doctrine."

It is true that the name of a Republic has been given back to Cuba, but the naval "bases" have been retained and the "markets" have been virtually monopolized in both Cuba and the Philippines by a system of discrimination in its own favor by a preferential tariff, which is the modern synonym for the colony-farming system of old Rome.

Doubtless the great majority of the people of the United States were moved by generous impulses, and took in good faith the ostensible purpose given out for the war, and it is pleaded that these things have brought betterment to the people of the Philippines and Cuba, but what have they done to the people of the United States? That question cannot yet be fully answered, because the harvest has not yet been reaped. But there is a partial answer in some of the signs of the harvest, now ripening

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States; that estimating a population of twenty million people of Germanic origin in the United States, and considering the British, American and German people are of the same stock, he urges that these people should "get together," and that Germany be encouraged to develop parts of South America, such as Southern Brazil, rather than that this work should be left to Asiatics. He ridicules the Monroe doctrine as one which, having served its purpose in 1823, is out of tune with world-geography now, even if it had not been violated by the United States; and warns his countrymen that if they continue to worship this fetich and refuse to see that the world has moved since 1823 they will run into disaster.

from the seeds of "industry, markets, control, navy, bases." The acquisition of the Philippines made necessary a great enlargement of the navy to protect the conquered territory, and the starting of the United States on a new programme of naval expansion had the effect, by example, and by new fears and questionings arising in Europe, of accelerating the German naval expansion, and that, in turn, had its effect on Great Britain and the rest of the naval nations. The result is that last year the United States war department required to spend a round sum of $220,000,000, and to-day its armaments, pensions and interest on its war debts wipes out sixty-five per cent. of the entire national income, leaving scarcely more than a third for administrative and constructive work. The infatuation of German high councillors of state with this theory has borne like generous fruit to those who profit by war preparations and a bitter fruit to those who pay the taxes, for the naval expenditure of that empire has expanded from $45,000,000 in 1901 to over $113,000,000 in 1912, not counting public works fairly chargeable against the naval schemes. And here, too, the total cost of war preparation in Germany is two-thirds of the national income.

Then the invasion of the Philippine Islands in violation of the Monroe doctrine has had the natural effect on a guilty conscience in magnifying the immigration of Japanese into a "yellow peril," and this again calls for more "sea power" to allay this fear. Witness its effect on the conduct of the Panama Canal. When Admiral Yashiro, in command of a Japanese squadron, visited the Canal in 1911, he remarked that it was a pity to fortify the Canal, as this "would invite attack." The remark was telegraphed to the "Times," was cabled at once from London to Washington, and there caused the immediate passing of the credit for the cost of the fortifications. "The Admiral," says the special correspondent of the "Times," was censured by his govern-

ment, but there are Americans whose opinion carries weight who think that the Canal would have been safest unfortified under an international guarantee. The guarding of this canal against serious attack is no easy problem; and, so far, at least, as Congress is concerned, it has hardly as yet been seriously faced, and credits have only been voted for part of the system of fortifications planned by the military authorities." The correspondent, after showing the tremendous difficulties of providing a really effective protection and the consequent seriousness of the disaster if the Canal were seized by a hostile force, adds: "This possibility will mean the maintenance in the Canal zone of a large military force. This is at present fixed at 8,000 men, but it is said that a permanent garrison of 20,000 troops will have to be kept there." In the United States it is thought by many that the fortification of the Canal would lessen the need of a big navy, but as to the effect on completing the Canal the "Times'" correspondent says: "To me the exact reverse seems to be the truth, for the Canal zone, depending, as it will, on sea transport for its supplies, will, in case of war, have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of an island." "Oh, limèd soul, that, struggling to be free, art more engaged!"

Yet an international guarantee, based on the same mutual trust that has made the Canadian-American lakes the safest of the world's waterways, would have been easy to make, and could even yet be arranged. If made, it would in itself be a great forward step in strengthening the forces of international good-will.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE GERMAN EMPEROR AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

NO discussion of Anglo-German relations from the Canadian standpoint would be rounded without bringing into view the personality of the Emperor William. When he became ruler of the German Empire he was called the "War Lord" in the American and English papers, but he has reigned now nearly a quarter of a century, and, except for the operations in West Africa and China, he has brought on no wars. "He has been lampooned and ridiculed in season and out of season, with reason and without reason," but, smiling at the ridicule and forgetting the bitter personal attacks, "he has consistently stood as the friend of England and the Anglo-Saxon world, and has incurred not once, but many times the hostility of many sections of his own people because of this friendship." These quotations are from the preface to a book by Alfred H. Fried on "The German Emperor and the Peace of the World," and of the author Mr. Angell says he "certainly has no prejudice in favor of Emperor William and the system and philosophy he represents," and that, therefore, Fried's testimony is all the more valuable for its impartiality. "The fact of Alfred Fried's life and work is, by the way, a curious commentary on the opinions of those who urge that German-speaking Europe is impervious to pacifist endeavor. Fried has created what is undoubtedly the most efficient periodical of the pacifist movement in the world, and that periodical appears in the German tongue. That there are powerful strongholds of reactionary thought in Germany no one would deny, but to represent Germany as an intellectual entity shut off by a Chinese wall from the general Euro-

pean movement of opinion is disproved by the facts contained in this book and by the work of its author." The author shows that as time has rolled on the German Emperor, notwithstanding his fondness for soldiering, is now being recognized by the world as a patient and powerful worker for peace, and his ambitions are those of a man who would like to see the nations of Europe duplicate on that continent the peaceful unity of purpose that has prevailed for the last hundred years among the peoples of the American continent. On the opening of the Kiel Canal in 1895, when warships from most of the civilized nations joined in the celebration, the Emperor said: "We are joining together two seas. Our thoughts turn towards the sea—the symbol of eternity. The seas no longer separate us, they bind us together, and are themselves bound together by this new link for the blessing and peace of all nations. The mail-clad giants assembled to-day in the Kiel waters symbolize peace, the co-operation of all civilized nations in their great mission of civilization. And, as we look across the endless sea, we cast, too, a glance upon the sea of nations. The eyes of the whole world are lifted questioningly towards us. They sue for peace. Only in peace can the world's trade be developed, in peace only can it prosper. We desire to maintain that peace, and will do so."

In many speeches he has suggested the idea of a United States of Europe, but never as a federation to be brought about by the sword. Sir Max Wæchter, whose life has been devoted to preaching a federation of all Europe, published in 1908 an account of an interview he had with the Kaiser. "The Emperor," wrote Sir Max, "said he knew me by name, and that he had always been most keenly interested in the scheme of a federation of Europe, which would put an end to the enormous waste of military expenditure and customs duties. . . . He repeatedly expressed his approval,

and finally said: "I lend my hand to any plan that can help to promote the great cause of peace."

Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, of France, in giving an account of conversations in 1909 with the Kaiser, said: "The Emperor has, on the whole, remained very faithful to his original scheme of a federation of all civilized states, and if he once spoke of a Yellow Peril, it was solely in order to draw attention to the divided state of Europe in the face of New Worlds which had so many natural advantages over the older one." He declared to the Baron: "We only wish to solve problems dividing the civilized world, to render it more easy for nations to live in harmony, to group together the forces of Europe, for it may be necessary later to use these united forces in the interests of a common economic policy."

Lord Salisbury, it may be remembered, urged a federation of Europe during his whole public life, and his arguments were a counterpart of those of the Emperor.

When the Interparliamentary Conference of 1908 was held in Berlin the Emperor sent this message: "I hope that the gathering which is being attended by so many distinguished men from all parts of the world will find itself at home in my capital, and for its part will strive for the maintenance of the blessings of universal peace, which I have so particularly at heart."

There is no room to doubt the complete sincerity of these and many similar expressions, for they correspond with the main trend of his actions in recent years, and with his known influence in favor of meeting other nations in an accommodating spirit when causes of friction have occurred. There is, of course, the paradox that the Emperor still believes in the theory: "If you would have peace, be prepared for war." The author explains this as follows: "When he advocates an organization of states, he advocates, even if indirectly, a de-

crease in armaments. And he is quite right so long as no other guarantees are forthcoming . . . but it is admitted that there are other ways of maintaining peace, and that the development of these new guarantees must be pursued with the same energy that has hitherto been expended on armaments. . . . In the days when the German naval policy was still young, the Emperor was able to say that with the launch of every German warship a further guarantee for peace on earth was afforded. We may pardon the soldier Emperor, who took his pride in the growing sea power of Germany, this erroneous view. The error was admitted at the time by experienced diplomats." Opinions are then quoted by the author to show that "voices in favor of an understanding on armaments are daily becoming more numerous and influential, a politician of such pronounced imperialistic views as Frederick Nauman declaring that "disarmament will cost us all the more the longer it is delayed," and the author predicts that the Emperor will not be the last to see the necessity for a decrease in armaments.

In connection with this subject the Emperor himself is a problem that must be explained. Our author says: "So far, the Emperor has appeared to us as an inexplicable paradox. He has always been in the front rank of the moderns when it is a question of technical innovation, new means of communication, the perfection of guns, rifles, battleships and torpedoes, the building of roads, the digging of canals and the construction of railways. But in purely intellectual matters he has hitherto been a conservative." This combination is nothing unusual, but "the new method of securing peace is an intellectual one; with the technical alone it can no longer be done. In addition to firearms we require treaties facilitating communication, thus drawing peoples closer together. In addition to armor plate we require arbitration agreements. . . . War material formerly provided the only means whereby a state could force

its view on another state. A change has supervened which must be taken into account by even the most enthusiastic supporter of armaments. War material is no longer an instrument to carry out the will of a state; it is used only to protect the state against the will of another state being imposed on it. . . . War material which to-day is the defence of the individual state will later become the defence of the community of states and be used for performing police duties in the name of a common civilization." We see this already done in the Boxer troubles in China, and in the present situation at Constantinople, where the bluejackets of the combined nations kept order for the distracted Turks.

Such events cannot take place without impressing a mind so alert as that of the Kaiser. Mr. Fried's book brings out many other interesting facts, showing a progressing, broadening and a wider sympathy in the Emperor's views, more especially in the persistent goodwill he has shown towards France, in spite of many rebuffs and discouragements. This alone shows the possession of a soul from which the world should have great hope.

The present writer's opinion is that the Emperor William's exaggerated notion of the value and effect of sea power is simply the result of his respect for English opinion and precedent. The circumstance that Britain's growth in social and intellectual power, in political influence and in financial and industrial activity have been synchronous with her naval predominance may be mistaken for cause and effect. He has reasoned that there must be some direct connection between sea-power and soul-power; if so, the measure of his mistake is the measure of Anglo-Saxon moral decline in judging that material possessions and material force are the first essentials of a people's greatness.

As to his regard of the British people, Prof. Benjamin Ide Wheeler, president of the University of California, in an article in the Toronto "Globe," says:—

> "Every well-informed person knows, or by this time ought to know, that the thought of a war with Britain is plainly abhorrent to the Emperor's mind. He greatly admires, as it is plain to all, the sturdy character of the average Englishman and his common sense. He does not forget that he was the grandchild, and the favorite grandchild, of Queen Victoria, and that she died in his arms. He would evidently value British appreciation. It sometimes seems as if he were nonplussed at the failure of the British people to understand him to understand his kindly disposition toward them, and to take him at his word. They interpret his utterances regarding friendly relations as mere formal diplomacy. He means them precisely as he says them,"

and Prof. Wheeler wonders why the people of Britain have been so slow to recognize him as their best friend in Europe.

It is true the Emperor has a strong belief in the Divine right of kings, but this belief is a safeguard rather than a danger so long as he does not forget the source of his authority nor imagine that it confers infallibility of judgment or infinity of knowledge.

Turning for a moment from the German Emperor to the German people in their relation to the people of Britain and America, let us recall the fact that the British, the American (including the Canadian) people, and even the French, are largely compounded of the Germanic race. Let us decide whether the large German element in the United States and in England and Canada has been a good element or a bad one. It is the opinion of thinkers of the highest authority that on the whole the element has been for the good of these nations, and it is certainly the boast of many who pride themselves upon the achievements of their race that the German infusion has made for steadiness, strength of character, patient

industry and high mental endowments. Now, if this has been the effect of such infusion upon life within each of these states, why would its effect not be equally good in a wider union—the creation of an international community of interest, whereby in a short time it would be a common saying that war would be unthinkable between the United States and Germany or between Germany and Britain as we now say it is between Canada and the United States? When such an understanding is reached there will be no naval strength wasted in dealing with the uncertainties as between these powers, but the problem would be merely one of providing for contingencies arising out of the doings of the "backward nations." The fleets of these nations would become an international or federal fleet, and the symbol of unity might be an international flag (which, it is said, was actually suggested by the Emperor William), with an international coinage and postage stamps for certain federal purposes.

The failure of nations to reach a friendly understanding is a fault of mental attitude, as in the case of individuals. As Shakespeare tells us, "There's nothing good or bad in life, but thinking makes it so." If the German government and people should unite and persist in thinking that Britain is adding to her already overpowering fleet to destroy the foreign trade of Germany, and if the British fear that the building of the new German fleet means an invasion by a German armada, then the mutual distrust must result in more naval and military expenditure until either civil war or international war ends the rivalry. But suppose—like two neighbors whose suspicions have led them to "protect" themselves by carrying revolvers, but who, after living a life of worry, hatred and fear, decide on a New Year morning to shake hands and lay by their weapons —these nations choose to regard each other not as unfriendly rivals, but as colleagues, whose co-operation for

legitimate objects is a mutual benefit, then the cloud immediately disperses. At this point we may enquire how Canada can best serve the cause of humanity, which is above all nations—by putting forth all her efforts to remove these misunderstandings or by adding to the armaments, which are one of the causes of the misapprehension.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE BALKAN WAR.

THERE are many who approve of a Canadian naval programme on the ground that human nature is unchangeable—that as wars always have been, they always will be, and that to be prepared for war is to prevent it; and that the Balkan war is an evidence of the first statement above, and a disproof of the theories put forth by Mr. Angell in "The Great Illusion." These arguments are taken up elsewhere, but the deductions made from the Balkan war are answered by Mr. Angell in an article in the "Daily Mail," which is summarized as follows:—

> "What has Pacifism, Old or New, to say now?
>
> "What relevancy have questions concerning the profit or loss of war? Do the Balkanese care whether it 'pays' or not? Would the demonstration of its futility have kept the peace? Are 'theories' and 'logic' of the slightest use, since men's conduct is so obviously guided by passion and not by reason?
>
> "So annihilating to the Pacifist are questions of this kind generally regarded that polite people think it rude to say 'Balkans' if a Pacifist be present. They carry the implication that because war

has broken out that fact disposes of all objection to it. The armies are at grips, therefore peace is a mistake. Passion reigns on the Balkans therefore passion is preferable to reason.

"I suppose cannibalism and infanticide, polygamy, judicial torture, religious persecution, witchcraft, during all the years we did these 'inevitable' things, were defended in the same way, and those who resented all criticism of them pointed in triumph to the cannibal feast, the dead child, the maimed witness, the slain heretic, or the burned witch. But the fact did not prove the wisdom of those habits, still less their inevitability; for we have them no more.

"We are all agreed as to the fundamental causes of the Balkan trouble: the hate born of religious, racial, national, and language differences; the attempt of an alien conqueror to live parasitically upon the conquered, and the desire of conqueror and conquered alike to satisfy in massacre and bloodshed the rancour of fanaticism and hatred. Well, in the British islands, not so very long ago, those things were causes of bloodshed; indeed, they were a common feature of European life. But if they are inevitable in human relationship, how comes it that Adana is no longer duplicated by St. Bartholomew; the Bulgarian bands by the vendetta of the Highlander and the Lowlander; the struggle of the Slav and Turk, Serb and Bulgar, by that of Scots and English, and English and Welsh? The fanaticism of the Moslem to-day is no intenser than that of Catholic and heretic in Rome, Madrid, Paris, and Geneva at a time which is only separated from us by the lives of three or four elderly men. The heretic or infidel was then in Europe also a thing unclean and horrifying, exciting in the mind of the orthodox a sincere and honest hatred and a (very

largely satisfied) desire to kill. If you would measure the distance Europe has travelled, think what this means: all the nations of Christendom united in a war lasting two hundred years for the capture of the Holy Sepulchre; and yet, when in our day their representatives, seated round a table, could have had it for the asking, they did not deem it worth the asking, so little of the ancient passion was there left. The very nature of man seemed to be transformed. For, wonderful though it be that orthodox should cease killing heretic, infinitely more wonderful still is it that he should cease wanting to kill him.

"The transformation of the heretic-hating and heretic-killing European is due mainly to economic forces; and it is because the drift of those forces has left the Balkans to one side that war is now raging. By 'economics' I mean not a merchant's profit or a money-lender's interest, but the method by which men earn their bread, which must also mean the kind of life they lead. We generally think of the primitive life of man—that of the herdsman or the tent liver—as something idyllic. The picture is as far as possible from the truth. Those into whose lives economics do not enter, or enter very little—that is to say, those who, like the Congo cannibal, or the Red Indian, or the Bedouin, do not cultivate, or divide their labor, or trade, or save, or look to the future, have shed little of the primitive passions of other animals of prey, the tigers and the wolves, who have no economics at all; and have no need to check an impulse or a hate. But industry, even of the more primitive kind, means that men must divide their labor, which means that they must put some sort of reliance upon one another; the thing of prey becomes a partner, and the attitude towards it changes. And as this life be-

comes more complex, as the daily needs and desires push men to trade and barter, that means building up a social organization, rules and codes, and courts to enforce them; as the interdependence widens and deepens it necessarily means disregarding certain hostilities. If the neighboring tribe wants to trade with you they must not kill you; if you want the services of the heretic you must not kill him, and you must keep your obligation towards him, and mutual good faith is death to long-sustained hatreds.

"You cannot separate the moral from the social and economic development of the people, and the great service of a complex social and industrial organization, which is built up by the desire of men for better material conditions, is not that it 'pays,' but that it leads men to recognize what is the best relationship between them And the fact of recognizing that some act of aggression is causing stocks to fall is not important because it may save Oppenheim's or Solomon's money, but because it is a demonstration that we are dependent upon some community on the other side of the world, that their damage is our damage. It teaches us, as only some such simple and mechanical means can teach, the lesson of human fellowship.

"And it is by such means as this that Western Europe has in some measure, within its respective political frontiers, learnt that lesson. Each has learnt in some measure, within the confines of the nation at least, that wealth is made by work, not robbery; that, indeed, general robbery is fatal to prosperity; that government consists not merely in having the power of the sword, but in organizing society; in maintaining courts; in making it possible to run railways, post-offices, and all the contrivances of a complex society.

"Now, rulers did not create these things; it was the daily activities of the people. But the Balkans have been geographically outside the influence of European industrial and commercial life. The Turk has hardly felt it at all. He has learnt none of the social and moral lessons which interdependence and improved communications have taught the Western European, and it is because he has not learnt these lessons, because he is a soldier and a conqueror, to an extent and completeness that other nations of Europe lost a generation or two since, that war is raging.

"But not merely in this larger sense, but in the more immediate, narrower sense, are the fundamental causes of this war economic. This war arises, as the past wars against the Turkish conqueror have arisen, by the desire of the Christian peoples on whom he lives to shake off this burden. Sir Charles Elliott tells us that 'the history of the Turk is a catalogue of battles. Their contributions to art, literature, science and religion are practically nil. Their desire has not been to instruct, to improve, hardly even to govern, but simply to conquer.' And another author, confirming Sir Charles Elliott, says: 'To live upon their subjects is the Turks' only means of livelihood.'

"But the management of society, simple and primitive even as that of the Balkan mountains, needs some effort and work and capacity for administration, or even rudimentary economic life cannot be carried on. And the Turkish system, founded on the sword and nothing else ('the finest soldier in Europe'), cannot give that small modicum of energy or administrative capacity. The one thing he knows is brute force; but it is not by the strength of his muscles that an engineer runs a machine, but by knowing how. The Turk cannot build a road, or

make a bridge, or administer a post-office, or found a court of law. And these things are necessary. And he will not let them be done by the Christian, who, because he did not belong to the conquering class, has had to work, and has consequently become the class which possesses whatever capacity for work and administration the country can show, because to do so would be to threaten the Turk's only trade. If the Turk granted the Christians equal political rights they would inevitably 'run the country.' And yet the Turk himself cannot do it; and he will not let others do it, because to do so would be to threaten his supremacy.

"And the more the use of force fails, the more, of course, does he resort to it, and that is why many of us who do not believe in force, and desire to see it disappear in the relationship not merely of religious but of political groups, might conceivably welcome this war of the Balkan Christians, in so far as it is an attempt to resist the use of force in those relationships. Of course, I do not try to estimate the 'balance of criminality.' Right is not all on one side—it never is. But the broad issue is clear and plain. And only those concerned with the name rather than the thing, with nominal and verbal consistency rather than realities, will see anything paradoxical or contradictory in Pacifist approval of Christian resistance to the use of Turkish force.

"War did not break out yesterday in the Balkans. It has been waged daily by the Turk for generations. And not the bloodless use of force either. Between the two kinds of war I know no reason why the Pacifist should not give his preference to the relatively more honest and overt.

"But this present war of the Balkan states would never have been necessary if the Christian Powers had not in their international relationship

preserved that general political doctrine of the Turk which they have abandoned within their own respective frontiers. For this has prevented their becoming sufficiently a community to enforce their own treaties. If they had not been afraid of one another, afraid of the Armageddon which threatens as the result of the bad faith or false conceptions of each; suspicious that each will use its position to 'grab' at the expense of the rest—their common action would not have been paralyzed as it has been. It is the one fact which stands out incontrovertibly from the whole weary muddle. It is quite clear that the inability to act in common arises from the fact that in the international sphere the European is still dominated by illusions which he has dropped when he deals with home politics. The political faith of the Turk, which he would never think of applying at home as between the individuals of his nation, he applies pure and unalloyed when he comes to deal with foreigners as nations. The economic conception—using the term in that wider sense which I have indicated earlier in this article —which guides his individual conduct is the antithesis of that which guides his national conduct.

"While the Christian does not believe in robbery inside the frontier, he does without; while within the state he realizes that government is a matter of administration, not the seizure of property; that one town does not add to its wealth by 'capturing' another, that, indeed, one community cannot 'own' another—while, I say, he believes all these things in his daily life at home, he disregards them all when he comes to the field of international relationship, la haute politique. To annex some province by a cynical breach of treaty obligation (Austria in Bosnia, Italy in Tripoli) is regarded as better politics than to act loyally with the community of

nations to enforce their common interest in order and good government. We do not conceive that there can be a community of nations, because, in fact, we do not conceive that their interests are common, but rival; like the Turk, we believe that nations live upon one another, not by co-operation with one another—and it is for this reason presumably that you must 'own' as much of your neighbors as possible. It is the Turkish conception from beginning to end."

Mr. Angell's reasoning discloses the wide gulf separating the character of the Balkan conflict from a war between two nations like Great Britain or the United States and Germany. The Moslem system was propagated by the sword, it has been upheld by the sword, and by the sword it has been ended in Europe. It is a striking proof of the truth of the statement uttered by the highest authority recognized in Christian statesmanship. "They that take the sword shall perish by the sword." It was not an international war; it was a revolt of a people against a ruling caste, and was, therefore, a civil war. Review the history of the Turkish system of government, and the great lesson we draw from the Balkan revolt is that the chief strength of a nation is not in standing armies, in guns and in battleships, but in the square dealing and good-will which disarms enmity.

CHAPTER XX.

SOME FETISHES TO BE ABANDONED.

BEFORE the reign of international law, which is rapidly gaining strength, can displace the force of arms—which never has and never can settle a question of abstract right—some fetishes and illusions must be given up by each nation. To begin at home, the notion that Britannia alone must rule the waves should be given up. Why? Because in any conflict of interest or of right between Great Britain and any other nation the will of the stronger determines the issue—in other words, Great Britain is at once judge, jury and plaintiff in the case. No consensus of opinion or agreement in action would be possible in a case where a single nation assumes the attributes of Deity, in judgment as well as power. The community of nations would not concede this. The boast of British men is freedom, and the refrain of "Britannia rules the waves" is that "Britons never shall be slaves." But the meaning of the word "dominate" is to exercise lordship, and if Britain is to "dominate" the seas does that not reduce the other nations to something less than complete freedom?

Of course, other nations must also give up similar fetishes, and among these is the question of "national honor." An individual litigant cannot in any civil or criminal court in the world appear and say that he is willing to have any point decided by the court but the question of his own personal honor. Such an impertinence would be laughed at in any country, but in international affairs it has done duty up till now to shelter nations in cases where self-interest has something to balk at.

Aggression can be committed by the masked artillery of finance as well as by armies, and the unseen operations

of the first may lead to bloodshed as naturally as the movements of the second. There is a system of aggression upon weaker nations exercised by marking them off as the victims of "spheres of influence." When trade monopolies propose to exploit some new region they appeal to their governments to afford them the cover of "the flag" and under this protection they secure their special trade privileges, using veiled threats where persuasion fails. The invariable result is that the weaker people are made to pay tribute to the trade syndicates, and commercial exploitation is followed by political control. This was the process in North Africa, in Persia, in Thibet, and in essence it was the process in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines. That it did not succeed in the case of China was not because of absence of intent. All this is a misuse of "the flag." The strength of a flag is the degree of righteousness and freedom which it represents in the conduct of national affairs; but it is mere prostitution when that flag is used to deprive a people of their political or commercial freedom. The use of the British navy to protect these trade plunderers, yet to prevent other nations from doing the same violence is, of course, one of the causes of jealousy between Britain and Germany. While this does not justify similar pillage by Germany, the Germans can easily persuade themselves that they are under greater necessity. The case is put by Admiral Chadwick in the address already quoted:—

> "There are now in Germany some 66,000,000 on a territory about equal to North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia and Florida taken together. In Great Britain and Ireland are 45,000,000 on an area just about that of New Mexico, but they have illimitable possibilities of expansion within the British Empire. Nearly a million more Germans will be in the world in 1913 than in 1912, for that is the country's natural increase. Fifteen years hence there

will be a full 80,000,000 of Germans on land which will now grow food for but 60,000,000. The question in the mind of every thoughtful German is: Whence shall come the trade which shall support these extra millions? Where shall they go? Where shall they sell? What shall become of their ever-increasing manufactures? The crux of the situation lies in this last inquiry, which is one common to all great manufacturing nations. And these, to secure and further their trade, have devised the vicious principle of 'spheres of influence,' an expression which in itself epitomizes the whole of the present great difficulties, and which has materialized by the forcible appropriation of vast territories of backward people who cannot defend themselves. The opposition of Great Britain to the desire of Germany to have a share in these fundamentally vicious partitions threatens war."

Again the question comes back to Canadians, Are they to allow their mental and moral balance to be upset by appeals to "loyalty," to the "flag," when this flag is being used abroad to destroy the self-government which has been achieved at such cost and is so much prized at home? If trading companies wish to adventure into other countries, let them take their own risks, and let our government refuse to allow the public peace to be endangered to serve private ends. It is ominous for the people of Great Britain and full of warning to the people of Canada to notice how almost invariably its foreign policy in recent years has been inspired by the question of commercial gain. Any aggression can be committed on a weak people so long as it can be shown that trade can be promoted. It reminds one of the last days of Rome. "When the era of wide conquests came," says one historian, "the government faction for a while would embark on no war that did

not promise direct remuneration, not merely to the state but to themselves. Thus they destroyed Corinth and Carthage because those cities interfered with their growing commercial system; they spared Alexandria because Alexandria was in the main an aid to their gains. Presently their own selfish interests clashed. Then followed political tempests, civil wars."

One of the high politicians from a British Dominion, speaking publicly in London last year, said:—

> "One of the worst species of the 'Little Englander' is the man who has a faculty of seeing signs of impotence in the British people, when the current statistics of their trade overwhelmingly prove the very contrary to be the fact."

Another well-known member of the Imperial parliament, discussing the Persian question, considered it the duty of Great Britain to join Russia in dividing up that country because it promoted trade. Such quotations could be multiplied from the mouths and pens of scores of politicians and journalists who are teaching ethics to the people. It explains the degradation of national ideals, and, in the opinion of some, the lowering of the physical standard of the population. Dr. Tredgold, a high authority on eugenics, after stating that the fall of the birth rate explains the retrogression of the nation, says:—

> "All denominations bewail the loss of Christian faith, and point out that where the ideals of rich and poor alike are confined to the laying up of earthly treasure alone, as though this life were the end of all existence, there is bound to be bitter disappointment and unrest."

Does all this imply that Canadians should submit to the invasion of their own territory? By no means. For the very reason that we should not take part, even for Britain's sake, in aggression on other people, we

should resist such aggressions upon ourselves. But nearly all the misunderstandings that have threatened or caused war in the last century have involved the question of aggressions—either aggressions in actual war or aggressions of trade, which lead thereto. It may be called the international crime of the day. Therefore, the violence we would resist if done to our own territory we should refrain from doing to other nations. Hence, any war in which Canada takes part should stop with the boundary and the seashore.

PART III.—THE MORALS OF WAR.

CHAPTER I.

FOR AND AGAINST WAR.

WITHIN the past few years studies in history and the laws of human life in general have shed a fresh flood of light on the physiological and moral effects of war. Much enlightening literature has been produced on these subjects, and their discussion has naturally brought out a mass of argument on both sides.

The advocates of war and of big armaments say that war brings out the manly qualities and maintains the virility of the race. To this the Pacifists, while admitting that war calls out the heroes who are willing to lay down their lives for their country, reply that in the end war reverses the process of the survival of the fittest, because it selects the best of a nation's blood and courage, and leaves the feeble and the unfit to propagate the race. This argument is further considered in the deductions elsewhere made from Roman history.

The war advocates maintain that combativeness is a fundamental element in human nature, and that the people who lack the courage to fight are already degenerates. To this the Pacifists reply that there are two kinds of courage—that expressed in brute force and that expressed in moral force; that the native courage and energy of men are misdirected when they are manifested in murder (whether that murder is be-

tween individuals or wholesale, as in the case of wars), but that the same courage and energy can be devoted to overcoming the obstacles of nature, such as the drainage and irrigation of waste lands, the construction of railways, canals, telephones and other works of benefit to their fellows; that all the physical advantages of military drill can be obtained by people of sedentary habits in rendering aid to those who are sick or disabled, or in otherwise helping others by any service calling for physical exertion; and that men's fighting instincts can be evoked against insanitation, against epidemic diseases, against social evils, against the vicissitudes of climate or for the rescue of their fellowmen from dangers.

The war advocates say that standing armies and big navies are necessary for defence and to prevent war. "But," reply the Pacifists, "if war is necessary to maintain the virility and manly qualities of a nation, why tax the people to death to prevent it? If war is a good thing, why not have the human slaughter process carried on systematically, as it has been among the central American republics and some of the African and Arabian tribes? *

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* Germany having been counted as a military nation, Mr. Angell points to the fact that in forty years only eight thousand men out of sixty million Germans have been engaged in war, and that against Damaras and Hereros, compared with almost perpetual fighting by the Turks, Arabians, Albanians and north African tribes. On the Western Hemisphere is a similar situation. "The least warlike of all, the nation which has had the least training in war, the least experience of it, which has been the least purified by it, is Canada. After that comes the United States; . . . while the most warlike of all, and consequently the 'most manly and progressive,' are the 'Sambo' republics, like San Domingo, Nicaragua, Columbia and Venezuela. They are always fighting. If

The argument as to the unchangeability of human nature has been taken up under other headings, and it is evident from the facts there quoted that, while the tendency to do wrong persists in human nature, the manifestations of that wrong have changed, and are still in process of changing. Customs and practices associated with peace as well as war have been abandoned, never to be revived, and newer conceptions to be brought about by a more complete understanding of the laws

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they cannot get up a fight between one nation and another, the various parties in each republic will fight between themselves." Regarding the normal condition in Venezuela, Signor Caivano, an Italian lawyer, in a farewell address to the people after twenty years' life in that republic, said: "The curse of your civilization is the soldier and the soldier's temper. It is impossible for two of you, still less for two parties, to carry on a discussion without one wanting to fight. You regard it as a derogative of dignity to consider the point of view of the other side. You deem that personal valor atones for all defects. The soldier of evil character is more considered than the civilian of good character, and military adventure is deemed more honorable than honest labor. You overlook the worst corruption, the worst oppression in your leaders if only they gild it with military fanfaronade and declamation about bravery and destiny and patriotism. Not until there is a change in this spirit will you cease to be the victims of evil oppression. Not until your general populace refuse thus to be led to the slaughter in quarrels of which they know or care nothing, but into which they are led, because they, also, prefer fighting to work—not until all this happens will those beautiful lands, which are among the most fertile on God's earth, support a happy and prosperous people, living in contentment and secure possession of the fruits of their labor."

of life will change the mental attitude to war itself. We have an analogy in the brute creation. Naturalists tell us that without doubt the dog is descended from the wolf, so that here we have an animal among the most ravenous and bloodthirsty in the brute creation so transformed by being brought under the government of man that it has become a perfect synonym of fidelity, gentleness and kindness, and when man himself has learned the lesson of his dog by submitting himself to the government of his Divine Educator his relations to his fellows will be transformed as radically.

The things that have been will be, and, therefore, wars will continue, is an argument based on the previous argument regarding the fixity of human nature, but this argument is swept away by the distinct and specific forecast of human progress contained in the prophecy of Isaiah—a prophet whose other predictions have been fulfilled with such definiteness as to raise a question whether they could have been written after the event. This special prediction is: "He shall judge between the nations, and shall reprove many peoples: and they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." A similar prediction, in almost the exact terms, is made by the prophet Micah, and it is to be noticed that both refer to international relations in the "latter days."

If it is said, in rejoinder, that these events refer to the millennium, and to the time of the second advent of Jesus Christ, the reply may be made, who is to say whether that event is very near or very far? No one will know. If the drying up of the River Euphrates refers to the breaking up of the Turkish empire, as some able scholars have long held; and if the repeopling of Jerusalem and Palestine by the Jews —which is taking place before eyes of the world in a remarkable way—is the literal fulfilment of another well-

known prophecy, then the time for the abolition of war on an international scale may be closer than most of us imagine.*

CHAPTER II.

AMAZING GROWTH OF THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS—WORLD CONFERENCES AND THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING FOR THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

BUT suppose we reject the idea that there is any authority higher than the national governments now in existence, what amazing changes shall we find taking place in the world, and these—some of them political, some social, some economic, some relating to philosophy, science and industry—all tend to elevate the authority and power of the international mind and to subordinate that of the local and national.

Within the past third of a century the religious, scientific, economic and industrial associations have enlarged the scope of their periodical conventions from the national to the world-wide, and even the political bodies have followed the movement. Local and national

* The transformation of Palestine through Jewish immigration is one of the marvels of the past decade. A quarter of a century ago the population of Jerusalem was about 25,000, of whom about 5,000 were Jews; to-day its population is nearly 80,000, of whom over 50,000 are Jews. Once more the Jews are taking up land in Palestine, and already 50,000 hectares (about 124,000 acres) are under Jewish ownership.

conventions are still held, but the results are found to be best focused and concentrated in one great channel through an international union. There is scarcely a subject of interest to civilized man which this development has not affected, and in every case it tends to break down the barriers of nationality, just as the clans and tribes of past ages have been merged into the greater unit of the nation.

It is impossible to enumerate, in this brief sketch, the number and variety of these organizations of world-wide scope, to which additions are being made every month, but a few samples are here given:—

THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL.—This court consists of a panel of 130 eminent jurists, appointed by forty sovereign states, each state appointing from one to four members. There have been seven controversies tried and settled by the Tribunal, principal among which is the British North American fisheries case, which had been a bone of contention since 1818.

THE INTERNATIONAL PRIZE COURT.—Established by the Hague Conference in 1907, consists of fifteen judges appointed for six years. It is for the adjudication of cases of capture of neutral merchant ships and cargoes in time of war.

INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION.—This is a Parliament of Parliaments, and includes members of Parliaments who advocate the principle that the differences between states be decided by arbitration, just as the differences between individuals are submitted to courts of justice. It deals with all questions of public international law which are concerned with the maintenance of peace. Its practical object is to bring before the various Parliaments the problem of harmonizing international relations. Its headquarters are in Brussels, and at its conference in 1911 it passed a resolution in favor of the unhampered use of all waterways by the

ships of all nations, and urged the opening of the Panama Canal to vessels in peace and war.

INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (Institute of International Law).—Founded 1873 for the promotion of International Law, and to contribute towards the maintenance of peace and the observation of the laws of war.

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION.—Founded at Brussels 1873, for the study of International Law. Headquarters, London, Eng.

INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE LA PAIX (Institute of International Peace).—Founded 1903, with a view to publishing documents relating to International Law, the solution of international difficulties, statistics of war and armaments, and the development of international institutions. Office at Monaco.

CONCILIATION INTERNATIONALE (International Conciliation)—Founded by Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, member of the Hague Tribunal and Senator of France. Headquarters, Paris, France.

THE JEAN DE BLOCH FOUNDATION.—Created in 1902 for a period of ten years, to hold conferences and issue publications on the subject of modern warfare. Headquarters, Berne. Associated with the above is the Lucerne Museum of Peace and War, which was founded in 1902 to illustrate the results of armed peace and the consequences which would result from a European war.

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LEAGUE.—Founded in 1870 to advocate the settlement of all international disputes by arbitration, and the creation of a High Court of Nations for that purpose. Headquarters, London, Eng. Official organ, "The Arbitrator."

INTERNATIONAL PEACE BUREAU.—Founded by the third International Congress at Rome, 1891,

and consists of institutions, associations and individuals, to collect information on subjects common to the associations working for peace. It is directed by a commission of thirty-five members from different nations. Headquarters, Berne, Switzerland.

INTERNATIONALE ARBITRATION AND PEACE ASSOCIATION.— Established at London, Eng., 1880, for the objects indicated by its title. Organ, "Concord."

UNIVERSAL RACES CONGRESS.— Organized at London, Eng., July, 1911, for the discussion of matters affecting race problems in every part of the world.

NOBEL INSTITUTE.—Formed at Christiania, 1904, to watch the development of relations between peoples, and to advise the Nobel Committee in the distribution of Peace Prizes.

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION.—Established 1904 at Boston, Mass., by Edwin Ginn, who had founded an "International School of Peace." Devotes an annual income of $50,000 to issuing valuable information on international questions. One of its latest activities was in promoting the International Conference of Chambers of Commerce, held in Boston, September, 1912, and it aids the work of various peace and good-will organizations in America and elsewhere.

LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.—Founded in 1895 by Albert K. Smiley, at Mohonk Lake, N.Y., for the purpose of creating public sentiment in favor of arbitrating international differences. It holds annual conferences for discussion and report, and the meetings are largely attended by men of international repute on national relationships.

THE GARTON FOUNDATION.—This was founded in London in 1912 by Harold Harmsworth to

assist in propagating the views of Norman Angell, who is director of its educational work.

Besides many international associations for the promotion of the various sciences, arts and industries there are institutions and societies of a partially world-wide character, such as the Pan-American Bureau, with headquarters at Washington, for the promotion of friendly relations between the twenty-one republics of North and South America; the National Peace Council, London, Eng., composed of about 500 delegates representing over 180 bodies in sympathy with world peace movements; the Anglo-German Friendship Committee; the Associated Councils of Churches in the British and German Empires; Women's Anglo-German Friendship Union, and other organizations for promoting good relations between Great Britain and Germany; Inter-Parliamentary Union of the North, formed to promote good relations between Sweden, Norway and Denmark, etc.

There are in Great Britain and Europe over one hundred societies specifically devoted to the question of peace; about thirty in North and South America, and about twenty in other parts of the world.

One remarkable aspect of these movements is the progressive growth of their number and influence. From the years 1815 and 1816, when the first peace societies of the world were founded in the United States and England, down to 1866, only five international peace congresses and two other conventions were held relating to these questions.

But in 1867, the year of the Canadian Confederation, an international league of peace was founded by Victor Hugo, Garibaldi and Lemonier at Geneva, and a league of permanent peace at Paris by Fréderic Passy, and a third league in the United States by the American Friends. In the comparatively short interval since our confederation practically all the great international associations, such as those mentioned, have been formed;

and in the year 1911 131 conventions of various organizations of an international character were held.* More remarkable still, from 1899 to the beginning of 1912, 134 general treaties containing arbitration clauses have been concluded between various nations, plus fifty-six renewals of short-term treaties. Of these 134 treaties, over a hundred have been made in the past seven years.

With these astounding facts staring us in the face no gift of prophecy is needed to see Canada's opportunity. It only requires enough insight to estimate the force of the events now shaping themselves behind the present foreground of seeming obstacles. With an ear to the ground and an eye to the sky Canada may gather

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* There is now a "Union of International Associations," a kind of clearing-house or directory of societies and associations of all kinds, whose interests in each country have become linked by international reunions or conventions. The headquarters are at Brussels, and its first world's congress was held in 1910. The report of its last congress in 1912 shows that there are now over five hundred organizations holding international conferences, assemblies, or conventions. Statistics of the history of the international convention idea have been gathered, which show the progressive nature of their growth. These are taken by ten-year periods, and show the following known conventions:—

Ten-year Period.	World Conventions.
1840-9	9
1850-9	20
1860-9	77
1970-9	169
1880-9	309
1890-9	510
1900-9	1,070

enough to apprehend the secret of power on land and sea—to achieve success where all nations have hitherto failed. With the national motto of "Millions for Goodwill, not one cent for Force," Canada may be the chosen herald of the world's peace—the Nation of the second Annunciation.

CHAPTER III.

WAR AND PHYSICAL AND MORAL DEGENERACY.

IN a book called "The Human Harvest" Prof. David Starr Jordan, of the Leland Stanford University, of San Francisco, argues that the fall of Rome was due to a race decay brought about through the long drain of war and the consequent "survival of the unfit." The best blood of Rome was spilled in foreign wars, and there was left in Italy the weaker citizens to carry on the race, and this downward breeding and ceaseless wars went on till there remained only the physical "culls." "The sons of real men gave place to the sons of scullions, stable-boys, slaves, camp followers and the riff-raff of those the great, victorious army cannot use but does not exclude." The fall of Rome "was fixed at Philippi, when the spirit of domination was victorious over the spirit of freedom. It was fixed still earlier, in the rise of consuls and triumvirates and the fall of the simple, sturdy, self-sufficient race who would brook no arbitrary ruler. Then we read in Roman history of the rise of the mob and of the emperor, who is the mob's exponent. . . . The decline of a people can have but one cause—the decline in the type from which it draws its sires. A herd of cattle can degenerate in no other way than this, and a race of men is under the

same laws. . . . The seeds of destruction lie not in the race, nor in the form of government, nor in ambition, nor in wealth, nor in luxury, but in the influences by which the best men are cut off from the work of parenthood." The author quotes Dr. Otto Seeck as calculating that "Out of every hundred thousand strong men, eight thousand were slain. Out of every hundred thousand weaklings, ninety to ninety-five thousand were left to survive." The empire perished for want of men. To cultivate the Roman fields whole tribes were borrowed. "The barbarian settled and peopled the empire rather than conquered it. It was the weakness of war-worn Rome that gave the Germanic races their first opportunity. And the process is recorded in history as the fall of Rome."

Another writer* draws the same lesson of the effect of the war habit on the physique of people as instanced in the Highlands of Scotland, where to-day in some of the glens it is hard to find a six-footer, whereas generations ago there were few who did not stand more than six feet. This is his explanation:—

> "The toll taken from Ireland and from Scotland was not less wasting than from England. Every valley, every moor, every hamlet, every mountain glen—they all sent of their best, and their best never came back. In the Highland shires and islands of Scotland the loss was perhaps worst and most wasteful of all. Life there was rugged and hard. The weaklings died in infancy, and through the survival of the fittest there was bred their race of kilted giants. The Union Jack flies over no spot of earth that matched with its soldiers the Isle of Skye. No regiments ever brought greater

* Dr. James A. Macdonald in an address, "William T. Stead and His Peace Message."—World Peace Foundation Series.

glory to the flag or died more daringly for its honor than did the Scottish regiments in the kilted tartan. But at what a price, not to themselves alone, but to Scotland! The tragedy of the Celts is in this sentence: 'Forever they went out to battle and forever they fell.' The Grants stained the marble palaces of India vermillion with their blood and saved the honor of the race in the awful hour of the Mutiny, but few of their clan are left in 'their ain dear glen.' The 'Cameron's Gathering,' that rose wild and high on the march to Waterloo, would summon few of the Highland host to-day through the snows of Lochaber. No Chisholms are left in Strathglass. The Mackenzies are few at Loch-broom. In the gloaming glens of the West Highlands is a silence deep as death, where once a thousand men would start up in a night at the call of Argyll. No Lord of the Isles who sleeps at Iona could ever again gather a clan worthy his tartan, though he blew all night on the pibroch of Donald. From the days after Culloden on every battlefield where Saint George's banners flew the Scottish war-pipes sounded shrill and clear, and the reddest blood of Scotland was poured out without stint. But at what a cost!

"And the cost was not alone in the death of so many brave men who fell, but that those heroes in their youth and their prime left no breed behind. The heroic sires died with heroic sons unbred in their loins. It is the countless heroes who ought to have been, but are not—that never-ending phantom host who had no chance at life—had they taken the places left empty by the fall of their sires, the loss had not been so far beyond repair.

"In vain does Kipling try to reconcile us to Britain's irreparable loss by glorifying the lavish abandon of the sacrifices she made:—

'We have strewed our best to the weed's unrest,
To the shark and the sheering gull.
If blood be the price of Admiralty,
Lord God, we've paid in full.'

Paid in full! And the waste and burden of that toll is the nation's tragedy to-day. The blood that went to sharks and gulls might have been the seed of the Greater Britain."

Like deductions are made from the American civil war, where over a million of the best men of the young republic perished. "The other day I stood on the road over which Sherman marched through North Carolina, leaving behind a trail, not only of sorrow and loss, but of bitterness, which a half-century has not eradicated. This was the proud, sad boast of those North Carolinians, in whose veins is the blood of the Scottish Celt as untainted as my own: 'With only 115,000 voters in the state, we sent 128,000 soldiers, the flower of our men and boys, into the war, and on the fateful day at Gettysburg North Carolina drove the wedge of grey farthest into the ranks of blue, and left more dead behind than any other Southern state had, all told, on the field.' A sad, proud boast, indeed; but who can measure that irreparable human loss! And the full tale of your wages, North and South, was that, while your heroes and patriots fell in their youth, the bounty-jumpers and the skedaddlers, the self-seeking and the mercenary, the men who played politics with others' lives and the men who made fortunes out of war business—they all lived and flourished and reproduced their ilk to breed your grafters and bosses and bloated plutocrats of to-day."

Dr. Jordan mentions the remarkable case of degeneracy in human life in the valley of Aosta, in northern Italy, where a form of idiocy known as crétinism has

been perpetuated. It seems that the severe military laws in force in Switzerland, Savoy and Lombardy for many generations took the strongest peasants to the wars and left the goitrous and the idiot to carry on the affairs of life at home. Those who had goitre were exempt from military service, and the crétin always had the goitre, though why the two diseases went together is not known. These people became an object of charity, and a special asylum was established for their care, and, under this mistaken charity, crétin married with crétin, with the result that a new and repulsive type of human being has been developed. "In fair weather the roads about Aosta are lined with these awful paupers—human beings with less intelligence than the goose and less decency than the pig." And the asylum at Aosta is "a veritable chamber of horrors."

These are startling facts, and illustrate the law pronounced of old that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children. Such facts, however, require more investigation before one can draw such sweeping conclusions as to make the fall of Rome the sole result of physical degeneration. Certainly, no wise stock breeder would kill his best cattle and sheep for the market and reserve the weakest and scraggiest of his herds and flocks for breeding purposes, and there is an analogy in the law of human generation. But man is something more than a horse or an ox. He has the gift of reason and spiritual faculties which not only enable him to control the brute creation and his own animal impulses, but is able by these higher faculties to control the powers of nature. This is a kind of warfare with physical forces which requires no slaughter of his own kin or kind. There are men and women of frail physique who have been endowed with the greatest powers of soul; and moral courage in the individual has never been measured in feet and inches of stature. The Hebrews considered themselves insignificant in com-

parison with the Philistines and Canaanites, but the social vices of the latter were so filthy that the land "vomited them out." If all were determined by the physical basis of life, the Canaanites would never have been dispossessed. While these facts lead us to question the inference that physical degeneration is due entirely to war, regardless of the causes that lead to war, they stand certainly against the claim that war develops the manhood of a people.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FALL OF ROME AND ITS LESSONS TO MODERN NATIONS—THE SINS OF SODOM.

AS Rome was not built in a day it was not destroyed in a day, and Prof. W. S. Davis, in a work on the "Influence of Wealth in Imperial Rome," takes a wider survey of the causes of the decay of Roman power. Among these causes were the life of sensuality and love of wealth, which often had their issue in aggressive wars. And with the first cause was associated the decline of the birth rate under marriage, which is one of the ominous signs of the times among modern nations where wealth abounds. The inhabitants of the Roman Empire, says Prof. Davis, were taught that war was a thing for the government only; that all fighting must be done by a relatively small professional class called an army, and the army thus became more and more a class apart from the mass of the inhabitants. But "among the causes was the constant decline in population. The process of depopulation had been going forward in Italy since the second Punic War, when 15,000 of the flower of Italian youth fell at Trasemene

and 50,000 at Cannæ. The census shows that it took thirty years to repair the loss on paper; nothing could make good in reality the slain thousands and their lost posterity. The wars of the Republic were fearfully bloody, and probably did more than to reduce the population. If we may reason from the analogy of France after the drain of the Napoleonic wars, the actual physique of the Italian people was reduced. The strong had been killed off, the weaklings were left to propagate. In France in 1789 the average military height was 1.65 metres; in 1832 it was only 1.56 metres; and it would be hard to say that the wars against Carthage, Macedonia, and finally the civil wars, two generations later, were less exhausting than those of the French revolution." Families were restricted "in order to leave the children as rich as their parents. . . . Lucan, writing in Nero's day, complained that in many Italian towns most of the houses stood empty, most of the fields lay waste, because there were no persons to dwell in them or to till them. . . . The growth of luxury, the 'advantages of childlessness,' the low cost of prostitution," etc. Then there were the gladiatorial games, which was a system of war in a state of national peace. In the famous sham fight presented before Claudius, on Lake Fucinus, 19,000 men contended; and every swordsman slain was "an artisan lost to a society that sorely needed laborers; a potential father of a family lost to a society that even more needed fathers." Then there was the slaughter of the Jews by Vespasian and Titus, "wasting the lives of a race that could have given much to the Empire." . . . And so the barbarians at length destroyed a society that was more slowly destroying itself. Latifundia, slavery, the uprooting of the small farmers, bad systems of tillage, the excessive desire for wealth without regard to methods or of duty to posterity; the desire to avoid the cares and expenses of child-rearing; and downright sensuality were accom-

plishing their perfect work. First Italy, then a vast Empire, devoted itself for centuries to a feverish effort to get money by any means, and to spending that money on selfish enjoyments."

Low ideals, or the lack of ideals, are another assigned cause why the Western Roman Empire fell and why the Eastern Empire remained longer. "No state ever excluded the ideal from its national and social life so strictly as did Rome. It taught its prosaic commercialism to all its provinces. Its citizens served mammon in the place of God with more than usual consistency. The power they worshipped carried them a certain way—then delivered them over to their own rottenness and to the enemy. Their fall was great, for their Empire, with its social structure, still looms as the greatest fabric ever reared by human ingenuity; while the lesson of their fall lies patent to the twentieth century."

No doubt, in the case of Rome, there was an interaction between these various causes and the wars. Many of these wars, we know, were undertaken for the express purpose of getting fresh supplies of slaves to minister to the luxury of wealthy Romans, even in the time of the Republic; and Plutarch states that in ten years of Cæsar's operations in Gaul he killed a million and took captive a million out of the three millions who opposed him.

It would seem that these causes could all be summarized in the question of St. James: "Whence come wars and fightings among you?" and in his answer: Even of their own lust, covetousness, pride, love of pleasure, etc.

But from war, civil dissensions, anarchy, and providential visitations of punishment, such as plagues, famines, the destruction of cities, etc., we must go back to their germinating causes. This we learn from the disruption of the Hebrew Kingdom—to be considered in

the next chapter—after the boom days of Solomon, and from the denunciations against Jerusalem by the prophet Ezekiel. "This," he said of that city, "was the iniquity of thy sister, Sodom: pride, fullness of bread and prosperous ease was in her and in her daughters; neither did she strengthen the hand of the poor and needy." So that the bestial sensuality which was Sodom's culminating crime may have been the evolutionary outcome of the other evils, as war was, and still is, in other cases. "Fullness of bread and prosperous ease" are primitive phrases whose modern equivalents are the accumulation of wealth through the unjust exploitation of the labor of the poor, and the debasement of the higher faculties of man to mere material things. The greater the wealth of those in authority and the more it is sought as the great end of life the greater the efforts to protect it, and the greater the temptation to divert the labor of the masses to this object, in the name of loyalty and nationality. When we bring into Canada herds of uneducated foreigners, and, without a thought of their spiritual and mental betterment, use them only to add to the value of our stocks, bonds and lands, we are storing up similar troubles from which our children will suffer. And the more we forget the source of our wealth and centre our aims and hopes upon the wealth itself the more the nation is likely to be tempted to reduce the lives and labor of the masses to peonage in its protection. The logical tendency of all this is towards the war which it is our professed aim to prevent.

CHAPTER V.

NAVAL CAREER OF A GREAT NATION—THE SEQUEL.

IN that great storehouse of political knowledge, the Old Testament, which modern politicans have scarcely begun to draw upon, there are many facts that have a direct bearing on the present situation. In particular the condition of the chosen people under the reigns of David, Solomon and their immediate successors bears some striking analogies to the British Empire and to Germany, the United States and other countries at the present time. There are also some striking contrasts which point to a different outcome to that recorded in the past. The reign of David may, in some respects, be called the Elizabethan age of the Hebrews, that of Solomon the Victorian age. From a petty chief David became a great King. He made secure the possession of Jerusalem, and from every frontier of the territory of the twelve tribes he drove back his hostile neighbors. "The Philistines, the Moabites, the rising power of Syria, the predatory Edomites and Amalekites were thoroughly broken into submission."* In short, his Kingdom became one of the "great powers" of the time, and by a trade alliance with Hiram, King of Tyre, the great naval power of that age, he added a prestige which, though short-lived, had its influence in the national decline of Israel and in the transformation of the habits and character of the people of Judah. By this treaty David was to furnish wheat, oil, fruit, wine and cattle to Hiram and Hiram was to supply from the forests of Lebanon the timber for the new Temple at Jerusalem, and to raft the timber down the Mediterranean coast, and his architects and artisans, who were skilled far beyond the Hebrews,

*"Solomon: His Life and Times," by F. W. Farrar.

were to erect and embellish the structure. Though David was to make preparations for the building of the Temple, he was not allowed to have the honor—which above all other honors he would desire—of finishing and dedicating it. Why? "Because thou hast shed blood abundantly and hast made great wars; because thou hast shed much blood upon the earth in My sight."

And now Solomon succeeds to a Kingdom which had become famous alike for its political power, its material wealth and the heroism of its sovereign. "And the King made silver to be in Jerusalem as stones, and cedars made he to be as the sycamore trees that are in the lowland for abundance." The Kingdom took toll of the trade that passed between Egypt and Tyre, it levied on the caravan trade from Assyria and the countries to the east, and storage depots were built to accommodate the expanding imports, and cavalry and chariot stations followed. To further protect this trade, Tadmor (Palmyra) in the desert was built at great expense, and the cost and labor of carrying out these great enterprises was maintained by slave labor from raids made upon neighboring tribes. Then he built other cities, such as Hazor, Megiddo, and Gezer, for the protection of the increased trade, and erected a palace much more magnificent than the Temple itself. Such splendor could not be kept up except at the cost of new taxation, and we find for the first time an officer appointed "over the tribute" (levy, corvée, or forced labor). He multiplied his wives as he added to his trade, and the introduction of foreign princesses increased the number and extravagance of his courtly attendants. The amassing of wealth and the introduction of heathen rites into the Kingdom were both in violation of the Divine law. No doubt at this juncture attachés of King Hiram's court impressed Solomon with the vital importance of sea-power, which had given Tyre its enormous trade and political influence, for was it not

evident that without command of the sea Tyre could not have achieved her "due weight in the councils" of the empires of the east? At all events, King Solomon built a navy of his own, and established bases at Elath and Ezion-Geber, on the Edomite coast of the Red Sea, the shipbuilders, wharf-builders and sailors being generously furnished by his Imperial naval ally. From thence he was able to control the trade of Ophir (India), and an unprecedented supply of gold was the result. "And all King Solomon's drinking vessels were of gold, and all the vessels of the house of the forest of Lebanon were of pure gold (none were of silver); it was nothing accounted of in the days of Solomon. For the King had at sea a navy of Tarshish* with the navy of Hiram." The luxuries and extravagance of the King were imitated by his councillors and the elders or leaders of the people. Through their increasing wealth and "higher standard of living," the better classes of the Hebrews became averse to manual labor, and, after raiding the Canaanites and surrounding tribes until no fresh supplies of slaves could be brought in, new machinery had to be devised by Solomon and his councillors to keep up the demands of his establishments and provide for his new outlays. Officers were, therefore, appointed to organize a domestic levy, under which each tribe was required to furnish a "voluntary" contribution of a month's labor, each taking a month in turn. Thus the Hebrew nation took up the white man's burden. To satisfy the further demands of his increasing seraglio and the imposing civil service connected with it and with his army and charioteers, who were supplied from "store-cities," or military stations, he raised a loan from his ally, and

* The ships trading on the long voyage to Tarshish were the largest of the time, hence "ships of Tarshish" meant those of largest tonnage, a term equivalent to our phrase "ocean liner."

secured it by alienating a part of Galilee containing twenty towns—also a violation of the Mosaic law, which declared: "The land shall not be sold forever"—and under what dishonorable conditions! On going down to take possession of the new territory, Hiram, who bought the land for agricultural purposes to supply his navy, found it to consist of alternate stretches of sand hills and swamps. Hiram called it Cabul (the good-for-nothing land) and returned the property; but Solomon did not return the money. To maintain his grandeur he further increased his standing army, and added to the new force of charioteers—both in defiance of the law of Moses.* He came to the throne as the head of a people whom all the world respected for their integrity, their piety, and their exalted ideals of family life—he left a people who had lost those ideals in the race for wealth and in yielding to his own corrupting example. Till that period the Hebrews were an agricultural and a pastoral people, but the reign of Solomon transformed their habits and started them on that commercial career which was in part the cause of their immediate national decline, and the explanation of their entire disappearance as a people with a territorial home. Enemies arose even before Solomon's own death; the people were discontented from the increasing taxation, and it only needed the threat of new taxes to be imposed by his headstrong and arrogant son to raise the cry, "To your tents, O Israel!" to rend the Kingdom by a rupture that never was to be healed. What became of the Hebrew sea-power? Some of the ships went to the bottom of the

* The prohibition of a standing army was doubtless because of the temptation it afforded to commit wars of aggression. The use of chariots would be a further temptation for aggression, so common among foreign nations, as it would enable an army to cover long distances in making an attack.

Red Sea to keep company with the sunken chariots of that nation whose policy Solomon had so closely emulated, and the remnant were of no service by the time the Egyptian King Shishak had swept up the country from the south and plundered both Temple and palace.

What happened under Solomon was the strict fulfilment of the warning of the prophet (see Samuel viii. 10-20) when the people forsook the true God and demanded a King to "fight their battles." Whether it was social impurity, greed in trade, luxury and extravagance, ambition for power, or the oppressive taxation incident thereto, or all these combined, which led to war, that war was a retributive consequence, and in this case it was a civil war, not a foreign invasion, which shattered the national power

So, after all the accumulated evidence that history offers of the brutalities, the mental and physical sufferings and the unutterable domestic sorrows of war; after all the proof that the interests of reasonable and necessary trade are helped by peace and disrupted by war; after the full realization of the weary load that has to be carried by the toilers to keep up the preparations for war; and the failure of physical force to settle any moral question, our analyses is not complete till we take into account these other factors. It would seem, then, that war is not the primary evil of the world, but rather the sequence and culmination of other evils, the grand round-up of human sin. This is not to justify war, but only to confess that there are other evils perhaps worse in their nature of which war brings its retribution, and, sometimes, its redress.

We cannot get away from the fact that the Hebrew people were commanded to undertake certain wars, and in one case they were to exterminate a whole people. This was in the case of the Canaanites, who were occupying the country assigned to the people of Israel. This case seems a puzzle at first sight, as the extermination

of a nation sounds unmerciful. It may wear a different aspect when we look beneath the surface. These Canaanites had for scores of generations devoted themselves to unnameable abominations until they became a byword even to other heathen nations—Sodom itself could not furnish a parallel to their impious bestialities, and these practices, added to their brutal rites of religion, were of such a nature as would have made it impossible for the Hebrews to have settled and intermixed with them without the speedy corruption of their family life. Dr. Maclear points out that the Canaanites had warnings, repeated time after time for five hundred years; that an extra forty years was given them by the wanderings of the Israelites in the wilderness; that in the capture of Jericho every impulse to try military science and attack its towns was restrained in the Israelites, who were scarcely more than spectators of the event; that the conquerors were forbidden to appropriate to themselves the least benefit from the spoils; and that the strange halt at Gilgal was another chance for the people of Canaan. To sum up the situation, the Israelites "were repeatedly warned that they held the land on no other tenure than that which the Canaanites were destroyed for infringing." *

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* And as though this was not enough, as though no proof should be wanting that the campaign to be waged was not the victory of one nation over another, but God's controversy with degrading idolatry and unnatural and unbridled licentiousness, the invaders themselves, when they suffered themselves to be enticed into the orgies of Baal-peor, experienced a fearful punishment for their apostasy.—G. F. Maclear on the "Book of Joshua."

CHAPTER VI.

WAR UNDER THE MOSAIC CODE—UNDER THE CHRISTIAN CODE.

WHATEVER opinions may be held on this event, there is no question about the following laws, which were to govern the national relations of the Hebrews:—

1. Their Kings were not to "greatly multiply gold and silver.

2. Standing armies were contrary to the genius of Hebrew institutions. When the country was invaded calls were made for volunteers, who even found their own weapons and provisions, and when the enemy were driven off they returned to their homes. Saul's organization of a standing army ended in disaster, and David's military census was punished by a plague.

3. Their own religious usages made wars of conquest impossible. Those of David, annexing Edom, Moab, Syria and the Philistine territory, grew out of invasions of his Kingdom, and these lands had, moreover, been promised to the Israelites centuries before.

4. The use of horses and chariots was forbidden, and their prohibition was to prevent aggressive war, for without them a successful war on foreign territory would be impossible in that age. In this respect the horse and chariot were the prototype of the modern warship, which is a machine for doing damage at a distance.

Coming to the New Testament and to the person and teaching of Jesus Christ we find all that is recorded of Him to be against the use of physical force. The title, "Prince of Peace," was given to Him centuries before His advent. His birth was announced in a celestial chorus of "Peace on earth, good-will to men"; and one of the last acts of His earthly career was an em-

phatic disavowal of the use of physical force by others on His behalf. When Peter struck off Malchus' ear with a sword Jesus performed a miracle to restore the severed member to the high priest's servant on the instant—probably without the loss of a drop of blood—and the sentence uttered then is echoing round the world with ever-increasing solemnity of warning to the nations: "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword."

CHAPTER VII.

THE GREAT NAPOLEON ON WAR.

HERE let us bring forward the great Napoleon as a witness on the reformatory power of war. Here was a man the peer of Alexander and Cæsar in military genius, and perhaps their superior in political sagacity. He could handle men and armies as dexterously as Paderewski could finger the keys of a piano; and European kings and princes were toys in his hands. Books and reviews still come from the press in a perennial stream on the wonders of his career. In his exile at St. Helena Napoleon had time to review his life and work, and this is how he weighed his achievements in the balance with those founded on good-will:—

> "When conversing, as was his habit, about the great men of the ancient world, and comparing himself with them, he turned, it is said, to Count Montholon with the inquiry: 'Can you tell me who Jesus Christ was?' The question was declined, and Napoleon proceeded: 'Well, then, I will tell you. Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and I myself have founded great empires; but on what did these crea-

tions of our genius depend? Upon force. Jesus alone founded His empire upon love, and to this very day millions would die for Him. . . .I think I understand something of human nature, and I tell you, all these were men, and I am a man; none else is like Him; Jesus Christ was more than man. I have inspired multitudes with such an enthusiastic devotion that they would die for me . . . but to do this it was necessary that I should be visibly present with the electric influence of my looks, of my words, of my voice. When I saw men and spoke to them, I lighted up the flame of self-devotion in their hearts . . . Christ alone has succeeded in so raising the mind of man towards the Unseen that it becomes insensible to the barriers of time and space. Across a chasm of eighteen hundred years Jesus Christ makes a demand which is beyond all others difficult to satisfy. He asks for that which a philosopher may often seek in vain at the hands of his friends, or a father of his children, or a bride of her spouse, or a man of his brother. He asks for the human heart; He will have it entirely to Himself; He demands it unconditionally; and forthwith His demand is granted. Wonderful! In defiance of time and space, the soul of man, with all its powers and faculties, becomes an annexation to the Empire of Christ. All who sincerely believe in Him experience that remarkable supernatural love towards Him. This phenomenon is unaccountable; it is altogether beyond the scope of man's creative powers. Time, the great destroyer, is powerless to extinguish this sacred flame; time can neither exhaust its strength nor put a limit to its range. This it is which strikes me most; I have often thought of it. This it is which proves to me quite convincingly the divinity of Jesus Christ."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE GREAT EAST, THE GREAT WEST AND THE PROBLEM OF REPLENISHING THE EARTH.

AT the mention of the "Yellow Peril" we are naturally led to think of the effect of migrations from continent to continent. The white races have had possession of Europe for a long period; they have taken possession of North America and Oceania and are predominant in South America, while they are political rulers of Africa. Asia is the home of the yellow races, and, while that continent has about three-tenths of the land surface of the world, it bears a population of three-fifths of the human race—that is, about 900,000,000 out of the total human population of 1,600,000,000. The population of Europe is 106 per square mile and that of Asia 58 per square mile, but there are large areas of Asia quite devoid of human inhabitants, while in some of those parts that are settled the population is high as 560 per square mile. The most densely peopled part of Europe is Belgium with about 600 people per square mile at present, but in the Japanese islands, if we leave out those mountainous areas that are untillable by reason of their precipitous and rocky nature, we have a population of about 1,000 per square mile. One writer gives the good agricultural area of Japan at only 19,000 square miles, which would give a density of 2,360 people per square mile. Africa at large has 11 people to the square mile; the two Americas a little over 9 per square mile and Oceania less than 2 per square mile; so that, taking the continents altogether, there are just about twice as many inhabitants per square mile in Asia as in the rest of the world. In spots the world is over-crowded; speaking at large, it is not; but the pressure is greatest in Asia. The question then arises, Is the disposition

which the white races have recently shown to pen the yellow races within Asia a just or wise one, and can the territorial divisions of mankind be fixed by common agreement? Or will the intercourse between peoples, now growing so steadily, continue in greater ratio until by gradual intermarriage a single type of mankind is produced compounded of all the races now on earth?

The last question would be answered in the negative if the present race antipathies have their foundation in any Divine instinct or sanction. Neither question has been studied with thoroughness by men of knowledge. but the first question is one which must be considered seriously by the thinkers of both white and yellow races if a perilous conflict is to be averted. This much can be said to start on: the civilization of the white races is in the main a Christian civilization, and Christianity claims to be of universal application and destined for universal acceptance. Its theory compels the European and American peoples to seek and to find a solution of the territorial problem on the basis of good-will, and not by the self-defeating instruments of war. If the Anglo-Saxon nations had not coerced the Asiatics into intercourse with themselves there might now be some excuse for an attitude of non-intercourse, but the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon nations imposed themselves upon China and Japan by force of arms; and since then Christian missions have had a powerful influence in the awakening of Japan and Korea and in the re-birth of China.

Christianity is before Asia on trial through its representatives, the nations of Europe and America. If these western nations, for their own selfish ends, do violence to the rights of the Asiatic nations, what may we expect when accounts have to be balanced? What, also, will be the effect of western wrong-doing upon the Oriental mind when they consider Christianity as a religion to be adopted by themselves from its western

exemplars? Suppose that, after outraging the natural rights of Asiatics on Asiatic ground, two great Christian nations, like Germany and Great Britain drench their own land in blood over some question of territory or trade, how will it strike these eastern peoples? They can reason as acutely as western people, and they would be apt to conclude: "If this is the effect of applied Christianity on the European people themselves, we will have none of it."

The Christian nations of Europe and America are surely reaching a crisis. This is the White Peril, indeed, and the men of Nineveh seem to rise up in our condemnation.* This is certain, that the existence of these people of the east is a part of the plan of the ages, and the natural increase of this division of mankind is no blind and purposeless process. And if it is a Divine decree that these swarms of humanity should have more room in the earth, or are to hold some new relationship to the white races not now recognized or admitted, we may be sure that all the armies and navies of the rest of the world put together will not avail to thwart the plan.

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* "And the people of Nineveh believed God, and they proclaimed a fast, and put on sackcloth, from the greatest of them even to the least of them. And the tidings reached the King of Nineveh, and he arose from his throne, and laid his robe from him, and covered him with sackcloth and sat in ashes. And he made proclamation, and published through Nineveh by the decree of the King and his nobles, saying: Let neither man nor beast, herd nor flock, taste anything, let them not feed nor drink water; but let them be covered with sackcloth, both man and beast, and let them cry mightily unto God; yea, let them turn everyone from his evil way, and from the violence that is in their hands."

CHAPTER IX.

SEA POWER AND COMMAND OF THE SEA—WHAT NAVAL POWER CAN DO AND WHAT IT CANNOT DO—SOME ILLUSIONS REGARDING "COMMAND OF THE SEA."

"SEA power," "Sovereignty of the Seas," "Command of the Sea," "Predominant Naval Force," "Empire of the Sea," "Control of the Sea." These are recently coined phrases, which, next to the thunder of a broadside of fourteen-inch guns, are designed to awe the mind of the man in the street into a dumb acquiescence in some law, newly re-discovered, but immutable and eternal. Once these awful phrases are pronounced a note of interrogation may be regarded as a symbol of blasphemy, yet dare we ask what imperishable principles are hidden therein?

What do we mean by "command" or "control" of the sea? Is it that we propose that a man or a nation or a combination of nations shall sit like Canute on the shore and forbid the tides to rise; or that we seek to stretch booms across the Atlantic and Pacific to abolish the billows and declare all cyclones contraband? Or has the maritime power of some nation been so augmented that an edict is to be issued to the edible fish of the Seven Seas commanding them, on pain of being bombarded or dynamited, to assemble in "home waters" and there remain till consumed? None of these supernatural powers are at present asserted. But what "command of the sea" does mean is that one nation may assemble such forces for destroying human life on the sea that it can coerce some other nation or nations into changing or retaining their form of government, or that it can, upon its own will, cripple or destroy the peaceful

commerce of such nation. It is usually the latter purpose that is spoken of, and to this end the various naval nations of the world are now spending over $750,000,000 a year. This outlay is described as an insurance of sea-commerce. Sea-commerce is a system of conveying across the ocean between the various countries the produce and materials needed for the life and comfort of the inhabitants of the earth. All the civilized nations are both willing buyers and willing sellers of these products and raw materials—in fact, the people cannot live without them under present industrial conditions. So that the commercial definition of "Sea Power" and the "Control of the Sea" is a system by which we spend our $750,000,000 a year to secure the power to destroy that without which no modern nation can exist. This is insurance as laid down by some high naval authorities; but it is not based on the theory of mercantile insurance. In fire insurance the companies protect the insured from loss by fire, but they do not do it by taking the power themselves to destroy the property of their own clients. That is only done in international politics.

Another definition of sea power is that it is a visible demonstration of offensive power by warships whose purpose is to maintain the peace of the world. This means that if the peace is maintained it is through fear, because the force in question is a physical force. Is there any permanent peace based on fear? And this fear is not always on one side. The side using the most machinery and spending the most money is likely to experience fear also, since it has most to lose.

Again, can command of the sea—meaning by sea, the oceans of the world—really be exercised by any nation? All the ocean outside the three-mile limit is open to all nations. "It has become an uncontested principle of modern international law," says Hall in his treatise on that subject, "that the sea, as a general rule, cannot be subjected to appropriation." This freedom

may be abrogated in localities where two navies meet in war, but war is not the normal condition, it is the exceptional condition of ocean traffic now, and "it is beyond the resources of any nation to carry on war with an equal nation for more than a few months. Then the lanes of traffic are open again and cannot be closed except through commercial competition. This has nothing to do with sea-power, for the nation with the less sea-power may have the greatest elements of success in commerce."* "Control of the sea" is a phrase which does not express an accomplishable fact or feat, because at the present time no one nation's navy can make itself master of the whole seas, and if it could the whole world would rise in protest and execration. We refer, of course, to the stoppage of commerce.

The truth is that ocean traffic has become a gulf stream which, within a comparatively few years, has spread in wider volume between every continent and island direct, and no longer flows concentrically upon England. Each year widens this stream and varies its flow and reflow, and the civilized world is so united by the sea, outside of Anglo-Saxon commerce, that the interruption of its necessary communications becomes intolerable, no matter what the "sea power" of any nation. The cold logic of this change is being forced upon the thinking men of Great Britain. In the shrinking of the area of effective "control" of the British navy to the home waters and the North Sea we have a visible demonstration of the fallacy of "command of the sea" in the sense in which it is being defined by the advocates of force. But supposing all the resources of the British Empire were put to accomplish this kind of control, it would not be worth while, seeing that the freedom of the sea is becoming just as essential to every possible friend or enemy as to herself.

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* Prof. David Starr Jordan on "Sea-Power."

CHAPTER X.

WHAT THE VOICE OF NATURE TELLS OF THE SEA.

WHAT does the voice of Nature say of the sea and its relation to the human race? If one were to drop down from another planet, and, taking the wings of the morning, pass the whole globe under review, one would find nearly three-quarters of its surface covered with salt water. Why this great waste of water with so little land? Because the vast surface is required so that the sun's heat may raise enough cloud and moisture to supply rain to the continents. Without this immense evaporating pan the gardens of the earth would be as barren as the crater-scarred ranges and cracked plains of the moon. The sea, then, is the mother and nurse of all land life as well as the generator of those illimitable varieties of animal and vegetable life brought forth within her own bosom. Her mists, which furnish the boreal pole with its glaciers and wastes of snow, give movement and purity to the air of other zones, while her clouds shield the southern toiler from the torrid heat. None so strong as can defy her anger; and yet how gentle and soothing to the nerve-racked soul or the feeble invalid, to whom her ozone breath gives new life and hope where physicians fail. She no longer divides and estranges mankind; the siren music of her waves is borne to every zone and interpreted into the one meaning, in every language—"I unite." The sea is herself a unity, for her waters are nowhere entirely cut off from each other. The purifier of the air of all the earth, and the never-failing restorer of the healthful balance of nature's elements, she bears her blessings with impartial generosity to every clime and to every race and condition of men. Her universality and her

motherhood of every land by cloud and rain stand as a perpetual reproof of the petty factions, discords and jealousies of nations.

Of the sea Hamilton Wright Mabie says in his "Life of the Spirit": "The sea has been the friend of man in a special and peculiar sense. It has not only fed and clothed him and made a highway for him, but it has invited him to do heroic deeds, and it has stirred his imagination generation after generation. Its perils have seemed to invest the rewards it offered with a compelling charm for the daring and adventurous; its spell has wrought on the most heroic spirits. The first sailors were explorers, and, therefore, heroes. No charts traced their course for them; no lights burned on strange coasts to guide their perilous ways; no bells tolled on dangerous reefs, or were rung by the swing of the waves. They were beset with unknown perils; but their galleys bravely broke the solitude of the Mediterranean, passed beyond the Pillars of Hercules into the vast outer sea and through a thousand perilous years crossed and recrossed that sea, until it has become a lighted highway of commerce. The story of the Sirens seems so probable that one who loves the sea is often tempted to accept it as history. Voices are always calling from out the distance and the shifting mists; voices full of a wonderful music, with tones that set the heart vibrating, and echo in the imagination like the sounds of a vaster world. That music has lured many to the fury of the devouring seas, but it has invited more to brave deeds and splendid achievements. The sea has a nobler melody than the song of the Siren; out of its deeps there rises the great music of freedom, faith and courage. . . . The song of the sea, which rises and falls with the tide along the shores of the world, is the song of life for hearts that grow cold in the selfishness of mere comfort, for the imagination that loses its larger reach in the sensuous warmth of fruitful valleys. Far inland that song is

heard by those who are in peril of becoming the children of a day instead of the sons of God. . . . And how beautiful the sea is! With what radiancy of color, what soft loveliness, what splendor of light, God has clothed it as with a garment! The land has its majesty of mountain outline, its endless charm of varying form, but the sea is all motion, atmosphere and changing light. Its voice seems to come from far beyond the horizon, and all its beauty is steeped in mystery. The land reveals its sources of use and charm; one feels that he may count and possess them; but the sea hides and baffles and eludes. Its secret is never told; one never becomes familiar with it; it make its appeal always to the imagination, never to the memory."

But the sea is more than a voice of nature to all mankind. Its illimitable reach of influence, its inscrutable mystery suggest the question: "Is it not a symbol of that mystery which encircles man's life as the sea encircles its islands? A mystery sometimes of darkness and storm, and sometimes of unsearchable light and splendor; the mystery of forces not yet mastered, of elements not yet comprehended, of a world vaster and more wonderful than that in which we build our homes and plant our gardens?"

The grandest thought in Byron's grand hymn to the ocean is this, that the sea is a reflection of the Almighty himself:—

Thy shores are empires, changed in all save thee—
Assyria, Greece, Rome, Carthage, what are they?
Thy waters wasted them while they were free,
And many a tyrant since; their shores obey
The stranger, slave or savage; their decay
Has dried up realms to deserts—not so thou,
Unchangeable, save to thy wild waves' play,
Time writes no wrinkle on thy azure brow—
Such as creation's dawn beheld thou rollest now.

Thou glorious mirror where the Almighty's form
Glasses itself in tempests; in all time,
Calm or convulsed; in breeze or gale or storm,
Icing the pole, or in the torrid clime
Dark heaving—boundless, endless and sublime—
The image of Eternity, the throne
Of the Invisible; even from out thy slime
The monsters of the deep are made; each zone
Obeys thee; thou goest forth dread, fathomless, alone.

"The sea is His, and He made it," is a frequent acknowledgment in various forms by the inspired prophets, and the special blasphemy for which the prophet Ezekiel was moved to denounce the great maritime power of Tyre was that that Kingdom claimed the sovereignty of the seas by right of its own will. "Because thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said: 'I am a god, I sit in the seat of God, in the midst of the seas'"

Thus, the first needs of all created life, the voice of universal nature, and the authority of Holy Writ all constrain us to one common confession, that the "command of the sea" is the sovereign right of its Creator alone. Is it not folly towards men, insanity towards Heaven, that any two or three nations should be preparing to "incarnadine the multitudinous seas" upon a phantasmal claim of its control in their own right? Tyre made this blasphemous claim, but what was the end of Tyre? So complete an extinction of her commercial and political power that the exact site of the older of the two cities has not been determined by explorers to this day. Dominion over the lower animals of land and sea was allowed to mankind at large, and the use of land and sea was permitted for this purpose, but to no nation or class was ever committed such universal dominion over their fellowman as is implied in command of the sea. It will be better for Great Britain and Germany to follow the example of Nineveh by appointing a day of fasting and humiliation than to outdo Tyre in its monstrous assumption of the attributes of Omnipotence.

THE CALL FOR MILLIONS.

Millons for Dreadnoughts, nothing for poverty!
Millions for slavery, nothing for slaves!
To princeling exploiter, surrender earth's property—
Millions for nothing, to sink in the waves!

Halt not to reason why—yield up your treasures—
Reason would break the spell binding you fast:
Jingoists call for blood, offer hell's pleasures—
Give your life, give your all, give to the last.

Turn from the paths of peace, think of war's glory—
Widows and orphans to weep for the slain;
Ignorant feuds shall need bayonets gory—
Plutocrats urge it, your loss is their gain.

Millions for Dreadnoughts, nothing for poverty!
Millions for Moloch, for Jesus a cent!
Heed not a praying world—license its robbery—
In the whirlwind of nations find time to repent.

Ben Cosman.

LONGFELLOW ON WAR.

(A poem written after a visit to the arsenal at Springfield.)

This is the Arsenal. From floor to ceiling
Like a huge organ, rise the burnished arms;
But from their silent pipes no anthem pealing
Startles the villages with strange alarms.

Ah! what a sound will rise, how wild and dreary,
When the death-angel touches those swift keys!
What loud lament and dismal Miserere
Will mingle with their awful symphonies!

I hear even now the infinite fierce chorus,
The cries of agony, the endless groan,
Which, through the ages that have gone before us,
In long reverberations reach our own.

On helm and harness rings the Saxon hammer,
Through Cimbric forest roars the Norseman's song,
And loud, amid the universal clamor,
O'er distant deserts sounds the Tartar gong.

I hear the Florentine, who from his palace
Wheels out his battle-bell with dreadful din,
And Aztec priests upon their teocallis
Beat the wild war-drums made of serpent's skin.

The tumult of each sacked and burning village;
The shout that every prayer for mercy drowns;
The soldier's revels in the midst of pillage;
The wail of famine in beleagured towns;

The bursting shell, the gateway wrenched asunder,
The rattling musketry, the clashing blade;
And ever and anon, in tones of thunder,
The diapason of the cannonade.

Is it, O man, with such discordant noises,
With such accursed instruments as these
Thou drownest nature's sweet and kindly voices,
And jarrest the celestial harmonies?

Were half the power that fills the world with terror,
Were half the wealth bestowed on camps and courts,
Given to redeem the human mind from error,
There were no need of arsenals or forts.

The warrior's name would be a name abhorred
And every nation, that should lift again
Its hand against a brother, on its forehead
Would wear forever more the curse of Cain!

Down the dark future, through long generations,
The echoing sounds grow fainter and then cease,
And like a bell with solemn, sweet vibrations,
I hear once more the voice of Christ say, "Peace!"

Peace! and no longer from its brazen portals
The blast of war's great organ shakes the skies!
But beautiful as songs of the immortals,
The holy melodies of love arise.

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